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INTERNATIONAL RELATION

In Question & Answer form

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FOREWORD

This book consists of two parts. The first part concerns International Relations as a discipline. Contemporary theories and doctrines which are necessary for an understanding of world politics have been discussed in this part. The second part provides a study of some major international developments of the period following 1919. It involves an attempt at analyzing some important events and their impacts and implications which build up the panorama of contemporary world politics. All these discourses come in the form of answers to questions. They show how to write answers and what to write in it. They also point out how systematically facts can be marshalled and how nicely a problem in the field of International Affairs can be approached from a detached, neutral and objective standpoint without ever committing to any doctrinaire interpretation. Above all, they show how brevity can be maintained in any approach, however difficult it is. Composed of these features a book of this kind may humbly address itself to any student who reads International Relations under the grim shadow of examination. This book is prepared in accordance with the syllabi of different examinations of different Universities and also of different competitive examinations. Its manuscripts have been revised by R. Sengupta without whose help the book would not have reached the mass of students seething under the threat of examinations. Assistance also came from Prof. N. C. Dutt and Mr. S. Bhattacharya. Mention must also be made of Mr. P. K. Sen and Mr. S. K. Sen whose generosity sustained my effort in many a prosaic moment. I owe all of them a world of gratitude.

Calcutta

B. Ghosh

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INTERNATIONAL RELATION

PART ONE

THEORY

PART ONE

THEORY

Q. 1. Write a brief note on the problem of scope and definition of International Relations.

In a general sense the term International Relations embraces all intercourse among national societies and all movements across national frontiers. It implies processes at a given time and in a given context by which national societies adjust their mutual interests. This is a broad definition and cannot indicate the precise of scope of the subject as a discipline.

A list of other attempts to supply the deficiency has been equally ineffectual. Those who believe that the discipline concerns relations among States essentially ignore the fact that "States are not monolithic blocs and that within them and often side by side with them, individuals and ideological or interest groups are the real decision-makers."

Viewed from the stand-point of powers the discipline has been described as dealing with those relations among nations which involve the power of States. Such a definition suffers from its ambiguity. Whether a certain activity involves the power of States is not always obvious. In the nineteenth

century the commercial pursuits of the citizens of a nation did not normally concern State power but in modern times they do and in either case international relations came to be largely governed by them.

International Relations cannot also be defined as "relations between powerful groups." In that case the discipline assumes a broad dimension and the need would soon arise to distinguish the relations that are political from the others.

The 'operational definition' suggested by Hoffmann makes more sense. "The discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and the activities which affect the external policies and the power of the basic units into which the world is divided." Such a definition clears the area of confusion and offers a more or less workable approach to the study of International Relations. It will accept the United Nations as a subject for discussion but not the World Meteorological Organisation. It indicates an area of inquiry but does not reveal the essence of the subject. That is why it is useful as an approach to the field 'whose scope is in constant flux'.

Q. 2: Describe the scope of International Relations as an autonomous discipline.

International Relations maintain a degree of autonomy both as an area of human activity and as an intellectual discipline. If discipline implies a consciousness with regard to the unity of the subject, International Relations can be regarded "as a largely autonomous field within the sprawling and loose science of politics."

Two points decisively concern the discipline. First, International Relations as a field can be sufficiently distinguished for all analytical purposes. Such relations owe their character to their decentralized milieu. Absence of supreme political authority distinguishes international from national spheres. In international spheres power is

fragmented into competing or independent groups and each holder of that power is a sovereign unit. Thus the reality of the co-existence of supreme and sovereign multiple units is the basic truth out of which International Relations derive their character. Sometime empires are born out of a fusion of such units but an empire is always " 'a creation of force artificially superimposed upon a multiplicity of unwilling national societies', not the realization of a community which transcends such societies."

The absence of a supreme and a generally accepted authority explain why the rules governing international politics differ so radically from those of domestic politics. The groups into which the world is divided owe their loyalty to the groups rather than to the world as a whole. Even in the period when an ideal of unity transcended national boundaries like the concept of the christian community, power essentially remained fragmented. Such ideals have never been the expression of a supreme temporal power. At their best they could exercise certain restraints on the actions of the groups.

Manning explains the difference in perspective between international and national politics. The former, he says, begins with the context and is then directed to the content. It is concerned with environment and consequently the inter-relatedness of everything within. The latter starts with the basic unit and then moves to the setting. It concerns individual organism with its relations with everything without.

This difference in perspective can be explained by an analogy. A country's policy with regard to its nature can be explained from the perspective of either domestic affairs or international developments. The first standpoint would admit internal tensions as the cause and external insecurity as the condition for any country's decision to attack its neighbours while the alternative view-point would go the reverse way.

It is worth noting that International Relations as a discipline do not admit as a model the image of the integrated community which seems to be the implicit model on which political scientists and sociologists operate in their field. Modern States are characterized by the existence of a national organization of power directed to a common purpose and assisted by a bureaucracy and the rule of law. The internal inconsistencies of a society are resolved on certain points of agreement on fundamentals which ensure the equilibrium of a system. International politics has no such system to deal with and International Relations largely become prone to deal with the process of adjustment of this integrated system to the decentralised international milieu. The study of International Relations take this adjustment either as a norm for analysis or as a goal.

A common defect in the study of International Relations arises out of a systematic misapplication of the model of integrated system to decentralised milieu of international politics. It will equally be an error to consider domestic politics as a by-product of world politics, though domestic politics cannot stand in isolation from international developments. Hoffmann writes: "One of the crucial features and paradoxes of politics today is that whereas internal politics are conditioned and affected by world problems more than ever before, the foreign policies of nations remain largely dictated by the domestic experience and by the nation's image of itself." International developments might become domestic issues but a nation's reaction to them on international stage depends upon its domestic experience and its own image. The difficulty of unscrambling domestic issues from world problems is no argument against treating International Relations as an autonomous discipline; it only shows that have to build up an "architectonic conception of our discipline."

Q. 3. Write a brief note on the problem of terminology in International Relations.

The terms 'International Politics' and 'International Relations' are so frequently used that they have become more or less two interchangeable expressions. To modern students of political behaviour this is a fallacy. A failure to appreciate the somewhat subtle but fundamental difference between international affairs and diplomacy has contributed to the semantic confusion in the present-day study of International Relations. These students insist that international politics must have a contracted connotation in being concerned only with the politics of international community. Such a discipline centres on diplomacy and takes into account the relations among States and other political units. As against it International Relations embrace "the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society, and forces, pressures, and processes which determine the way men live and act and think."

In the rank of those who agree on this subtle distinction there is a sharp conflict over the role of international politics in International Relations. Some assign international politics a major role while others make it subservient to other forces of world environment.

The logic in recognising "International Relations" as a broader term than international politics appears to be sound. Such a distinction offers the basis on which new insights may be explored to understand the care of the subject. When international politics is confused with International Relations, one just stresses that the relation of States fall within the purview of political science which has given birth to this discipline.

Q.4. "Ideology is probably the most important factor that affects the international milieu."—Discuss.

Broadly speaking ideology means a system of abstract ideas held by individuals. These ideas explain reality and express value goals. They always carry with them certain

programme of action which directs to the creation of an order which will contain their fulfilment. This definition indicates the bearing of ideologies in International Relations.

Ideologies in international politics are important in so far as they provide justification and rationalisation to any policy of a society. Truly speaking ideologies perform dual functions in international politics. Either they provide goals for political actions or they conceal all manifestations of a struggle for power. In the first case ideologies themselves become transformed into objectives for the realisation of which political power is sought while in the other case they merely provide the false front behind which elements of power are concealed.

The influence of ideology on human behaviour has become a widely contested theme. Taking ideology as a major determinant of International Relations, F. S. C. Northrup writes that the problems emerging out of conflicting ideologies must be admitted into our consideration and resolved otherwise conflicting ideas would neutralise human aspirations and generate misunderstanding and war in place of peace and understanding. Jeremy Bentham entertained opposite view. To him ideologies are "fig leaves of the mind" necessarily used to justify human behaviour while concealing the ulterior motives behind it.

In the camp of those who admit the influence of ideology on International Relations there is no agreement as to how it does so. Communists for example argue that Marxism-Leninism is anti-imperialistic and democratic ; Western observers see it as inherently authoritarian and aggressive. Again Communists contend that 'bourgeois capitalism' produces war whereas its exponents call it 'democratic capitalism' and consider it as instrument of international peace and co-operation. Thus the difficulties surrounding ideological problems mainly originate from the basic difference in outlook. Three factors are chiefly responsible for all difficulties : the nature of ideologies,

complexities in the task of measuring the relative weight of several influences of which ideology is only one ; and finally impassioned and extreme claims made for and against any ideology.

It should be noted that the capacity of ideology to influence international behaviour varies directly with the passage of time and changing conditions. Whether ideologies will be permitted to determine objectives depends upon how the contents of ideology has been reshaped to suit its priorities. However, one thing is certain. Ideology, whether stable or in transition, influences the setting of objectives of a policy. In the words of Schleicher "ultimate foreign policy goals are probably affected more than all those lower in the ends-means hierarchy. This is true because the former are related more directly to ultimate ideological values goals, such as the preservation of the nation state and the protection and expansion of ways of life—for example democracy, communism and fascism." Sometimes it so happens that the ideologies of leaders and influential citizens go as a part of the internal setting, into the making of policy-ends. Ideas held by the leaders of dictatorial governments or formidable public opinion in a democracy enter into the shaping of foreign policy ends.

"Ideology is probably most important in international affairs, as it determines and is a part of the setting within which decision-making takes place." In this capacity ideology seems to have two different characteristics. In the first place some ideologies may be divisive among nations. A case in point is nationalism which has been referred to as the 'justifying ideology of a nation-state' offering a system of "symbols of justification for the acts of a State", by these symbols "the State-organized cohesiveness of a nation are advanced and justified." As against this we can name communism as an integrating force in the present world, a force which has been regarded as conducive to co-operative behaviour.

Finally it should be noted that "the resources to the decision-making in conducting external relations are affected by ideology". This is happened in two ways. "First, it may influence the proportion and the form in which resources of the group are made available to the decision-makers." "Secondly, ideology may affect, either or adversely, the total resources of a State." In either way, however, ideology becomes a determinant factor of foreign policy objects. In this capacity it becomes a formidable factor offering international milieu.

Q. 5. Describe after Morgenthau the different types of ideologies and explain their relation with the struggle for power.

Morgenthau divides ideologies into three categories. These categories admit "typical ideologies" which influence foreign policy. "Ideologies of the status quo" belong to the first category. These ideologies consist of the principles of International Law and Peace. Peace is one of the goals of International Law and therefore, pacifism is the basic element in the loyalty to International Law. This pacifism is opposed to any disturbance in the status quo and thereby to any element of change. Adherence to such ideologies will therefore, be in the interest of these powers which are favourably placed in the existing system. By these principles revision of existing territorial distribution or political arrangements is ruled out.

These ideologies are contradicted by a second set of ideologies which justifies changes in the status quo. These are the "ideologies of imperialism." They stand on the negation of existing arrangements and aim at bringing about new order. In different circumstances these ideologies take different shape, i. e., demand for equality on behalf of an injured state (Hitler's repudiation of the Versailles Settlement), demand for colonial possessions (Mussolini's conquest

of Abyssinia), 'the white man's burden' (Western colonial control over Asia and Africa), Liberty-Equality-Fraternity (expansionist wars of Revolutionary France), etc.

To the third category belongs all 'ambiguous ideologies' which may be used for both just and unjust causes, for their susceptibility to political and circumstantial twists. When President Wilson enunciated the doctrine of national self-determination he had little idea as to the use of the doctrine which Hitler made for territorial expansion at the cost of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. "Rarely, if ever, has modern history offered a more striking example of the importance of ideologies in international politics and of the confounding effect of an ambiguous ideology aptly employed."

These ideologies have a definite relation with the struggle for power. Morgenthau's analysis starts with the contention that manifestation of all politics, domestic or international, do not appear as what they actually are—manifestations of a struggle for power. He says, "the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalisations." He thus drives home the idea that power is the basic force in all politics and international relations are simply its reflection.

This power-motive is of course concealed and this concealment is intended for both domestic and foreign consumption. Morgenthau argues that "the actor on the political scene cannot help 'playing an act' by concealing the true nature of his political actions behind the mask of a political ideology." "While all politics", he says, "is necessarily pursuit of power, ideologies renders involvement in that contest for psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience."

Ideologies fulfil a dual function in international politics. Either they provide the ultimate object for the fulfilment of which political power is sought. In other words they become the goals of political actions. Looking from the opposite angle they become the pretexts and false fronts to

conceal the element of power which is inherent in all politics. Ideologies can perform these functions severally or both at the same time and in the process they become invariable weapons in the struggle for power on the international scene.

The foregoing analysis leads to the following conclusion : "Ideologies are essentially irrational ; they have a considerable emotional content ; they can be used to obscure the real facts of a situation or the real motives of ambitious leaders ; they can be appealed to by extremists and thus make reasonable approaches and compromises difficult and even impossible ; they frustrate efforts to find areas of agreement ; they make it hard to deal with international problems without undue sacrifice of national honour or prestige ; they turn international conferences into propaganda forums instead of opportunities for the accommodations of diplomacy." All these show that ideologies cannot curb struggle for power. They stimulate and aggravate it.

Q. 6. What is nationalism ? Indicate its role in the development of international society.

Nationalism is a word with high latitude of connotation. It is one of those, frequently used terms which defy scientific definition. Uptil now political scientists and authorities on history have failed to arrive at any satisfactory definition of the terms : nation and nationalism.

Renan, the French philosopher, stresses common inheritance from the past and a common outlook for the future as the primary factors which can constitute nation. "What constitutes a nation", he says, "is not speaking the same tongue or belonging to the same ethnic group, but having accomplished great things in common in the past and having the wish to accomplish them in future." Here emphasis is thus placed on history and tradition and everything else has been subordinated to these factors.

John Stuart Mill eschews the subjective plane of Renan and offers the problem a widely objective approach: "A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same Government, and desire that it should be Government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively." The 'common sympathies' of Mill are, of course, directly related to accomplishment of "great things in common in the past" and is exactly the same as "the wish to accomplish them in future". Mill breaks new ground only when he introduces the concept of government or in his own words "Government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively".

Hans Kohn in his article in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* explains nationalism as a "state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state". He adds: "In the age of nationalism, but only in the age of nationalism, the principle was generally recognised that each nationality should form a State, its State, and the State should include the whole nationality". This definition explains not only the word nationalism but also the phenomenon "nationalism" which played important role in the modern age of revolution. Mill rescued nationalism from the highly elastic definition of Renan by introducing the concept of government. Kohn associates it with the nation-state that a surcharged definition may emerge with all its character of exclusiveness.

Hartmann provides the objective tests for nationalism which are common place in modern political observation. He says: "For nationalism, there must be a feeling on the part of the people that they possess group values or, as John Sturt Mill expressed it... 'Common sympathies'. They must have a common outlook at least to this extent;

that they agree they are a distinct group who ought to be governed by themselves and as a group.....Other common factors of whatever kind, assist in the growth of nationalism, but no one of these—a common language, or religion, or colour or territorial propinquity—is essential per se”.

In a general sense Hartmann's definition has the largest approximation to modern concept of nationalism. Nationalism is an illusive emotional force concealed under the expressions, common sympathies, group values, common aspiration etc. This emotional force derives from History, language, Geography, religion race and tradition. Some times the use of symbols and slogans promote nationalism. For example, geographical position made British nationality meaningful. The role of Jewish faith in political zionism indicate the integrating value of religion. The Nazi doctrine of 'Aryanism' and the South African 'Apartheid' are examples of race as an integrating force. Similarly the struggle of several linguistic groups led to the disruption of the old Austro Hungarian Empire. The role of history and tradition in the growth of nationalism has been amply explained by the history of India. The call for "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" indicate the influence of exciting slogans. That apart national flag, national anthem and national shrines all contribute to the growth of nationalism.

Nationalism played a decisive role in the development of international society. The term 'nation' is derived from the Latin word 'natio' which originally meant a small community of people of common descent and language. In this sense nationalism began to emerge dimly in Europe in the Middle Ages. The emergence of new States like France, England, Spain etc. showed new trends in European political observation. This period marked the transition from the universalism of big empires to the particularism of national States. Machiavelli and Bodin embodied this new political observation in their philosophy.

Nationalism received stupendous impetus from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic expansionism. They "awoke a popular awareness of the political power implicit in large numbers of people living together within a State". The force of nationalism was the most persistent single factor in shaping all political reconstructions of subsequent years. It was the most liberal force in the nineteenth century and the Indian and German unifications were its triumphs.

The triumphs of nationalism in the nineteenth century denoted the transformation of the human mode of life from older orders and personal domination of man over man to somewhat greater and technically more perfectly organised social systems. The result was that as the nineteenth century rolled down to the twentieth, nationalism received new dimension. It came to mean a distinct political community with a consciousness in their own value. The question arose as to how political rights, material goods and social prestige are distributed in a given time or which constituents of society represent the nation in the real political sense. Thus national movements came to be inter-twined with social movements. The Wilsonian principle of self-determination offered legal expression to this outlook.

Closely allied to this was the emergence of a peculiar totalitarian nationalism manifested in the activities of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Expansionist Japan in the interval period. Side by side with it liberal nationalism manifested itself in other parts of Asia and Africa. But it has now found its new rival in communism which makes rapid stride in Eastern Europe and S. E. Asia.

Q. 7. Define political power and explain its patterns. Or, what are the major solutions to the problem of power in international politics ?

In its simplest definition, power is "the totality of a State's effectiveness in world politics." This effectiveness results from a set of factors known as 'elements of national power'. Hartmann's definition of power shows a pragmatic approach to the problem. "Power", he says, "is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests". Given that International Relations is the process through which States adjust their national interests the unfailing deduction from Hartmann's definition is that power is the essence of all international politics - a fact which Morgenthau tries to drive home.

Morgenthau keeps the definition of power in a subjective plane. "When we speak of power", he says "we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large." This relation of control is the alias of "the power of man over the minds and action of other men".

The concept of power, it is said, is related to that of sovereignty. Sovereignty has been regarded as the legal justification of power. The totality of a State's effectiveness in international politics essentially means its power to preserve its own security and interests.

Political power, Morgenthau says, must always be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence. The threat of physical violence is inherent in every politics. In domestic politics it comes in the shape of police action, imprisonment or capital punishment. In international politics it comes in the guise of war. In the case of violence becoming an actuality there is a total abdication of political power in favour of military or pseudo-military powers. In international politics armed strength as a threat is the most important constituent of power; but when this threat becomes an actuality in the form of physical violence, the psychological

relation between the two bodies which is the essence of political power is lost and new order comes to effect.

The armed strength of any nation which is the quintessence of its power is a threat to other powers in their mutual relations. This power viewed as threat in international politics is the 'problem of power'. As a counterpoise to this problem three different systems have come to effect in international politics. These are unilateralism, balance of power and collective security. These "are the organisational alternatives for coping with the power problem under the assumption of the continued existence of the nation-state system in any thing like its present form."

Of these three systems the first one, unilateralism, indicates that "a nation can depend solely upon its own power, make no alliances, and join in no collective security arrangements. It can deal with the power problem unilaterally and go it alone'. Isolation and neutrality are the most familiar expressions of a unilateral power policy, but unilateralism can take 'interventionist' forms as well. The essential requirement for a unilateral policy is that a State pursue it by itself, independently and alone". The success of unilateralism is calculated in terms of security of the State practising it and such success depends upon many factors. The Swiss, for example, have been maintaining neutrality for a long time and have achieved some success.

The alternative to unilateralism is the balance-of power. "A nation may choose to make alliances or to arrive at understandings with friendly States to bond together against mutual enemies. This is the classic pattern of the balance-of-power". The enemies against which such a coalition has been made may or may not combine at the first instance although in the long run the union of strength occurs. The formation of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente in Europe prior to the First World War is an example of it.

The balance of power alignment rests on the principle

that security can be guaranteed through the strength of the allies. Prevention of war is generally thought to be the primary indication of its success. By the same logic peace becomes its by-product. By the strength of this logic advocates of balance-of-power principle have justified its efficacy as an instrument for maintaining peace. Critics of the principle conversely argue that balance-of-power leads inevitably to war because of the race for power that frequently characterise the final stage of the balance-of-power." Yet from the point of view of the security of the participating States, the usefulness of balance does not rest upon whether it ends in war or prevents war per se, but whether it enhances their individual security under conditions of war and sol or peace. To say that balance of-power ends in war is not necessarily an argument against the effectiveness of alliance in terms of security, although it is an argument that seems particularly forceful to those who regard peace par se as the goal of States".

The alternative to both balance-of-power and unilateralism is collective security. Originally it meant "that all nations could be secure if all were guaranteed their 'territorial integrity and enlisting political independence' against 'external aggression' by any State or States." Basically the idea amounted to a mutual insurance plan. Its membership therefore had extensive scope and could be either universal or nearly universal. It was a security organisation the armed strength of the members of which were supplementary to each other. Hartmann points out that the idea of collective security rested on three assumptions. "First, it was rooted in the hope that at the time of crisis such obligations would be honoured by the members. Second, and men were fundamental, it assumed that the security interests of most States were fundamentally compatible. Third, it assumed that the powers of revisionist ('have not') States desiring the overthrow of the existing status quo, would be small in comparison to the

power of the 'law-abiding' States that none would dare war, or if they did, that they would be defeated in sheet order and with relatively small effort."

The foregoing analysis will show that the short-comings of the concept of collective security have been somewhat overcome through universal or quasi-universal alliance and also through dealing the whole arrangement not against a particular State or States but against any power that embarked upon aggression.

There are two other alternatives to these three generally accepted patterns of powers. These are first, the establishment of a World-Empire through world conquest and secondly the creation of a voluntary World-Federation. These two alternatives are not very feasible because they evolve the end of modern State system. However their importance is that they provide means for eradicating the power problem on supra-national level while the three other alternatives offer solution to the problem on the nation-state level.

Q. 8. Explain the doctrine of Sovereignty in the context of International Relations.

The term sovereignty has no constant meaning. It is used in extreme variety of senses so that in modern political thinking it has come to enjoy a wide latitude of connotation. Writing in the sixteenth century Bodin viewed sovereignty as "the supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law." Thus coming from a man confined to the limitations of the age, sovereignty could not be anything more than an attribute of the territorial State governed by royal absolutism. Grotius defines sovereignty as a "power whose acts.....may not be made void by the acts of any other human will." Thus Grotius locates sovereignty in a widely subjective plane so that a little addition to its scope will render any idea of inter-

national sovereignty possible. This latitude in Grotius concept has ensured its acceptance by later political scientists. Here is Oppenheim for instance: "Sovereignty is supreme authority, an authority, which is independent of any other earthly authority." A power which cannot be cancelled by any 'human will' is same as the 'authority' supreme in relation to any 'earthly authority.'

Hartmann defines sovereignty on somewhat objective plane so that his approach becomes conducive to finding its bearing on International Relations. "Sovereignty," he says, "may be defined as the ability of a State to make independent decisions. A sovereign nation is one that is in a legal sense, free to decide to pursue the path of peace or the ways of war as its national interests may dictate." Morgenthau also offers a comprehensive explanation. According to him "Sovereignty is the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory and in consequence, independence from the authority of any other nation and equality with it under international law." This 'independence from the authority of any other nation' has some reservations. These reservations are incorporated in Morgenthau's analysis of "What Sovereignty Is Not."

In the first place "Sovereignty is not freedom from legal restraint." A treaty might impose certain legal obligations on a particular nation. What, therefore, affects sovereignty is not the quantity of legal restraints, but their quality.

Secondly, "Sovereignty is not freedom from regulation by international law of all those matters which are traditionally left to the discretion of the individual nations or,..... are within the domestic jurisdiction of the individual nations" as the Covenant of the League and the Charter of the U.N. put it. Thus it will be meaningless to assert "that the international regulation of the immigration policies of individual nations would be incompatible with their sovereignty".

Thirdly, "Sovereignty is not equality of rights and

obligations under international law". Peace treaties sometimes impose certain disabilities on certain nations like the vanquished ones with regard to size, military establishment, economic policies and foreign affairs. This of course never means—that these nations are deprived of their sovereignty.

The final reservation follows from the third. "Sovereignty is not actual independence in political, military, economic or technological matters". The actual inter-dependence of nations on one another in those matters some times makes it difficult for them to pursue any independent policy in International Politics.

State Sovereignty and International Law :

After analysing what sovereignty is and what sovereignty is not. One can go in for the study of the relation between State sovereignty and International law. Sovereignty is the essence of the nation-state system which in its turn is the central point of all International Relations. That is why it has been said that sovereignty is the "central formula under which we try to rationalize the complicated facts of our modern political life". Keeping in mind what sovereignty is i.e., taking into consideration the positive aspects of sovereignty one can broadly say that sovereignty is incompatible with International Law. International Law imposes certain restriction on the conduct of the nation-states in their mutual relations and these restrictions negate the independence of nations from foreign interference which is the essence of sovereignty. Possession by a State of absolute and unlimited authority rules out submission to external control which is reflected in the canons of International Law. "Each individual sovereign State is by right above the community of nation and possessed of absolute independence with regard to the community." This means that "limitation on sovereignty or the surrender of a part of

a State's sovereignty in the interests of international co-operation are both theoretically untenable and practically impossible". From this point of view International Law cannot be binding on the nation-states. A State-sovereign in respect of internal affairs cannot be non-sovereign while under International Law or while subject to any international organisation. In its further limit such a view negates "sanctions" of International Law and deprives all world organisations like the U.N. of its coercive authority. Thus a rigid interpretation of sovereignty will rule out co-existence and frustrate all possibilities for the development of an international society on the basis of peace and co-operation.

In view of this modern political scientists have accepted sovereignty in a more flexible sense. A voluntary undertaking of obligations, it has been argued, does not impair the sovereignty of a State. A voluntary submission to the U.N. Charter which is regarded as a treaty does not deprive a State of its sovereignty. It is said that ".....States that participate in various kinds of international agreements thereby lose their status as sovereign States, whatever may happen to the theoretical fullness of their sovereignty." Recently, of course, there is a tendency to push this view to its logical extreme. It has been stated in the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, prepared by the International Law Commission of the United Nations that "the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of International Law". The assumption behind this claim is that submission to International Law for the fulfilment of common ends has become necessary for the development of international society on the basis of peace and co-operation. The weakness of the principle is that its efficacy depends upon what attitude a nation assumes with regard to its own position. A nation not worried over its security will be prone to accept it. But on the opposite pole there are nations which would not accept this limitation on sovereignty. Soviet Russia, for example,

thinks of itself as 'an island encircled by capitalism'. To her therefore, 'Sovereignty is 'a legal barrier defending nations—from military and economic aggression'. A balance between these two view points can also be found out if the recognition of the limitations on sovereignty is made voluntary and reciprocal. Such limitations can exist when they are fair and freely consented to.

9. Enumerate the principal elements of National Power and show how they are interrelated.

What is National Power ? : The term 'power' usually denotes a State. A State is so called because it possesses strength or capacity to defend its own vital interests. The technical expression for vital interests is national interests. Therefore, the power which is used in pursuit of national interests both in domestic and foreign policies is national power. From this there is a simple abstraction : the power of a power is national power. This abstraction indicates two things : first, "like nationalism and sovereignty, national power is a vital and inseparable feature of the State system." Secondly, national power which aims at upholding the vital interests of a State is the invariable means for maintaining the independence of a State and attaining the foreign policy goals. National power becomes an empirical thing when calculated in terms of the resources of a State. In its highest empirical expression national power becomes the greatest empirical mark of the highly abstract conception of nation.

The elements of National Power : National power is calculated in terms of resources a State possesses. There are elements of national power which make for the power of a nation vis-a-vis other nations. There are six major elements of national power.

(i) **Demographic element :** The major point here is the population structure.

(ii) **Geographic element** : Here the central question concerns climate, location and the territorial size of a country.

(iii) **Economic element** : Material possessions and natural resources of a country and its present and projected production rates are the central theme in this element.

(iv) **Historical-psychological-sociological element** : It deals with such things as past experience of a country, its present outlook cohesive capacity of the society etc.

(v) **The organisational-administrative element** : It is concerned mainly with the government as well as administrative set up of a country.

(vi) **Military element** : The concern here is the arms and ammunition in possession of a nation.

These six elements of national power determine the strength of a State necessarily and inevitably and in doing so they form the raw material out of which individual States evolve their own conceptions of their national interests. These elements fall into two categories : those which are relatively stable form the first and those which are subject to constant change constitute the second. Geographic, economic, historical, sociological and to some extent demographic elements are stable, the rest are unstable elements. Hartmann recognizes such classification and in doing so he makes a common sense approach to the problem.

Morgenthau accepts a two fold division of the elements of national power. Thus geography and national resources are distinguished from national morale and diplomacy. On the whole he finds out nine elements of national power : (i) geography, (ii) natural resources, (iii) industrial capacity, (iv) military preparedness, (v) population, (vi) national character, (vii) national morale, (viii) the quality of diplomacy, and (ix) the quality of government. Morgenthau takes broad reality as his standpoint and therefore, his is a kind of realist approach as against the common sense approach of Hartmann.

A third classification of the elements of national power puts them into two broad divisions: land and natural resources (geography with associate advantages and also industrial capacity,) people and their genius (population, national morale, leadership etc).

Divided in whatever way the elements of national power remain the invariable factors in making up "the totality of a State's effectiveness in world politics." This effectiveness "is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests". In short these elements make up the power of man over the minds and actions of other men"—a power to which sovereignty offers justification.

Inter-relation between elements of national power : The elements of national power are divided into categories and treated separately for the purpose of convenience and political analysis. But essentially they are inter-related and none of them can be treated in isolation from the others. Of course these elements have individual bearing on national power but the total impression of that power would be lost if these elements are not taken as an integrated whole. As Carr points out, "in its essence power is an indivisible whole ; no country can for any length of time possess one kind of power in isolation from the others." For instance a phenomenal change in the size of a State will react upon all elements of national power and will thereby bring about a new dimension in the power-potentiality of the State. Variable factors are subject to constant change and any shift in the incidence of the elements of national power will change this structural balance and will thus influence their inter-relation.

The point that emerges from this shows that national power is not static but dynamic. A set of domestic changes or a combination of external factors may change the total weight of national power. Domestic changes i.e., changes

in the element of national power would influence the somewhat absolute character of national power in relation to any other subordinate authority in the domestic field. Changes in external factors show the relative character of national power. The power of one nation is always judged in relation to other nation, particularly those which are its enemies. When other elements are constant a change in the power of one State would mean a relative decline in the power of the other. So prospective increase would mean prospective decline and vice versa.

Q. 10. Explain the importance of Geography as the natural determinant of power.

To the political scientists the power of a nation is firmly rooted in its own geographical position. Geopoliticians claim that geography is the handmaiden of power. The extreme claim on their behalf has been advanced by Mackinder in his theory of geopolitics but a pragmatic approach to the problem is bound to be modest. Geography definitely has an effect on national power but its reputation as the most important determinant of national power does not seem merited. Therefore, the problem needs rethinking on a broad objective plane. Any deviation would land us into the errors of exaggeration.

The notion of geography breaks into four specific factors :

- (1) The size of the territory a nation controls
- (2) Its location
- (3) Its climate
- (4) Its topography

Each of these factors has individual bearing on national power. But it is as an integrated whole that they influence a nation's ability to influence the behaviour of other nations.

Size of Area : Size generally means 'land mass'. A

'landmass' may contain a single State like Australia, France or China or it may be shared by more than one State like North America. It may also contain a multiplicity of nations as Europe does. In other words a 'landmass' may contain one or more political units and may house one nation or more. Thus the co-existence of more than one sovereign units in a single landmass' is possible.

There can be an extreme variety of size. The Vatican City has an area of 108·7 acres while the Soviet Union is stretched over an area of more than 8·8 million square miles. Though size is a part of geography yet geography alone does not determine size. Other non-geographic elements always come to play. We learn from history that size of nations varies from period to period even though geography remains the same. The expansion, shrinkage or even disappearance of political units have become common observations in history.

Whatever be its determinant size influences power. The contention is proved by the most superficial examination by taking America and the Soviet Union as the case in point. Yet size alone cannot make a nation powerful. A chart showing the area of the ten largest nation in the world will be an evidence of the contention.

Political unit	Square miles of territory
U. S. S. R.	8,708,070
China	3,851,000
Canada	3,614,876
Brazil	3,275,510
United States	2,977,128
Australia	2,974,581
French West Africa	1,815,768
India	1,158,403
Argentina	1,079,965
Sudan	967,500

[The figures include territorial changes upto mid—1957]

The truth revealed by the chart does not tally with the commonsense notion of national power. The question therefore legitimately arises "as to whether size gives power or whether power brings size". History provides superficial answer to the question. Britain and France in the past two centuries of history built up big empires though they had relatively small territory ; but the Czarist Russia and Germany could not rival France and Britain in this respect. Thus a list considering the area of States would be a crude indicator of their power. "On this basis, Canada with its frozen wastes, Brazil with its jungles, and Australia with its deserts rank near the top in size, but they do not belong there in terms of power."

A large area contributes to national power in two ways. "First, a large land area is capable of containing a large population and a large and varied supply of natural resources. Thus uninhabitable land is not as great a source of power as is land that can serve as the base for a mighty population. Here two things are to be noted. First, there is no necessary relation between the size of a country and the numerical strength of its population. A country's size may be a source of strength if it is proportionately rich in population. Secondly, "uninhabited or uninhabitable lands may..... contribute to a nation's power if they are rich in resources"

Secondly, "a large area may also add to a nation's power by providing certain military advantages. Size gives a nation room to retreat without surrendering. Space helped defeat the armies of Napoleon and Hitler in Russia....."

"Size also makes it possible to locate vital centres of industry and government far from the nation's frontiers".

"Finally size confers a military advantage because once conquered, a large area is difficult to occupy and control, particularly if it is heavily populated. The task of occupying a hostile Europe proved demanding on German man-power."

Size, it should be noted, has a direct relation with its location. Whether size is a source of strength or of weakness depends upon its location. Location is also important for the national unity and the political integration of a State.

Thus size of area is an important factor in making up the national power of a country. In itself, it does not have much influence upon a nation's ability to defend its vital interests. "Size by itself does not determine national power. It is important only when associated with other geographic factors.

Location : Location is the second geographic determinant of national power and on the whole it is more important than size in respect of the power of a country. It is the "fundamental factor of permanent importance which the foreign policies of all nations must take into account." America's location permitted her to follow an isolationist policy for a long time. Again Russia's location which is handicapped by a lack of natural frontier in the west makes it perpetually an easily accessible part of the enormous Eurasian landmass.

Location is an important determinant of national power in dual sense. Its first importance is calculated in terms of the geographic zones in which it is situated. Secondly, its importance is calculated from strategic point of view i. e. in terms of its neighbours and its vulnerability to invasion. In this dual sense location becomes a primary geographic influence on foreign policy.

Political scientists and geo-politicians have made certain observation with regard to locations as the major determinant of national power. First, "it is claimed that location is a major determinant of whether a nation is a sea power or a land power. The explanation given for England and Japan's achievements on the seas has been that they are islands. The explanation offered for the massive land strength of

the U. S. S. R. and Germany has been their location, one in the heart of Europe, the other in the centre of the 'world island.' It is wise to concede that the possession of some seacoast is necessary for any State towards becoming a sea power. That is why Switzerland and Austria had never been sea powers. The absence of warm-water ports inside Russia was a perpetual bar to its building a formidable navy. By the same logic it can be said that States occupying huge landmass has a natural predilection for building up big army and the history of Germany is a case in point.

Location also offers strategic importance to a particular region. In this sense location influence the power of a nation. The Dardanelles, the straits of Gibraltar, the strait of Malacca or the passages such as the Suez and Panama Canals bear evidence to this fact.

Location some-time determines the nature of country's economy and influence the diplomacy and political institutions of a State. Location is also important because it is relative to other powerful States. Small nations bordering on a great nation often find their power suffering in consequence. In other words "geographic location plays a particular role in determining the power of a nation because it places a nation in the close company of smaller States that it may dominate or of giants who will eclipse its power." Location, it should be noted, has a fundamental relation with the foreign policy of a State and an appreciation of it has given rise to the concept of geopolitics.

Climate : The third geographic feature which influence national power is climate. Hartmann says : "The single most important geographical factor is climate. Climate has bearing upon two things : growth of crops and distribution of population. "Climate does affect a nation's power through its effect upon agricultural production and upon the size of the population".

This claim is based upon empirical observations. Those portions of the globe which suffer from extreme climate are denied of sufficient growth of crops and effective habitation. Alaska, Greenland or the great African desert regions offer examples where growth of extreme climate has retarded the growth of national power. Opposite contention may be held by the same logic and Britain, America, France, Germany etc. offer cases for it. The extensive development of science and technology has, of course, reduced the importance of climate as a determinant of national power. Egypt is an area of insufficient rain but its difficulty arising there from has been much overcome by the construction of the Aswan dam. Here is therefore, an example of man's interaction with nature.

Climate is important in so far as it is concerned with temperature. But for the Gulf stream Europe would have become much more colder due to its location in latitudes similar to those of Canada. The northern part of Asia is cold and this has made difficult for any external invader to make deep incursions into Russia. From the point of view of human activity the temperate zone (between 20 and 60 degrees north and 20 and 60 degrees south) areas are most conducive to the growth of national power. Most of the large cities of the world are located within these areas. About 85 per cent of the land areas of the world and 75 per cent of the habitable land lie in this temperate zone, north of the equator. Nearly 93 per cent of the world's population live here. Therefore, it is no surprise that areas situated in this zone have played decisive roles in world history.

Out of such analysis daring claims have been advanced. "It is often assumed that a nation must have a temperate climate to be a major power, for it is claimed that the arctic is too forbidding and the tropics too enervating to allow the kind of activity required of a modern, industrial

people." Such a conclusion is supported by two arguments : first, all the great powers of modern times have been located in temperate zones and second, Europeans who go to the tropics are seized with longous and cannot work. The first argument is some what true. The second argument is open to question because it rules out the possibility of the development of industrialisation outside temperate zone. "The most that can be said with certainty that extremes of climate can make impossible the support of a dense population and that excessive heat or cold may rule out the development of a modern industrial society. In neither case does climate have any direct effect upon the ability of a nation to persuade, reward, punish or use force on other nations. Its effect is wholly indirect through ruling out in certain cases the possibilities of a large population or a modern industry. At best, climate cannot be used to differentiate between the scores of nation that lie in the temperate zone, including all the major powers of the present day. All possess the climate believed necessary for modern national power. If one wishes to understand the reasons for the gradations of power among these nations one must look to other factors than climate."

Topography has clear influence on the power of a nation. Like climate it influences habitation and thus keeps a mark on the density of population which a region can support. Temperature, wind, rainfall and consequently the condition of soil—all these are influenced by the situation of a land and the position of Sea and Mountain. Valleys, Rivers and planes. In other words climate itself is influenced by topography.

Topographical features often determine national boundaries between nations and "thus set limits to their natural expansion." Where natural barriers lie along a nation's frontiers, they may increase the nation's military powers. Thus the pyranes are said to make a fourteen out of Spain, the English Channel guards the coast of England, and the

Atlantic and Pacific oceans are seen as providing a natural protection for the united States." Topography is thus viewed as an integral part of the set of geographic factors that determine national power.

(ii) What is geopolitics ? State and Explain Sir Halford Mackinder's "Heartland" theory.

Definition :

In a broad sense geopolitics is a 'science' which examines the influence of geography on world politics. To take a convenient definition geopolitics "is the science of the relationship between space and politics which attempts to put geographical knowledge at the service of political leaders." It is not political geography. It springs from quest for facts and principles which can serve national ends. Hartmann describes the science as an "offspring of the marriage of geographic and political concepts." On the whole the science has become important determinant of the ends of national policy.

Genesis : The beginning of the science is not known. But it is obvious that it owes much to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who is regarded as the father of modern geography. Perhaps the first systematic exposition of the subject is to be found in Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). He gives us a general theory about the influence of geographic factors on State. His State is compared to a biological organism which must grow or die. Ratzel's disciple was Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922). He accepted his master's views, improved on them and blended his own ideas with it. What emerged out of it he called 'geopolitics'. "To him the state was an organism and as such more than a legal entity ; it must grow and expand as geography and nature permitted and invited. The rules of growth constituted the new science, and although it

involved biological and social sciences it was essentially a mass of theories based on geographic determinism." It is said that Kjellen's 'The Great Powers' was admitted as the bible of German geopolitics. Besides Kjellen, having there were two notable geopoliticians, Sir Halfred Mackinder (1869-1947) and a German, Karl Hanshofer (1869-1946). The most of the leading exponents of the science, however, were german geographers and politicians. During the second world war Nazi Germany made the most of geographic influences on world politics. The modern geopolitical science has developed as a result of the conscious attempt of the German experts to use their geographical knowledge for the pursuit of political ends.

Sir Halfred Mackinder's 'Heartland' theory ;

Mackinder's dictum of geopolitics runs this way :

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland :

"Who rules the Heartland commands the world-Island :

"Who rules the world-Island commands the world".

Mackinder's 'Heartland' is the huge territorial expanse bounded by the Volga River, the Arctic Ocean, the Yangtze River and the Himalaya Mountains. This 'Heart land', he contends, determinated the world geographically and could do so politically. It is safe from the sea power. Therefore its position is invulnerable because in the ultimate analysis world politics is a struggle between land and sea power, "between continental and oceanic peoples". Mackinder's world-Island represents the territory of Eurasia-Africa. Thus he opines that Germany and Russia together can dominate this world-Island.

Mackinder's theory of geopolitics, it has been argued, helps us to understand some aspects of national development in some cases. Hartmann argues that the development of democracy and civil liberties in Great Britain and the United States was largely due to their geographical isolation providing security against aggression. Britain never faced

any successful invasion since 1066 and America could peacefully pursue her course after 1815. Similarly it is possible to connect the growth of totalitarianism in Germany and Russia with the fact that these two countries, due to an absence of natural frontier, 'lie exposed on the Northern European plain' to external invasions.

Despite its merits Mackinder's theory is exposed to criticism. The weakness of the theory lies in its exaggerations. These exaggerations result from an excessive reliance on the inter-relation between space and politics. Close relation between space and politics is of course the essence of geopolitics but an over-emphasis on it will lead to all weaknesses of overstressing the importance of geography to a point where other determinants of a country's growth and power are ignored. Commenting on the 'Heartland' theory Organski writes : "Unfortunately the accuracy of such claims, to date, those who have ruled East Europe have not commanded the Heartland of Eurasia, and those who have ruled the Heartland have not commanded the World-Island (Europe, Asia and Africa), and while one may safely wager that if, someday, one nation should rule all Europe, Asia and Africa, it would be well along the way to world rule, the question could still be raised : Is it due to geography ? Extremists like Mackinder have clearly gone too far."

Pouncing on a similar logic Nicholes J. Spykman has criticised Mackinder. According to him the 'Heartland' theory is based on an exaggeration of the potentialities of the Heartland and an underestimation of those of the Inner Crescent, which he renamed the Rimland and defined as the "intermediate region.....between the heartland and the marginal seas.....a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea-power and land-power." He rejected Mackinder's theory as false and offered his own dictum which runs thus : "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."

It should be noted that as late as 1943 Mackinder gave

his theory a rethinking in order to judge the validity of the concept in the light of the revolutionary changes in the world political situation and in warfare during the forty years that had gone by since the enunciation of the principle. Mackinder's thinking was put in his article "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace." Here he contended that the 'Heartland' theory was "more valid and useful today than it was either 20 or 40 years ago"; it still offered "a sufficient physical basis for strategic thinking." There is probably some truth in his contention. Robert Stranz-Hupe who criticised many aspects of Mackinder's theory in his "Geopolitics: The struggle for Space and Power" had to admit that "Sir Halfred Mackinder's concept of the 'heartland' is today, no less than when it was first presented in 1904, the fundamental axiom of world politics." The influence of geopolitics in Nazi Germany was great. Its impact upon the ultimate science of human relationship has not yet been determined.

Q. 12. Analyse the economic basis of national power.

Every power has its economic determinants. In this sense every power has its economic basis. The technical expression of these economic determinants of the power of a nation would be the 'economic elements of national power.' Economic elements include natural resources and technological capacity of a nation. There is no question that possession of national resources balanced by proper utilisation ensures the exercise of power by a modern state. Since resources are necessary for many purposes from waging war to operating a modern industrial system, their possession becomes a vital question in the determination of power. A nation can utilise resources even if it does not possess them within its own geographic boundaries. A strong and skilled nation can conquer and utilise resources that belong to other countries. A rich nation can buy resources from other

countries. But possession of rich resources is always a power-advantage. Yet mere possession cannot make a nation strong. A nation, if it is a strong one, can obtain resources by one method or another. A weak nation is always liable to waste its own resources and lose its own freedom as well.

The economic elements of national power can be studied under certain broad heads.

(i) *Natural resources :*

The expression 'natural resources' has wide connotation. It include soil and its products. In a general sense it means any gift of nature which can be utilised for productive purposes. From this point of view minerals like fuels and metals can be regarded as natural resources. But for the sake of convenience they are put into the category of 'raw materials.' More or less stable or constant resources like the fertility of soil lie perpetually outside this category. Nevertheless such a division is artificial and hence cannot be exclusive. As such they have equal influence on the exercise of national power.

The most elemental of natural resources is food. A country's power is directly related to the problem of food sufficiency. A nation which has attained a self-sufficiency in food gains certain advantages over other nation in international scenes. "In most parts of the world food is a major problem, one closely related to effective utilisation of human resources. Malnourished people cannot produce as much as well-fed ones, and they are potent sources of dissatisfaction and unrest." A deficiency in home-grown food has always been a source of weakness for Britain and Germany. During the war Britain's existence depended upon its ability to keep the sea lines open over which vital food supplies had to be shipped in. For its survival Germany had to pursue there major goals : first, she had to avoid a long war through a speedy victory before its resources were exhausted ; secondly, she had to plan for the conquest of the major food-growing

areas of Eastern Europe ; and finally she had to aim at the destruction of the British sea-power which cut off Germany from her access to overseas supply of food.

From this a simple fact emerges. Countries which suffer from food deficiencies have to divert their national energies and foreign policies from their primary objectives in order to ward off the fear of starvation. Self-sufficiency in food in America and the Soviet Union has always facilitated full realisation and complete exercise of national power. It should be noted that food supply always bear a direct relation with the rate of increase of population and the balance between the import and export of that country. Therefore, Morgenthau is not wrong when he says that a "permanent scarcity of food is a source of permanent weakness in international politics." Right indeed, India at present is the prime example of the truth of this observation.

Raw Materials :

Raw materials present an allied category of natural resources. To this category belongs all minerals. These raw materials are necessary for waging war and also for industrial production. In this age of technology and mechanised warfare, the proper exercise of national power has become squarely dependent upon the proper control and utilisation of these raw materials. In the modern age the most important raw material for industrial production and warfare are iron, oil, coal, uranium etc. Rare is the nation that possesses all these in sizeable quantities within its frontiers. Only America and Russia can boast of having a fairly balanced supply of these. A nation can import raw materials from abroad. The more the resources deficiencies of a nation is the more it must depend upon the transportation of imports from outside the frontiers. To this dependence there are two alternatives : stock-piling and finding out substitutes. The first alternative is feasible in so far as stock-piled materials do not deteriorate. The second alternative is

acceptable in so far as substitute materials are available. Germany could continue fighting in the Second World War because she made oil out of coal and also because she could fall back upon the reserve of oil she had piled. She derived extra advantage in this regard from her conquest of Roumanian oil fields.

The possession of raw materials required by other nations can thus give a nation power if would not otherwise possess. The Arab nations, for example, which have little consequence in other terms, have risen to power calculation by virtue of the oil they possess. Nations that control deposits of uranium, such as Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa, and the United States, have been courted by other countries.

Industrial Capacity :

Raw materials are of little use unless they are properly utilised. For such utilisation a nation must have a good industrial capacity. Industrial capacity indicate scientific capacity and technical nohow of the people. Together with this industrial capacity there must be a balance between resource and policy. Only then an effective utilisation of the economic potentialities of a country is possible. The absence of any one of these factors will retard the growth of national power. Belgian Congo commands a vast deposit of high grade uranium. But it had not risen in the power calculations. Again if the balance between the resources and the policy of a country is lost, the country loses its power to embark on any good project or wrongly undertake schemes which are not consistent with its natural supplies. Thus economic potentialities, while add to national power, also set the limits of national policy. The second rule, of course, does not operate when the very existence of a country is at stake. Sometimes the harmony between the resources and production and consequently between export and import is disturbed by economic depressions which cause

to impair much of national strength. The great depression of the twenties affected the national strength of many western states and caused dislocations in international scene.

It should be noted that at present there are great heartlands of heavy industry': (i) The United States (ii) Western Europe (iii) The Soviet Union. Possibilities are there that similar growth may take place in the far East (China & Japan) and also in India. Political conditions always affect the growth of industries. Therefore, the balance in the present distribution of heavy industries may any time be disturbed by political developments. It is a common observation that all leading industrial powers have come to be identified as great powers. Any change in the rank of industrial powers must be accompanied by corresponding change in the hierarchy of political powers.

Q. 13. Examine the importance of the military element of national power.

Military potentialities have been regarded as one of the most vital elements of national power. If international politics means struggle for power the importance of this element for the growth of national power can hardly be overrated. In fact what gives geography, natural resources and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a nation is military preparedness. Military preparedness requires a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued. In the case of all countries which have come to occur in big power calculation, military strength has invariably been a key to the pursuit of their successful foreign policy. This, of course, does not mean that military strength has got to be the only basis of all power calculations. Nevertheless a militarily weak nation cannot be politically strong. Military power has to be kept ready for use when necessary. The ability to keep it ready is directly relevant to national power. Such ability is derived from a set of factors. These factors are stated below.

The first factor is the size of armed force. It has three components: army, navy and airforce. The size of these components is relatively dependent upon the size of the population. The stability of the size depends upon the degree of necessity of conscription and the persistence with which that conscription is executed. There is no one or uniform methods of conscription. Different nations follow different methods. The general practice in the West is that men belonging to a particular age group, serve in the armed forces for one or two years. On the completion of their term they pass into active reserves for a number of years and finally into inactive reserves till they cross the age when military duty is no longer required of them. Since under this system all men in their prime fall into the military age group, the whole nation becomes a total military reserve for any country which follows it.

The problem of size leads to the second problem, namely the relation of the military age group to the population as a whole. The increase of military potentialities is possible only when the military age structure is substantially large. The major concerns in this problem are: total population, the number of men in the prime military age group, the percentage of population in this age group, the number of men presently under arms, percentage of population forming the active and inactive reserves and the percentage of the military age group in the armed forces. Of all these the few percentage questions are most vital. Hartmann says that "the higher the percentage, provided the absolute numbers are also large, the greater the vigour in war of the population." Sometimes other factors affect the percentage questions. Japan and Germany were disarmed after the Second World War. So their forces have scope to increase. Britain's forces are comparatively low due to her deliberate policy to cut down expense and supply labour to industry. France's figure is somewhat high. China's industrialisation leaves scope for the expansion of its forces. The statistics

in the following chart show the inter-relation of the percentage questions.

Country	Total Population 1958 or 1959 (millions)	Military age-group (millions)	Percentage of population in military age group	Men under Arms 1959 (millions)	Percentage of military age-groups under arms
China					
(1953)	582.6	82.9	14.2	5.50	6.6
U.S.S.R.	208.8	27.6	13.2	3.62	13.1
U.S.A.	177.1	17.0	9.6	2.51	14.7
United Kingdom	51.9	5.1	9.9	0.58	5.9
France	44.6	4.9	10.9	1.03	21.1

The third factor in the growth of military strength is the industrial advancement or the industrial status of a nation. The efficacy of the military age group tends to diminish if the expansion of that age structure is not balanced by technological advancement. Hartmann points out that "There is a distinct correlation between how industrialised a state is and how much of its military-age group it can keep on active duty China is able to keep less than half the percentage of this group in uniform that the United States can. The United States, as the most industrialised nation in the world has also the highest proportion of its military-age group under arms of nations at peace." Hartmann thus assumes a common sense argument. A country which is lagging behind in respect of technological development cannot build formidable military power even if the size of the armed forces and the military age group is big. This is particularly true in view of the revolution which the technique of warfare is undergoing.

Industrialised nations have two advantages: "First, a highly industrialised nation, because of its high output per man-hour, can permit more of its potential labour force to be put into uniform instead. Second, the more

industrialised the State, the more mechanised its armed services will likely be. The more an armed force is mechanised, and the more intricate its weapons and equipment, the larger the forces must be in order to sustain the large overhead in maintenance, processing, and organisation, which is necessarily entailed." It is for this reason, one may say, that the fate of nations and of civilisations has often been determined by a differential in the technology of warfare.

The fourth factor in evaluating military power is the quantity and quality of the armed forces. The size of the armed forces and the quality of their training have always been regarded as the two most important factors in military power. Even in the modern age the power of a nation in military terms is also dependent upon the quantity of men and arms and their distribution among the different branches of the military establishment. A nation technologically advanced may do very well in warfare. Thus America's superior grasp over technology and the superior man power of the Soviet Union turned Hitler's innovation to his destruction.

Hartmann puts particular emphasis on the 'weapons and equipment' question. "The quantity and quality of a State's weapons and equipment are very important. Here again the lack of reliable data may make evaluation difficult."

The following chart gives a comparative estimate of the total military strength of different nations in other words a balance sheet of world's land and sea forces.

Country	Land forces	Sea forces				
		FAC	BS	C	FEC	S
China	3,000,000	0	0	2	37	20
U.S.S.R.	2,500,000	0	0	35	480	500
U.S.A.	861, 64	38	10	53	642	196
France	812,000	5	2	5	75	18
United Kingdom	351,000	8	1	11	152	53
Japan	170,000	0	0	0	37	1
West Germany	243,000	0	0	0	13	3

FAC = Fleet Aircraft Carriers.

BS = Battle-Ships

C = Cruisers

FEC = Fast Escort Craft

S = Submarines.

The chart includes data that show the details of the military strength of a particular nation. "Their relative performances, however, may be of far more importance than their relative numbers. Quality cannot overcome entirely the advantage in warfare that quantity confers. Even so, a relatively small number of aircraft, with highly skilled pilots, enabled Britain to survive the German attacks with vastly superior numbers in the Battle of Britain in World War II." Since World War II, the factor of weapons and equipments has become more decisive than what it was in view of increasing technological innovations.

The final factor in the evaluation of the military strength of a nation is leadership. The quality of military leadership is as important as the timely use of technological innovations and both of these have exerted a decisive influence upon national power. The victories of Frederick the Great of Prussia and Napoleon were mainly the reflection of their genius and leadership. Military leadership has got to be backed by diplomatic and administrative leadership. Nevertheless military leadership remains to be vital in shaping a nation's fortune, particularly in time of war.

Q. 14. Briefly describe the importance of the demographic element as a natural determinant of power.
Or,

Examine the importance of population as an element of national power.

The population of a nation is a relatively important determinant of national power. On a superficial analysis the importance of a large population for the power of a nation becomes obvious. It is worth noting that almost all the major powers today have giant populations. No major power bears a population which is under 40 million. All dependent and consequently powerless areas go with much smaller populations. The fact that larger colonies all have won their independence is particularly an evidence of the importance of population as an element of national power.

Hartmann says that the demographic element has its quantitative and qualitative components. Size or distribution and the trend or direction of population are its quantitative component. The qualitative components consists of such things as national characters, national morale etc.

Size :

The first factor is size. Every State has its population base. The more populous the State is the greater is its power "since there are more people to work, more women to bear children and more men for the armed forces." The Vatican City has a population of 1,000 while the population of China figures about 700,000,000. A comparison between the two in point of power shows the importance of population as a source of strength. This gives a common sense, and therefore grotesque, notion about the relation of population size, to the relative power of a nation. India with a population exceeding that of U.S.S.R , U.S.A., Britain, Japan, West Germany and France cannot claim to be superior to any of them in point of power. Any approach to the problems of power ranking exclusively on the basis of population will find an unqualified correlation between the size of population and national power. Such analysis will hopelessly fall short of reality. Nevertheless population size has some relation to the relative power of nations. History offers its own evidence. "In 1800, France was the most powerful nation in Europe and with the exception of Russia she was also the most populous.....In 1869, Germany passed France in population size, and two years later she won over France a military victory that established Germany as the major power of continental Europe." "The importance of population," says Organski, "as a source of national power has long been recognised in international politics. The French were well aware that Germany was overstripping them, just as German leaders worried about the growing size of Russia. Mussolini called upon Italians to produce a larger

population.....Germany, Italy and Japan all tried to foster high birth rates for purposes of power. More recently the British observed the widening gap between the number of Europeans and the number of Asians and began to worry aloud about 'the prestige and influence of the West'."

Hartmann says that the size of population is directly related to geographic element particularly size and location of a state. On many occasions overpopulation has unfortunate results. For example Japan took up over population as a pretext to enforce its demand for living space and this led Japan to the Second World War. Again location, particularly such things as proximity to river, facility of land which ensure supply of food and good habitation, also have bearing upon the population size. Population becomes an effective source of strength when the military age-structure of the population is substantially large. In any age the age-distribution in a given population is an important factor in power calculations. As Hartmann points out, all other things remaining equal, a nation with a large population of maximum potential usefulness for military and productive purposes will be placed high in power-ranking calculation.

Trend of population :

The second quantitative demographic factor is the trend of the population. The technical expression of this trend in population is demographic transition. All other factors remaining equal, a fall in the size of population would reduce man-power and consequently spell decline in the strength of the national power. Such a conclusion is not, of course, always correct in the ultimate analysis because other factors weigh upon every change of national power. Organski points out that "differences in rates of population growth among the nations in the world today are not the result of chance but are closely related to other socio-economic changes. As

nations industrialise, they follow a pattern of change in their population,...this change has been called the demographic transition....Advanced industrial nations like the United States have just about completed the transition. Nations like China have it to start it."

Generally speaking as nations industrialise they follow three important stages of demographic transition.

(1) In the first stage there is high potential growth of population. Today in this stage there are nations as China, India, most of Africa and most of South America. The greatest population growth of three nations still lies ahead and therefore, the period is called the stage of 'high potential growth.' Birth-rates and death rates in this stage are both high.

(2) The second stage is the stage of transitional growth. When nations begin to industrialise they steadily move towards this stage. Today Japan and the Soviet Union are going through this stage. The United States and the Western Europe passed through this stage in the nineteenth century. At this stage birth rate remain still high but technological innovations, medical advances and improved economic conditions make death rate fall.

3) The final stage is called the stage of incipient decline. The United States and Western Europe lie in this stage today. In this stage there is further drop in death rate. Birth rate also falls and the gap between the two tends to be reduced. Of course the percentage of people in the working ages still remains high.

National Character and National Morale :

The qualitative and meaningful population factor consists of national character and national morale. Hartmann says that this factor is important for its illusiveness from the point of view of rational prognosis. It is also important for its permanent and often decisive influence upon the capacity of a nation to put weight into the scales of international

politics. The phrase national character implies certain qualities of intellect and character which frequently occur in one nation and very much valued by it. These qualities distinguish a nation from other nations. Thus, generally speaking, the major implication of national character would correspond to the anthropological concept of the 'cultural pattern.'

National character is more or less a stable factor. Therefore, as a factor it cannot fail to influence national power. Those who are at the wheel of national life bear to a greater or lesser degree the imprint of all the traits that make up national character. The elementary force and persistence of the Russians, the individual initiative and inventiveness of the Americans, the undogmatic common sense of the British, the discipline and thoroughness of the Germans, the sincerity and courage of the Chinese and pacifism and antimilitarism of the Indians, are some of the qualities that manifest in the national character of these nations. They will shape all individual and collective enterprise of the members of these nations.

National morale which is a part of the qualitative component of population is more illusive and less stable than national character. Yet its bearing upon national character and consequently upon national power is stupendous. Political scientists have defined national morale as the determination with which a nation supports the policies of its State in peace and war. It covers all activities of a nation its agricultural and industrial production as well as its diplomatic service and military establishment. It expresses itself in the form of public opinion and in that form it is an intangible factor. National morale is also important for its illusiveness and instability. Certain traits of character of a nation may manifest in certain stages of history but there is no certainty that they would persist under emergency. In this case no definite conclusion could be drawn. Hartmann points out that the national morale of any people might break at

certain point but the breaking point is different for different peoples and under different circumstances. The attitude of the British people to Hitler's aggression is an example of the importance of national morale.

Q. 15. Write a critical note on the assessment of national power.

There is no simple method of assessing national power. An enumeration of its constituent elements gives us a rough and ready idea but a correct assessment out of it is not possible. There is no convenient and accurate yardstick or uniform index to evaluate the different elements of national power. Stable elements like geography are so different from the illusive elements like national morale that it would be difficult to evaluate them by a common method. National power is essentially a subtle thing which is likely to escape measurement at every point. Organski explains the problem thus: "It is clear that even in the simplest case of two nations and one issue, it is not easy to predict in advance which nation will succeed in influencing the other, since this ability rests not only upon the possession of appropriate means for persuading, rewarding, punishing, or if necessary using force, but also upon the mutual appraisal these nations may make each other and of their possible relations. There are so many intangibles to be consideredhow could one measure the hypnotic power that Hitler had over Mussolini, or the degree to which one nation believes the promises of reward or threats of punishment by another?" If such complications exist when only two nations are involved, how much more complicated must it be when many nations come to interest on the international scene. In spite of these, power has to be measured in the conduct of international affairs.

Hartmann in his analysis gives us four important points from the considerations of which, he says, 'emerges the outline of the problem in assessing national power.' The

first problem is that "the elements of power are interrelated, each influencing other." "Where the people live will affect what they possess ; what their historical experience has been will influence how they look at life ; how they look at life will affect how they organise and govern themselves." All these influence the size and armed forces and therefore, have a bearing upon the security problem of a nation. Thus in assessing national power one should not attach too much importance to any single factor although each separate element must necessarily be weighed and analysed. All the elements have influence on one another and that should be considered.

The interrelatedness of the elements of national power is followed by the second problem. "The elements of organisation and efficiency of Government, and the fighting ability of the armed forces, are of crucial importance to power since through these elements potential is converted into actual power." Hartmann explicitly states that the demographic, geographic, economic and historical psychological-sociological elements are in a fundamental sense the raw materials. They are the fundamental human and material stuff out of which the organisational—administrative and military elements are born. The basic elements are the potential and the last two factors turn it into realised power.

"A third consideration relates to the problem of measurement of the elements. The problem concerns the nature and type of the yardstick by which power can be measured." There can be no proper scientific method for a scientific analysis of the elements. By scientific analysis Hartmann means the reduction and relating of the objective quantities through objective symbols. For assessing a thing one must isolate it from other things and get impression about its weight, length, bulk and frequency. This sort of mathematical or statistical reduction is not possible in the case of the different elements of national power. One can find out how many people compose a nation but what weight one

should put on the states morale? Thus a realistic assessment is difficult though not impossible. Sometimes the urgency of the problem leads to the imperfections of the solution but in normal cases final estimate can be shelved till better information is available. The reliability of a total power estimate depends upon the reliability of what the examination of different elements yield.

There is yet a fourth point and this is what Palmer and Perkins call the problem of 'changes in power.' This problem concerns 'the changes in power status of each State in time, and the relative changes in power relation between States that this produces." Hartmann says that "nations each day change in both potential and realised power. This is true of all nations, although the rate of change may vary widely from one State to another. Because each nation changes absolutely in terms of power, each also changes relatively to another" Thus the fourth point of Hartmann incorporates the problem of 'relativity of power' and it is fused with the problem of 'changes in power.'

Palmer and Perkins speak of a new problem termed as 'attention to power.' Leaders of State are conscious of the essential elements of power and their interrelatedness. Being power-conscious they try to make optimum utilisation of these elements within their respective States. "Yet all the power-consciousness in the world cannot effect a precise measurement of power. Since power is relative, States would need to have information on enemy States and this is never complete. Arms of the same size are not necessarily of equal effectiveness, and the same rule must apply to all weapons. Transportation efficiency may upset apparent equality in raw materials, and an abundance of oil can hardly be measured against adequate supplies of iron ore All of these considerations add enormously to the burdens of leaders who must see to the security of the State."

Thus in the conclusion one may say that the measurement of power is not an easy thing. No single event or no single

test can give adequate impression of power. Power is relative and subject to change. It is a subtle thing since so many intangibles are involved in it. In spite of all accuracy in measurement it is likely to escape correct assessment.

Q. 16. What is Foreign Policy ? How is Foreign Policy formulated ?

Foreign policy means determination of national goals and formulation of methods or means to achieve them. The problem of the maker of foreign policy, points out Walter Lippmann, "is to select objectives that are limited—not the best that could be desired but the best that can be realised without committing the whole power and the whole wealth and the very existence of the nation." Hartmann says that the most obvious limitation on policy is power and therefore, small powers are likely to be modest in their aspirations than the great powers. In international politics small powers with modest aspiration are, as they were called in the days of the Congress of Vienna, "powers with limited interests."

In a general sense every nation is a power with limited interests. Whatever resources a nation may possess, its power is limited both absolutely and relatively. A nation is absolutely limited in terms of its annual production like coal, steel etc. It is also limited relatively because its ambitions in foreign policy matters is always greater than what its power can afford. The formulation of a realistic foreign policy admits these limitations with the consequence that it comes to rest upon the power reserve a nation has. Hartmann says, "a nation that overdraws its bank account of power is courting, and after finds itself visited by, disaster. Yet when a state attempts to keep its policy carefully equated with its power, its encounters at the outset several practical difficulties in following a rational policy."

The first difficulty arises from the abstract nature of policy. Foreign policy objectives are always expressed in abstract terms. This leads to two difficulties. First,

"expressing foreign policy goals in abstract terms inevitably divorces them one step from concrete reality, because abstractions suppress part of the truth in order to keep sight of the essential idea. Thus the term democracy is used with equal enthusiasm by both Washington and Moscow and both can agree on the need for more of it so long as they refrain from going into detail."

The second difficulty with abstract goals is that this interpretation must constantly be made in terms of immediate practical circumstances. As a result great care must be exercised by the guardians of national policy otherwise the abstract goal will be lost in the whirlpool of practical situation and policy will lose its direction. Thus the first major difficulty in following a national foreign policy is this: foreign policy goals are frequently abstract but they have to be pursued through concrete means.

The second major difficulty with following a national policy in foreign affairs is that foreign policy goals may sometimes be mutually contradictory. A nation may attempt to achieve two goals that are incompatible with each other. The contradiction in goals may not be serious so long as the goals remain abstract.) But when they are given concrete shape i.e. implementation a conflict becomes inevitable. The danger of this is that if the conflict is not quickly resolved it creates confusion in the minds of the people and leads to some sort of schizophrenia in national character.

The point which emerges from this is simple. The formulation of a correct, national foreign policy is beset with difficulties. But this formulation is not impossible. A nation must have clear idea about its policy goals otherwise its policy will lose direction and the nation will be at the mercy of interrelation events

The first task in formulating foreign policy is to identify national goals i.e., national interests. National interests are generally innumerable - some are permanent, while the others are temporary; some result from past experiences

while others crop up from present necessities ; some relate to the future while some are of immediate concern. Thus the conceivable range of interests is very broad and accurate abstractions from them like peace, security and also concrete objectives like annexation of land, increase of export etc. is necessary.

The second important step in evolving a national policy is to set the national interests against the total power reserve of a country i.e., to cut down the list of interests in consistence with the power available to achieve them. There are certain interests which cannot be cut. They represent some permanent and fixed obligations and, therefore, they must get the first priority. They are very much vital to national security ; hence they are called vital interest. There can be two types of objectives under the category of vital interests. The first type consists of permanent objectives such as security, freedom from foreign domination, territorial integrity etc. Certain historically sanctified policies like the Monroe Doctrine for the U. S. A. also belong to this category. There is also a second set of objectives which may not be an immediate concern for a state but nevertheless is vital for its security and independence. Such things as territorial annexations or adherence to a treaty etc. fall into this category.

Two things follow from this. First, vital interests are those which a nation already possesses or expects to possess because they are fundamentally important to its own existence. Secondly, speaking from the reverse standpoint, vital interests include those objectives which are of fundamental importance and as such cannot be subject to any alteration or substantial modification. In this capacity vital interests are intrinsically bound up with the preservation of a nation's status quo. This is why vital interests become predominantly and essentially conservative in this nature.

Vital interests are always linked up with the question of

security of a nation. The security of a nation, therefore, is the only effective test for the vitality of any objective. Hartmann considers vital interests to be such interests as for which a nation will go to war immediately or in future. From this assumption he concludes that the test of whether an interest is vital is simply this : Will a nation, unless it feels hopelessly outclassed in terms of power, go to war for the preservation of it ? If the answer is broadly yes, it is considered as vital interest.

Beyond vital interests there is another set of interests, generally called as secondary interests. According to Hartmann they are the residue of interests beyond vital interests. They are called secondary because a nation can sacrifice them without putting national security in jeopardy. The sacrifice of secondary interests in general cases, is balanced by an equivalent return. The secondary interests sometimes in effect take the shape or the attributes of vital interests due to a clash of rival powers over it. This happens when the prestige of a nation is at stake. In such cases ultimately the prestige of the nation becomes the vital interest and the secondary interests become vehicle of its expression.

From this two things follow. First, a secondary interest is subject to change ; secondly, a secondary interest may lead to another secondary interest when one becomes the vital interest under pressure of circumstances and the other becomes its attribute. As a result of these secondary interests become less conservative than vital interests and as such they are less coherent and consistent than vital interests. An adjustment between vital and secondary interests is possible but generally the dynamic character of national interests and national power go against it.

Q. 17. Write a brief note on the tasks of diplomacy.

Or,

What is diplomacy ? What are its functions ?

Definition :

In a broad sense diplomacy can be defined as the process of negotiation which the official governmental representatives of different nations carry on to adjust their national interests. Hartmann makes a common sense approach to the problem. Customarily, he says, diplomacy refers to the whole process of political relations of States. States resort to it for mutual adjustment of respective national interests. In this sense diplomacy becomes the means through which national policies with regard to international developments i.e., all foreign policies are put into execution. With such connotation diplomacy becomes a pursuit which is feasible in time of peace although it becomes active in time of war.

In Harold Nicolson's explanation the term diplomacy seems to cover a wide variety of senses. "In current language this word 'diplomacy' is carelessly taken to denote several quite different things. At one moment it is employed as a synonym for 'foreign policy', as when we say 'British diplomacy in the Near East has been lacking in vigour.' At another moment it signifies 'negotiation' as when we say 'The problem is one which might be well solved by diplomacy.' More specifically, the problem denotes the processes and machinery by which such negotiation is carried out. A fourth meaning is that of a branch of the Foreign Service, as one says 'my nephew is working for diplomacy'. And a fifth interpretation which this unfortunate word is made to carry is that of an abstract quality or gift, which, in its best sense, implies the skill in the conduct of international negotiation ; and, in its worse sense, implies that more guileful aspects of tact."

Criticising Harold Nicolson, Organski rejects many of his definitions. Diplomacy becomes too narrow in its meaning when it is accepted as simply skill and guile in international negotiation. To equate diplomacy with foreign policy on the other hand will be too broad to be accepted. Leaving these aside one can pin the definition down in the

expression "negotiationand the processes and machinery by which such negotiation is carried out." Organski takes up this standpoint and rounds up the problem in the line adopted by Hartmann. Diplomacy, so he defines it, "refers to the process of negotiation carried on between the official governmental representatives of one nation and those of another (or others)."

Functions :

Morgenthau explains the functions of diplomacy under the head 'tasks of diplomacy.' "Taken in its widest meaning," says Morgenthau, "comprising the whole range of foreign policy, the task of diplomacy is four fold : (i) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. (2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. (3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other. (4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives. Failure in any one of these tasks may jeopardise the success of foreign policy and with it the peace of the world."

A nation which sets itself goals which it cannot attain faces the risk of war. Such a nation is likely to exhaust its strength for a strenuous pursuit and naturally finds itself in no power to fight with equal strength at all points of friction and prevent an enemy state from challenging beyond endurance. This leads to the failure of foreign policy which in its turn compels the nation to redefine its goals on the basis of its actual strength. Sometimes a nation goes forward towards an unattainable goal under the pressure of public opinion, confuses that goal with true national interests and exhaust all its strength in the process. This in its turn forces the nation to undertake a rethinking of the problem in the light of its own strength.

It happens occasionally that diplomacy wrongly assesses

the goal and power of other nations. In such cases war becomes inevitable. If a nation mistakes a policy of status quo for a policy of imperialism and vice versa or confounds one kind of imperialism with another it is sure to invite war. If the nation which commits the error is strong enough to defend its own stand, it will then on its own accord go to war; if it is weak it invites attack and this leads to war. Thus errors of diplomacy in any case leads to war.

Diplomacy must take a comparative estimate of its own goals and that of other nations in the light of their compatibility. If they are compatible there can be no problem. If they are not compatible a nation must see to what extent its interests are vital and to what extent it can make sacrifices in order to adjust its own interests with that of other nations. This compromise or give-and-take is to be effected through diplomacy because reconciliation of interests is a function of diplomacy. If the incompatible interests of two nations appear vital to each other, they do not immediately go to war. Diplomacy offers them a means through which they may redefine their objectives and make them compatible to each other. Reconciliation in this way is sometimes possible through diplomacy but even then these two nations in order to defend this vital interests unconsciously go to the brink of war.

The final task of diplomacy which aims at preserving peace is to find out appropriate means for pursuing its objectives. Diplomacy can offer three means: persuasion, compromise and threat of force. No diplomacy can be intelligent if it solely relies upon any of these three means; nor can diplomacy claim to be peaceful if it is based wholly on the threat of force. This means that the foreign policy of a nation cannot be successful if it relies on a single means to the exclusion of other. Looking the other way a successful foreign policy must combine persuasion and compromise and this in its turn must be backed by occasional display of military might. Side by side with this diplomacy must

assess situations so that it can put right emphasis on any of these means at any particular moment. Finding out means is perhaps the most difficult task of diplomacy and this task must correctly be discharged in order to make the foreign policy of a nation a successful one.

Q. 18. Explain the functions of diplomats.

Or,

Write a brief note on diplomatic representation.

A diplomat is the representative of a state. His function, therefore, is to represent the interests of his country in one form or other. He is the agency through which a state tries to adjust its national interests and political relations with that of other states. In this sense a diplomat is the most effective medium of give-and-take between two countries. He is the agency through which a state collects information necessary for the formulation of foreign policy. When the foreign policy is formulated the diplomat serves to be the vehicle through which the foreign policy is implemented. Morgenthau says that diplomats together with the foreign office in the capital form the most effective organised instrument of diplomacy. "While the foreign office is the brains of foreign policy, the diplomatic representatives are its eyes, ears, and mouth, its fingertips, and, as it were its itinerant incarnations."

Diplomatic representation is of three kinds : symbolic, legal and political.

Symbolic representation means that a diplomat in his official capacity is the symbolic representative of his country. As such he fulfils symbolic functions and makes himself exposed to all such functions performed by other diplomats. In this way he fulfils his interactions with the government to which he is accredited. Such functions constitute a two-fold test. In the first place they serve to test the prestige a nation commands in international society. Secondly, they are also a test of the prestige in which his own nation

regards the country to whose government a diplomat is accredited. The Indian ambassador in London is India's diplomatic representative there. He represents the President of India as well as the government and the people of India at the official functions which he arranges like state dinners, receptions etc. or at those in which he is invited. In all these ceremonies the diplomat cannot participate as an individual. His participation is tantamount to symbolic representation of a country.

Like symbolic representation a diplomat has to fulfil legal representation. Legal representation means that in his official capacity a diplomat acts as the legal representative of his government. This means that he is the legal agent of his government and he is supposed to perform all legal function permitted by the Constitution of his own country and of that to which he is accredited. The orders of his government in this connection serve to be the main spring of his functions. Thus armed by the orders of the government and sanctions of the Constitution, a diplomat is entitled to make declaration, sign treaty or contracts obligating his government and represent his country in international conferences. For example, the American ambassador in London may be authorised to sign a treaty, ratify any document or make any important declaration concerning war and peace. He also gives legal protection to all American citizens there. If authorised he may represent his country at any international conference or in the General Assembly of the United Nations and cast vote in the name of his government.

A diplomat accomplishes the task of political representation when he together with the foreign office shapes the foreign policy of his country. "This is by far his most important function. As the foreign office is the nerve centre of foreign policy, so are the diplomatic representatives, its outlying fibers maintaining the two-way traffic between the centre and the outside world."

A diplomat has to discharge one major task of diplomacy namely the formulation of foreign policy. He has to assess the objectives of other nations and determine their actual and potential power necessary for the pursuit of those objectives. For this he has to keep himself informed about the plans of the government to which he is accredited. He gathers information through direct interrogation of government officials and political leaders, through canvassing the press and getting touch with other mouthpieces of public opinion. Furthermore, he has to assess the opposing trends within the government and political parties and their influence on government. He has to evaluate the potential influence of public opinion upon governmental policies. A foreign ambassador in London must keep his government informed about the present and probable future attitude of the British Government to international affairs. Upon the soundness of his judgment and report the success or failure of the foreign policy of his own government and its ability to preserve peace depends.

"When it comes to evaluating the actual and potential power of a nation," says Morgenthau, "the diplomatic mission takes on the aspects of a high-class and sub rosa spy organization." Diplomatic mission generally have members who are experts in various fields. They are collectively engaged in acquiring through all available means information about actual and planned ornaments, military potentials, economic trends, industrial developments and some other informations in various fields. All this information provide raw materials necessary for the formulation of a foreign policy. Therefore, such information must be accurate as far as possible and this accuracy is indispensable for the soundness of the decision of the home government.

Q. 19. Write a brief note on the Art of Negotiation as a Diplomatic means.

The term negotiation implies a process of mutual give-

and-take. It is a process through which two or more States adjust this national interests. In other words negotiation is just a vehicle by which a State implements its foreign policy.

The point which emerges out of this is simple. Negotiation is a compromise for it involves a delicate balance between what is wanted and what is given. This compromise is the fundamental spirit of diplomacy. Cambon considered diplomacy as an art of compromise. A diplomat is a negotiator per excellence. To know how and when to compromise is the hall-mark of an accomplished negotiator.

In older days negotiator was the term for diplomat although in present usage the term has come to assume a wider connotation. In the past negotiation meant an exclusive business of a diplomat. In the modern usage it is used as a descriptive term for one of the major tasks of the diplomat. The diplomat negotiates and this he does under the instruction of the home government. Whatever matter concerns him in a given time and under given circumstances goes into the scope of his negotiation. On one occasion he may be instructed to avoid war and on the other he would be asked to provoke war.

The very fact that a diplomat in his functions serves the instructions of his government makes him immune from blames and keeps him away from praise. Whether he deserves praise or blame depends upon how will he carries out the implementation of his country's policy. An inept execution of the implementation shows the inaptitude of the diplomat in the art of negotiation and therefore brings stigma on him. Otherwise any disreputation on his part arising from his failure must be explained in terms of the instructions sent by the home government i.e., in terms of the foreign policy of his government.

It follows from this that the major task of the diplomat as a negotiator is to apply his task and intelligence to the conduct of official relations between the governments of

sovereign states. In other words he has to apply intelligence to the task of successful execution of the instructions and tack to the task of avoiding failures. To what purpose and to what ends the diplomat would employ his capacity would be determined by the home government for they are matters of foreign policy and therefore, they do not fall in the purview of his functions.

In order to achieve the optimum result of his labour a diplomat as negotiator has to follow certain norms. In the first place, as both Hartmann and Cambon point out, a diplomat as a negotiators starts from the assumption that diplomacy means the art of governing things to a definite end, namely negotiation and that negotiation ends in compromise. In this sense a good diplomat is a good negotiator and a good negotiator is a good compromiser. A diplomat as a compromiser must know when and how to compromise and what to compromise if maximum benefit is to be derived out of the compromise.

From this follows the second norm of a diplomat's behaviour. His art of negotiation must effect a compromise whereby the greatest benefit must accrue to the state at a minimum cost. He must know very well the secondary interests of his state which are available for barter and must not, in his anxiety to resolve difficulties, effect unnecessary compromises at a high price. In other words he must get at the root of a problem and find out the finer points in it so that in conventional dealings he can avoid too many concessions to resolve a problem.

Thirdly, a diplomat must not base his negotiation on precarious basis. He must frame a logical and correct programme of action and turn every thing on account in accordance with it in order to get the desired object. He must be cautious in adjusting the demands that are calculated in their excessiveness to what is considered excessive in the position of his opponent.

Fourthly, a diplomat must make his negotiation as

flexible as possible within the frame work of official instructions. Finally, a diplomat must have patience. Diplomatic process is often very lengthy and protracted all negotiations must, therefore, be carried out patiently.

The art of negotiation has certain limitations. Compromise means readiness for accomodating matters i.e , willingness to make concession if necessary. Thus a psychological factor is involved in the matter of negotiation and this affects negotiation. The psychology of a nation may change just at the time when the process of negotiation is nearing fulfilment. A nation may lose its willingness to concede and the flexible character of negotiation is lost. The result is dead-lock in negotiation.

Negotiation essentially means compromise. Therefore, negotiation may suffer if such compromise is reached under compulsion. Some times the foreign policy of a nation takes the form of pure aggression. This results in dictated agreements. In such cases we get uneasy compromise and negotiation suffers. There may also be occasions when a nation bent on territorial expansion, may for a time be willing to compromise in its negotiations with other states. Therefore, each nation entering upon diplomatic negotiations must assess the objectives of other nations and determine whether it is dealing with a nation desirous of settling problems or intent upon making concession. Again we know that every nation when entering the field of negotiation keeps their vital interests aside and makes itself willing to barter away its secondary interests in order to reach a compromise solution. This means that every nation goes into negotiation for the solution of a problem but it remains confined to its own limitations which are imparted by the sacrosanct character of its vital interests.

Q. 20. Write a brief note on the following :

(a) Democratic Diplomacy (b) Open and secret Diplomacy. (c) Totalitarian Diplomacy (d) Personal Diplomacy,

Diplomacy customarily means the process by which states mutually adjust their national interests. In the past diplomacy was subject to constant change due to the dynastic character of civilization. In the modern age technological innovations and scientific discoveries produce stupendous bearing upon world politics and under changing circumstances diplomacy also changes its character. In fact, diplomacy has an everchanging character which becomes increasingly complicated as civilisation progresses from one generation to another. Therefore, the vehicle by which states adjusted or executed their policies, say before the First World War cannot remain the same today. World politics underwent a revolution in the meantime and corresponding changes took place both in diplomacy and in the approaches to it.

Democratic Diplomacy :

From the end of the nineteenth century diplomacy was fast undergoing a revolution. By the beginning of the twentieth century the term 'democratic diplomacy' has gone into extensive use. It symbolised a new order in world politics. It was an order in which governments were rapidly losing this aristocratic leaning; and their aloofness from the people. "Peoples were speaking to peoples through democratic representatives and informal channels." This change was more apparent than real. In its fundamental character the new order in diplomacy did not very much differ from the old. In the old order diplomacy remained to be rather an esoteric profession. It still remained so in the new order. But in the past men of wealth and influence carried out diplomacy. With the changing circumstances diplomacy came to be conducted with the assistance of a growing number of career officers. These officers were in new circumstances considered to be the elite guards of diplomacy. Ever since their training and competence were being steadily raised. It has thus been rightly said that diplomacy came to be put on a broadly professional and non-political basis.

The experience with 'democratic diplomacy' has not been

a happy one. "Too often it has been associated with the diplomacy of the market place, or even plebiscitary diplomacy—that is, with conditions under which important and delicate negotiations between states cannot possibly be conducted with success." Nicolson notes some of the evils of diplomacy. "The most potent source of danger," he says, "is the irresponsibility of the sovereign people." The second evil is the ignorance of the people about the foreign affairs of their state. The implication of these foreign affairs was not adequately grasped by them and so they could not apply a trained and informed mind to issues of foreign policies. Delay and imprecision were the two other dangers in democratic diplomacy." In a diplomacy public opinion sets limits to the freedom of diplomat's actions. Political leaders often dependent upon the public opinion were prone to taking indecisive decision or preferring 'a vague and confirming formula to a precise and binding definition'.

Secret vs. Open Diplomacy :

A significant change in the nature of contemporary diplomacy has been the shift from secret to open diplomacy. Hartmann considers this shift to be an 'ailment' of modern diplomacy. 'Ailment' here means defect in view of which diplomacy becomes increasingly complicated with the passage of time.

In a general sense, the shift from secret to open diplomacy has been the result of the growth of 'democratic diplomacy'. Palmer and Perkins make this point clear : " 'Democratic diplomacy' came to be associated in the popular mind with open rather than secret negotiations. Secrecy connoted undercover, shady dealings ; it was held to be incompatible with true democracy." Secret diplomacy was prevalent in old order. In contrast with open diplomacy it means secret obligations entered into by the heads of a state or its government. This engagement is entered upon without the knowledge or consent of the people. Such agreement is never permitted to stand the light of public scrutiny,

By contrast, open diplomacy refers to a process of negotiation which is shaped by a combination of public opinion and other existing conditions. The result of this process is a contract based on compromise which is always judged in the light of public opinion. In open diplomacy the veil of secrecy is lifted and the public opinion is always taken into consideration. At least the people are not kept in ignorance in open diplomacy. Thus the principle of open diplomacy involved a distrust of secret diplomacy coupled with somewhat a naive and wrong conception about the nature and function of diplomacy and diplomats.

The foregoing analysis of open and secret diplomacy has its limitations. In the past it was often found that secret diplomacy was secret only in the formal sense that they had not been published verbatim. Planned leaks often changed the character of secret diplomacy. Similarly open diplomacy is open in a formal sense that the process of negotiation is more or less revealed to the public. But it is not true that in open diplomacy public opinion is very much considered or state secrets appear to stand the test of public scrutiny. So the distinction between the two types of diplomacy is a very convenient but at the same time a rough and ready analysis which tends to confuse when probe is made into the very root of the problem.

The shift from the secret to open diplomacy began after the First World War. It resulted from an attempt to reconstruct the orderly world of politics that lay shattered by the First World War. Diplomacy was the symbol of international intercourse and was considered to be responsible for war and peace. The scholars of the day attributed the war to the failures and mistakes of the diplomats. This approach was viewed by others with scepticism. To them "diplomacy made an irresistible scapegoat, for if international conflicts could be avoided by changes in diplomatic technique, there existed an easy way out of post war difficulties back into the peace and order of the prewar

era." Out of this emerged the two different schools with their rival views about secret diplomacy.

The first major attack on orthodox diplomacy was launched by President Woodrow Wilson. In his famous fourteen points the goal of diplomacy was stated clearly : "Open covenants of peace. openly arrived at, after which there will be no private understanding of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed frankly and in the public view." The words 'open covenants openly arrived at' later became the slogan of those who sought to reform diplomacy.

The rival views about open and secret diplomacy have been nicely summed up by Organski :

"The people of a nation have a right to know what international commitments their government makes, because it is they who will be called upon to sacrifice their wealth and their lives to keep the pledges that their diplomats have made. In international as well as in internal affairs, democracy requires that governments be responsible to this people, but the people cannot exercise their rights unless they have full knowledge of what the government is doing. To the people of the world, battered and burned by a war of unprecedented horror which they felt had been foisted upon them by diplomats, such an argument had tremendous appeal. In the democratic nations it was irresistible.

The defenders of secret diplomacy soon conceded that the agreements made by diplomats should become public. To argue otherwise in democratic societies would have been indefensible. But they refused to concede that the negotiations, themselves, should be open to the public view. In other words, they accepted the idea of open covenants, but preferred to have them secretly arrived at. They argued with vigour that privacy was one of the prerequisites of success in international diplomacy..... that the glare of publicity would make diplomats into propagandists and force them to kowtow to momentary public prejudices."

The foregoing arguments from rival standpoints are partially true but none is very convincing. The case for open diplomacy is based on the assumption that open diplomacy is more democratic and that democratic control of international diplomacy which in its turn is based on the popular control of national policies, increases the chances of peace. This contention still borders on assumption because it is not proven by facts. Sometimes warlike leaders enjoy widespread popular support. Again humiliating terms are sometimes administered in international negotiations to peaceful nations. It would be nice to make diplomatic process subject to democratic control, but it would be wrong to assume that the problem of war would be solved thereby.

The arguments in favour of secret diplomacy are also based on some weak assumptions. For example it is wrongly argued that a negotiator loses flexibility if he has to negotiate in public. It is supposed that under fear of public criticism he cannot make any retreat from his original stand even if that retreat is to the advantage of his nation. By this assumption the major cause of inflexibility of modern diplomats is attributed to their being exposed to public scrutiny. This assumption has no evidence to sustain itself and therefore does not stand.

The assumption that private meetings produced tangible results in the world of secret diplomacy of the 19th century and that open negotiations are not very fruitful in the 20th century ignores the fact that modern diplomacy is conducted in changed circumstances. If open diplomacy does not bear fruit the reason is that "the diplomacy of recent years, both secret and open, has been a miserable failure" Again in the period of secret diplomacy, 'diplomacy... ..has never been kept secret from those whose support was necessary to the diplomats'. A. J. P. Taylor observes in his 'The Struggle for Mastery of Europe' that in the mid-19th century, "Though they (the diplomats) carried on the

mysteries of secret diplomacy, there were few real secrets in the diplomatic world."

Modern advocates of secret diplomacy do not maintain a rigid stand on behalf of it. They believe that the requirements of democracy can be fully met by making the agreements public after they are concluded. The implicit idea in it is that "there should be no secret arguments but only secret negotiations leading to agreements that are eventually made public....." If this is accepted the shift from the original stand of the advocates of secret diplomacy is complete and the major advantage of secrecy is sacrificed in favour of an adjustment of the old concept of diplomacy with the new outlook.

Totalitarian Diplomacy :

Totalitarian diplomacy means the kind of diplomacy which totalitarian states pursue for the fulfilment of their own ends. Totalitarian states in this connection imply ruthless dictatorships under which subordination of the individual to the collective will poses a challenge to the liberty of men. These states utilise modern innovations, political techniques and psychological power to extend their control over other states. They invoke and direct to that end new ideas like racial divisions or racial superiority, mysticism, militarism and the like. Like any other state they take diplomacy as an instrument of national policy, but they debase diplomacy and degrade its language and practice with conquest as the aim of the state diplomats become agents of espionage and double-dealing becomes their art. This means that with the totalitarian states diplomacy ceases to be a means for peace but in the contrary becomes an instrument for the provocation of dissension and misunderstanding.

Two things are to be noted about totalitarian diplomacy. First, diplomatic representatives of totalitarian states generally use general methods of diplomacy or common rules of procedure because such rules conceal their schemes of

aggression. Secondly, the old techniques of diplomacy are of little use in dealing with the totalitarian states. Diplomats generally have restricted movements in the capital of these totalitarian states. Their access to the governmental circle is also limited and they are always looked with suspicion. Negotiations with diplomats of totalitarian states often become protracted and sometimes degenerate into an endurance contest. The story of the European diplomacy in the thirties and some aspects of the diplomacy of the cold war provide examples of totalitarian diplomacy.

Personal Diplomacy :

Diplomacy is sometimes conducted not through the persons of diplomats or diplomatic agents but through the participation of very important personalities like Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers etc in diplomatic negotiations. Diplomacy effected by such personalities is called personal diplomacy. Many fateful decisions affecting the whole course of the Second World War and the postwar settlements were made during the personal meetings of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt or Truman. Sometimes these meetings give the formal and final shape to negotiations which remain in a fluid state among lower level of diplomats. On some other occasions the heads of states or VIPs directly approach to their counterparts in other countries. Churchill and Roosevelt for example developed the practice to a fine art during and after the Second World War.

Some political scientists consider the participation of heads of states in any discussions or their personal meetings highly undesirable. They say that the functions of the top officials of the State are decision making and policy-formulation. Negotiation will, therefore, be the function of diplomats. In the fifteenth century, Philip de Commares who is sometimes regarded as the 'father of modern history' observed : "It is the highest act of imprudence for two great princes, provided there is any equality in their power, to admit of an interview, unless it be in their youth, when

their minds are wholly engaged and taken up with entertainments of mirth and pleasure." It is sometimes true that personal diplomacy on a very high level comes to be based on subjective considerations which affect the vital interests of a State. Philip de Commires said that the princes should accommodate matters and their differences by the mediation of wise and faithful ministers. Harold Nicolson has also expressed his distaste for the participation of top policy-makers in international negotiations. Such participations, he says, result from a misunderstanding of the functions of top policy-makers and a confusion of distinctions between foreign policy and diplomacy. According to him negotiation is the function of professional diplomats and that ministers should keep to policy-making. Sisley Huddleston expressed similar views: "In foreign affairs in particular, a President, a Prime Minister, or any other high functionary of the State entrusted with the most vital responsibilities, should, first and last, make, as it were, an abstraction of himself."

Some experienced diplomats do not agree to this view. They say that sometimes solution of difficult problems may require resources beyond the command of qualified diplomats. There may be occasions when a particular issue can be solved by concessions which only high functionaries of the State can make. In a sense it is true. In the modern age of open diplomacy when the government is responsible to the public for its dealing of international affairs it is risky to depend upon intermediaries. Hence high dignitaries participate in international negotiations and personal diplomacy comes to effect.

Q. 21. Do you think that there has been a decline of diplomacy ? If so, what are the reasons ?

Defining diplomacy as the process of negotiation carried on between the official governmental representations of nations, one can safely say that such negotiations are not

of great importance in modern times in altering relations between nations. This means that diplomacy can no longer perform the role it did in the past. This decline of diplomacy set in with the end of the First World War and is a common place in the political observation of modern age. Even in the 'twenties there were diplomats who made somewhat important contributions to the formulation of foreign policies. In the confusion of the thirties diplomats' part in shaping foreign policy came to be drastically contracted. Ever since the decline of diplomacy as a technique of conducting foreign affairs has been very rapid. After the Second World War, diplomacy lost all its vitality and as a means for peace it has been reduced to utter insignificance.

Morgenthau attributes this decline to five important factors. The first and most obvious factor is the development of modern communications. Morgenthau writes: Diplomacy owes its rise in part to the absence of speedy communications in a period when the governments of the new territorial States maintained continuous political relations with each other. Diplomacy owes its decline in part to the development of speedy and regular communications in the form of the airplane, the radio, the telegraph, the teletype, the long-distance telephone." It is true indeed that the development of communications has put diplomats abroad in close and continuous contact with authorities at home. This has deprived them of the freedom and initiative which they formerly enjoyed.

The technological developments coincided with the depreciation of diplomacy. This depreciation somewhat explains the discard into which the traditional methods of diplomacy have fallen. Morgenthau writes: "To the technological ability to part with the services of diplomacy must be added the conviction that those services ought to be parted because they not only contribute nothing to the cause of peace, but actually endanger it. This conviction grew in the same soil that nourished the conception of

power politics as an accident of history to be eliminated at will."

Diplomacy, it should be noted, is connected with the modern state system and both constitute the scope of modern international relations. Therefore, the hostility to diplomacy as a result of its depreciations shows the weakness of the modern state system and the kind of international politics it has produced. The depreciation of diplomacy mainly results from the general revulsion against secrecy as a diplomatic technique. The opinion that gained currency after the First World War was that the war was due to a large extent to the secret machinations of diplomats. Wilson was the most eloquent spokesman of this new thought. The Preamble to the Fourteen Points states :

"It will be our wish and purpose that the process of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind."

This new revulsion against diplomats is simply a continuation of the old prejudice against those persons who were looked down upon as dishonest intriguers.

With the rise of this new idea about diplomacy was associated the third factor of its decline. In pursuit of this new idea the modern statesmen evolved the practice of 'diplomacy by conference.' The creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations as the forum for a new types of diplomatic intercourse marked a departure from the established pattern of diplomacy. The parliamentary methods of transacting the business of diplomacy of which the operations of the General Assembly of the United Nations are typical, undermined the importance of old-type diplomacy.

The entry into international politics of two super powers namely Russia and the United States is the fourth factor that accounts for the decline of old diplomacy. For different reasons these two powers deviated from the

wellknown track of orthodox diplomacy. The United States could not build up an adequate Foreign Service. The Soviet Union requires its diplomats to conform rigidly to official instruction. As a result a diplomat ceases to be a negotiator and becomes a messenger. Thus the absence of adequate instruments for diplomatic intercourse has forced these two nations to build up new systems under which the old method of diplomatic transactions is bound to disappear.

The nature of contemporary world politics, particularly the relation between Soviet Russia and America with the dominating cold war idea of 'inflexible opposition', also contributes to the decline of diplomacy. As there is little room for compromise and adjustment, diplomacy cannot function properly. Morgenthau says : "Given the nature of the power relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and given the states of mind these two super-powers bring to bear upon their mutual relations, diplomacy has little with which to operate and tends to become obsolete. Under such moral and political condition, it is not the sensitive, flexible, and versatile mind of the diplomat, but the rigid, relentless, and one-track mind of the crusader that guides the destiny of nations. The crusading mind knows nothing of persuasion and compromise. It knows only of victory and of defeat."

Q. 22. What is International Law ? Is International Law true law ?

Definition :

International Law has been variously defined by various authorities. Oppenheim, a standard authority, defined it as "the name for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally binding by civilized States in their intercourse with each other." International Law to him is "a law for the intercourse of States with one another, not a law for individual," "a law between, not above, the single States." This definition was

given as early as 1905. In 1931 a new definition was given by Ellery C. Stowell. "International Law," he says, "embodies certain rules relating to human relations throughout the world, which are generally observed by mankind and enforced primarily through the agency of the governments of the independent communities into which humanity is divided." In 1948 Philip C. Jessup considered International Law to be a "law applicable to relations between states." But he was aware of the growing opposition to this traditional concept. He knew that individuals were increasingly becoming subject to international law. Therefore, he outlined a "modern law of nations" which would be applicable to individuals as their relations with states and even to certain internationalships of individuals. Another definition is given by Fenwick. He says that International Law is "the body of rules accepted by the general community of nations as defining their rights and the means of procedure by which those rights may be protected or violations of them redressed."

Is International Law true law ?

Some writers of the Austirian School challenge the validity of the term International Law. They say that International Law is a branch of International Morality and as such cannot be called law. They follow the simple argument that it is not a command of superior and there is no sanction or machinery of enforcement behind it. Any system of rules which has no binding force cannot be regarded as law.

Against this charge it can be pointed out that "international law, unlike domestic law, is very limited in scope and that the greater portion of international relations has not come within its jurisdiction at all. While it may be true that it should govern all the relations of states, traditional international law in reality has applied only to those subjects on which states have agreed that it should apply". Naturally International Law cannot be so much binding as domestic law.

It is true that laws to which states must submit have no sovereignty in the sense that domestic laws have. Still they are called law and this is the paradox of International Law. Some authorities try to explain this contradiction by introducing what is called the theory of consent — "that is by insisting that states cannot be bound without their own consent but once consent has been given they are bound without infringement of their sovereignty because the limitations were voluntarily accepted. More generally, it is held that states enter the community of nations with the assumption that they accept its laws and that the continued general observance of certain rules of conduct implies a tacit acceptance of those rules." The theory of consent has its limitations. What will happen to sovereignty if a state is bound against its will? The theory of consent does not answers to this question.

As against the Austrian critics of International Law Oppenheim takes a stand in its defence. Law, he says, is "a body of rules for human conduct within a community which by common consent of this community, shall be enforced by external powers." This definition of law implies these conditions : (1) there should be a community ; (2) there should be a body of rules governing human conduct within their community ; (3) the community must agree that these rules will be enforced by external powers (i.e. 'external to the person against whom they are enforced'). International Law stands for all these conditions. The Family of Nations in the community where International Law comes into operation. All intercourse between nations in this community are conducted through a body of rules based on custom and agreement. There is also a general consent of the community that these rules should be enforced by external power. Thus by the standard set by Oppenheim International Law is perfect law although it is not as effective as domestic law.

From the foregoing analysis a significant point emerges the argument against International Law that it is no law

because 'where there is violence and obvious injustice there is no law' has no meaning. The absence of centralised legislative, judicial and executive authority does not disqualify International Law as true law. Quincy Wright says, "A considerable failure of realisation is.....to be expected of any rule of jural law." Eagleton points out, "the theorist who wishes to deny to the law of nations the title of true law does not in the least affect the actual conduct of affairs in that society, nor the fact that those affairs are regulated by rules as well enforced and obeyed as those of domestic law." Oppenheim perhaps makes the point most clear: "Violations of International Law are certainly frequent, especially during war. But the offenders always try to prove that their acts do not constitute a violation, and that they have a right to act as they do according to the Law of Nations, or at least that no rule of the Law of Nations is against their acts. The fact is that states, in breaking the Law of Nations, never deny its existence, but recognise its existence through the endeavour to interpret the Law of Nations as justifying their conduct."

Q. 23. Write a critical note on the source of International Law.

The method by which International Law develops is what is meant by 'Source'. There is no supernational legislature and, therefore, International Law grew out of the need of nations," says Hartmann. Over centuries nations have voluntarily or under compulsion subjected themselves to certain body of rules which regulate their intercourse. What sort of method will be applied to regulate the relations of different nations depends upon the particular necessities that have brought these nations together. Upon these methods and these necessities depend the content of International Law.

The sources of International Law are briefly stated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Accord-

ing to Article 38 of the Statute the Court in deciding disputes that are submitted to it, must apply.

(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states ;

(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law ;

(c) The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations ;

(d)judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law."

Thus there are four sources of International Law :

(1) Treaties and agreements, (2) Custom, (3) Reason, and (4) Authority.

Treaties :

"Treaties and agreements create rules 'expressly recognized' by the contesting nations. In other words, nations are bound by treaties that they have ratified.....no nations is bound by a contractual agreement that it has not legally accepted."

Treaties were concluded in the past, as early as 13th century B.C. But it is only of recent times that they have become the most important source of International Law. Only law-making and not all treaties are treated as sources of International Law. Such treaties are, generally bilateral or multilateral. They "stipulate new general rules for future International conduct or confirm, define or abolish existing customary or conventional rules of a general character". The example of this sort of treaties is the covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the United Nations. Law-making multilateral treaties generally contain scope of universal application.

Treaties, as the source of International Law have their own limitations. Any contractual obligation in the form of treaties which create International Law binding on each

state is a matter of independent choosing for any state. The other sources of International Law generally apply to all states and sometimes states which do not confirm them have no escapes from them. But in case of treaties, the general practice is that states voluntarily go into obligations through voluntary ratification of certain treaties. Thus states are free to accept or reject any proposed treaty. In other words they are free to bind themselves to any obligation or not as they please. The result of this is that the enactment of universal or quasi-universal legislation has never been a quick process in International Relations.

Customs :

Custom is the second source of International Law. It is much older source than treaties. Oppenheim considers custom to be the real basis of International Law. Custom in International Relations means the common consent of states with regard to certain practice. Consent may be explicit i.e., in the form of a treaty or implicit i.e., in the form of certain behaviour or conduct which a state would not follow if it does not consent. Thus consent as the basis of custom forms with treaties the exclusive sources of International Law.

Hartmann says that "..... customs and usages, once evolved, acquire legal validity." He adds that customary law which rests upon general consent and is independent of any treaty, arises out of mutual convenience of states. Such customary laws are generally applicable to all states.

Reason :

Reason is the third source of International Law. This is necessary for situation may arise when treaty provisions and customary rules may not apply to a particular case in point. In such case International Law must be guided by 'general principles of law.' These 'general principles of law' have to be determined through a process of reason and logic that will in its turn determine what general

principles fit the particular case. In other words, scholars who accept 'Reason' as the source of International Law generally mean that 'Reason' is to guide the International Court in selecting a principle of law recognised by the civilised nations for application to a particular case.

Authority :

Authority is the fourth source of International Law. Hartmann says that authority is needed for the elucidation of obscure points. What authority as the source of International Law means has been explained by Mr. Justice Gray in his verdict over the famous Paquete Habana case which arose out of an incident in the Spanish-American War involving the capture of fishing vessels by the American warships : "where there is no treaty..... resort must be had to the customs and usages.....and as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labour, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat." Thus authority means judicial decision and teachings of publicists. In this capacity authority forms the subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.

Q. 24. How can International legal disputes be settled through judicial Machinery.

Or,

Write a brief note on arbitration and adjudication as the methods for the settlement of international disputes.

International Courts :

International disputes are generally settled by international courts. The first international court, in the modern sense of the term was established in 1899 by the First Hague Peace Conference. It was called the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. Before 1899 international judicial bodies were mainly adhoc tribunals. The Permanent Court of Arbitration at Hague was a 'primitive type of court'. Resort to it was voluntary.

Since the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at Hague international court underwent an evolution. In 1922 the Permanent Court of International Justice was established as an integral part of the League System. When the United Nations came into existence this Court came to be superseded by the International Court of Justice. This court is the principal judicial organ of the U. N. The stability of this court is a part of the U. N. Charter.

Jurisdiction of International Court of Justice :

According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice "the jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in the treaties and conventions in force". This statement indicates the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It should be noted that the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is very limited. But by special agreements states may sometime accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over matters such as concerning the interpretation of a treaty or any question of International Law. In doing so states often make reservations for safeguarding their vital interests. That apart the jurisdiction of the Court is generally based on voluntary acceptance by States.

Arbitration :

Arbitration is a judicial process for settling international legal disputes. Since its task is to decide dispute it cannot in any case be an attempt at accommodation, nor can it be any friendly counsel. It is a binding decree which must keep to the letter of the law regardless of the cost or embarrassment to the contending parties. It is one of the most useful methods of legal settlement.

The essential nature of arbitration was made clear in Article 37 of the Hague Convention adopted in 1899 at the First Hague Conference :

"International arbitration has for its object the settle-

ment of disputes between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law.

Recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to submit in good faith to an award."

Arbitration, therefore, has three aspects: (a) The contending parties choose their own judges, (b) These judges decide the case on a basis of respect for law, and finally, (c) The decision is binding.

Apparently arbitration is a very simple method of legal settlement. It was evolved many centuries ago. It gained favour with the Greeks. Even the Pope frequently took resort to arbitration as a method for settling disputes between States. In the nineteenth century, as Hartmann points out, resort to arbitration was generally made on an ad hoc basis, that is, State would often decide to use arbitration in some particular cases only. There were, of course, some bi-lateral treaties which provided before hand for the submission of certain classes of disputes to arbitration. All this was important. It meant that ever since Grotius International Law had existed without any control or general international court to which legal disputes could be referred. Arbitration was, however, becoming institutionalised in the course of time and this was mainly on a bi-lateral treaty basis.

Conscious attempts to institutionalise arbitration by creating permanent courts of arbitration and thereby to provide machinery for the judicial settlement of disputes, date from the First Hague Conference of 1899. Truly speaking the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was established in this year was neither permanent nor a court. It was simply a panel of arbitrators whose names were to be drawn upon if disputing states so chose. Nevertheless it is looked upon as the first international court for settling international legal disputes.

Resort to the Hague Court is purely voluntary. Article 38 of the Hague Convention makes this point clear :

"In question of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation or application of international conventions, arbitration is recognised by the contracting powers as the most effective and.....most equitable means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle.

Consequently it would be desirable that, in disputes about the above-mentioned questions, [the parties should use arbitration] in so far as circumstances permit."

It follows from this that "no State is bound actually to use arbitration under the provisions of the Hague Convention: the provisions are there for them to use if they find it convenient and desirable. However if they do use it, they are bound by the decision." "The Hague Court, therefore, although it marks an advance in the institutionalising of arbitration, adds no feature of compulsory resort to the Court."

In spite of its limitations the Hague Court was successfully utilised in no less than fifteen cases prior to 1914. These cases included the Venezuelan debt controversy of 1904 which involved Germany, Great Britain and Italy, and the Newfoundland fisheries dispute between Great Britain and the United States. This Court is still in existence but it has been little used since the coming into existence of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922.

Adjudication :

In a very general sense adjudication is a form of arbitration. In it a permanent court is the arbitral tribunal. Three things distinguish arbitration from judicial procedure or adjudication: "The nomination of the arbitrators by the parties concerned, the selection by these parties of the principles upon which the tribunal should base its findings, and finally its character of voluntary jurisdiction. The boundary between the two kinds of judicial procedure cannot be definitely fixed." "Because it is less impromptu

than arbitration and requires permanent tribunals, judicial settlement assures 'a larger measure of jurisdictional and procedural consistency. It should also assure a somewhat more favourable climate for the progress of the law from precedent to precedent."

Attempts at making the states understand the necessity of compulsory adjudication of disputes have been made for a long time, at least from the time of the First Hague Conference. But such attempts bore little fruit because the peculiar nature of the state system was not very conducive to really binding limitations on the separate states. The general predilection in international politics to maintain reservations over matters such as 'vital interests', 'national honour' or matters of 'domestic concern' often baffled agreements to resort to adjudication as a means for settling disputes. These reservations are very broad and general and any unilateral interpretation which cancels the original commitment fits into it. The result is that the system of adjudication could not develop and the Hague Convention only called for resort to arbitration "in so far as circumstances permit."

The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice as a part of the League System was the first significant step towards the system of compulsory adjudication. With the demise of the League this Court came to be replaced by the new International Court of Justice the statute of which forms an integral part of the U. N. Charter. The title of the new Court eliminated the idea implicit in the title of the old court that there is such thing as 'international' justice as distinct from justice pure and simple.

The United Nations Court is essentially a Court of adjudication. Hartmann says: "the real difference between proceedings in arbitration and adjudication is not to be found in the type of law applied, nor in the binding character of decisionsbut in the composition of the Court. Unlike

arbitral panels whose membership may vary almost infinitely, the composition of the court of adjudication remains the same, case after case. The same judges, barring sickness, absence on leave, personal disqualification on the part of a justice, or other such usual reservations to such a statement, sit each time."

The advantage of this court of adjudication lies in its membership. Article 3 of the Court provides that it "shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state." The procedure of selecting members is aimed at making the membership as universal as possible. In the first place the members of the Hague list of arbitrators nominate certain members. Their names are then forwarded to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. These two bodies then vote independently to fill the vacancies by an absolute majority vote. A member is selected only when he receives such a vote in both bodies. If a vacancy is not filled this way even after three sessions, the problem is placed before a joint conference of three members from both the Council and the Assembly. This conference meets only to arrive at the agreement as to who will be elected by a fourth meeting of both organs. If the deadlock is not resolved, the members of the court already elected fill the remaining vacancies by selecting candidates from among those who had already obtained votes in one or the other of the two organs. Generally the members serve a tenure of nine years but the re-election of judges is not unusual. In this way the Court "represents not only the major legal systems of the world but also the major great powers and important secondary powers as well."

Article 31 of the Statute of the Court states the advantages of this system of selection and thereby explains why other smaller states who have little chance of place on the Court, agree to this method of selection. Article 31 provides that when a dispute comes before the Court, "judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their

right to sit." "If the Court includes.....a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a judge" barring cases where "there be several parties in the same interest, they shallbe reckoned as one party only." "If the Court includes no judge of the nationality of the parties each ...may proceed to choose a judge" to be on the Court for that particular case.

In this way Article 31 assures the contending parties of having one judge of its nationality as the member of the bench or of having in any way a member of the bench to represent its own interest. Thus the process of adjudication offers more than arbitration does the prospect of impartial bench even after recognising the sovereign equality of states as a valid principle.

Article 36 of the Statute of the United Nations Court defines the jurisdiction of the Court :

(1) The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or its treaties and conventions in force.

(2) The States-parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning :

- (a) the interpretation of treaty ,
- (b) any question of international law ;
- (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation ;
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

(3) The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.

The jurisdiction thus defined is substantially the same as Article 36 of the Statute of the League Court. Resort to

this Court is voluntary but the "Optional Clause" of Paragraph 2 also provides it with a compulsory jurisdiction.

Q. 25. What is war ? What are its causes ?

Definition :

The term war in the context of contemporary politics and modern international relation assumes many meanings. Today we hear of 'cold war', psychological war, total war, propaganda war, preventive war and so on. Despite this variation in meanings war remains to be an instrument of national policy. Resort to this instrument is made when other instruments fail. Quincy Wright defines war as "a violent contact of distinct but similar entities." He says that in a narrower sense war means "the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force." The German student of war, Karl von Clausewitz takes a cynical approach to international relations and defines war as "a part of political intercourse." To him war is "by no means an independent thing in itself," it "is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means."

Oppenheim offers a simple definition of war. War, he says, is "a contention between two or more states through this armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases." This is a very simple definition from a commonsense approach and does not take into consideration the other intricacies of the problem.

Causes of War :

War is the result of different and diverse set of causes. We have bewildering number of theories about the causes of war. Prof. Sidney Fay in his work "Origins of the World War" has called the system of secret alliances the most important underlying cause of war. Other underlying causes are militarism, nationalism, economic imperialism and new-

papers, press etc. Prof. Quincy Wright believes that "war has politico-technological, juro-ideological, socio-religious and psycho-economic causes. Prof. Turner has listed forty-one causes of war under the headings economic, dynastic, religious and sentimental. Prof. Hodges has listed twenty-one causes of war under four 'primary causes'—social, political, strategic and economic. On the top of these there are Wickham Steed's contention that fear is the cause of war and Arnold Brecht's assertion that there is a cause of war because "there are sovereign states and a very great many of them." The 'devil theory of war' considers war to be the work of 'international bankers' and the 'munition makers' who wanted to profit by it. Another simple explanation regards war to be the work of evilmen in position of political power. Hitler's activities, they say, or the demand to 'Hang the Kaiser' provide evidence for this theory.

None of these theories appears to be very sound. Quite different from these and unusual in its nature is the Marxist approach to the problem which seems to have some national validity of its own. Marxist writers assert that wars are caused by the stresses and strains of monopolistic competition. Hartmann gives a summary of this approach : "..... wars occur under capitalism because private business, finding itself soon in danger of oversupplying its own domestic market, must continually expand to find new markets and sources of raw materials, and new possibilities for the more lucrative investment of profits.....this leads in the first stage to the colonial conquests by the capitalistic powers But after all the available lands have been expropriated and exploited, the incessant demand for more leads to wars among the capitalist powers themselves. In Lenin's view, capitalism caused wars. It followed that with the destruction of private capitalism wars would no longer occur."

Hartmann gives a very simple explanation of war. He says that nations resort to war because war offers the consumption of their national interests. Different states have

different national interests and, therefore, international politics becomes the field of sharp interaction of diverse and complex sets of foreign politics. This is a natural thing in a multistate system which permits individual states to decide when its vital national interests are threatened. Thus under multistate system national interests which often clash on international field fosters the spirit of war. Hartmann explicitly says that "the basic cause for war in the multistate system is that individual states decide for themselves when they have a cause for war. Any cause is enough cause if a state thinks it is." "The causes of war are thus individual by states as well as functional by types. The study of neither can be neglected."

Q. 26. Write a brief note on Total War.

When a war becomes all-embracing in any of its aspects it becomes a total war. Its examples are intensive use of human masses fired by strong emotions, total absorption of every activity of the society in the process of war or a complete mobilisation of a country's resources in it. The total war is not a new thing. It was there in the past but with the advance of time it has changed its characters so that in the twentieth century it no longer consists in the regular and methodical use of 'material parts' like fortifications, supplies etc. but has alarmingly increased in its scope.

Morgenthau says that war in our times becomes total in four different respects : (i) "With respect to the fraction of the population completely identified in its emotions and convictions with the wars of its nation." Here war is total in its psychological aspect. A war can also be total with respect to the (ii) "fraction of the population participating in war, (iii) the fraction of the population affected by war, and (iv) the objective pursued by war." The wars which become total in first three respects appear to have almost the same nature and Morgenthau connects them under the phrase 'war of total population.'

The first kind of Total War results from a complete identification of the masses of individual citizens with the war in which their country is engaged. This happens when two factors—one moral and the other empirical—come to play. The moral factor is the revival in the twentieth century of the doctrine of just war. It means that of the two contending powers in a war one has legal and moral rights and the other does not. This doctrine is in no way near to the concept of righteousness on one side as against the guilt of other—a view very much familiar with the medieval Schoolmen, but is akin to the idea that the Sovereign is to make war as an accuser and a judge. This definition increases the possibility of making any war just. The empirical factor lies in the possibility of universal military service through conscription. In such cases of conscription the whole nation operating in the capacity of army comes to be identified with the cause of war. Whether the people are charged with patriotism or what character the war assumes is a point which has no relevance here. The French system of conscription in the time of the French Revolution or the Napoleonic wars is a case in point.

The second kind of Total War results only when the population participant in the war is large. The concept of nation-at-work which is possible through effecting simultaneously universal conscription and the participation of women in auxiliary services, gives an idea of this kind of war. This sort of participation in war can either be military and economic. In other words the increase in the size of army and the mechanisation of warfare can make a war total in its scope.

A third kind of Total War is possible when the whole population becomes the prospective victims of it. People can be affected by war either directly or indirectly. Increased taxation, economic hardships, compulsory services etc. are examples of indirect consequences of war. The direct effect of war is generally measured by its destructive-

ness. High figures of losses are characteristics of Total War. Modern wars are enormously destructive and the cause is the mechanisation of modern warfare. This mechanisation has two-fold aspects : Mechanisation of transportation and communication as well as mechanisation of weapons. The effect of this mechanization is the expansion of the capacity to eliminate an unprecedented number of enemy by a single operation and over a long distance. To this should be added the mechanisation of modern life and culture. Thus there is an overall mechanisation which presupposes the possibility of Total War.

A mechanised Total War aims at world domination. This is the fourth and final aspect of Total War. Morgenthau points out that a mechanised Total War is the result of the evolution in the productive processes of the modern age. This war as a result, deriving a terrible all-embracing impetus from increased mechanisation, seems to be satisfied only with world dominion. This war, in that case will be a global conflagration—a war for total stakes.

Q. 27. What is Balance of Power ? What are its techniques ?

Historical background :

The concept of the balance of power exists in a multiple-state system. It was known to the ancient world and was conspicuously applied by the city-states of Greece, as well as in Egypt, India and China. The balance of power was "a prevailing notion of ancient times", says David Hume. The idea suffered very much with the advent of the Roman World-State. It was almost non-existent in the Middle Ages or as Quincy Wright points out, "scarcely existed anywhere as a conscious principle of international politics before 1500." In the subsequent years the emergence of the nation-state system ensured the rise of the concept of balance of power. It held sway in European politics during the two preceding centuries. Quincy Wright says, "While

other factors have had an influence, the concept of the balance of power provides the most general explanation for the oscillations of peace and war in Europe since the Thirty Years War". In the modern age the concept has lost its importance and certainly in present conditions it operates less effectively than in the previous centuries.

Definition :

The concept of the balance of power has no agreed definition. It is used in so many different senses that it is almost regarded as a 'bewildering phrase.' Some like Professor Pollard have tried to give a simple working definition of the concept while others like Ernst B. Hass have tried to sort out the principal meanings of balance of power and find out a definition out of it. Pollard takes balance of power as it is applied to a world of sovereign states uncontrolled by effective supranational agencies. To him balance of power is, therefore, a system of applying, through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures, checks to one power as a combination of powers so that they may not threaten the security of the rest. As against Pollard, Ernst Hass finds that the concept of balance of power has eight discrete meanings. It implies any distribution of power, a balance or equilibrium, hegemony or imbalance, stability and peace, instability and war, power politics generally, a universal law of history and a system and guide to policy-makers.

George Schwarzenberger offers a simple approach to the problem. He considers balance of power to be an "equilibrium"—"a certain amount of stability in international relations." This stability is produced by an alliance of states. In this sense balance of power "is of universal application wherever a number of sovereign and armed States co-exist." Thus Schwarzenberger considers balance of power as the inevitable outcome of the nation-state system. The same stand is taken by Sidney Fay: "It means such a 'just equilibrium' in power among the members of the family of

nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others." Hans Morgenthau originally accepting balance of power as "only a particular manifestation of a general social principle" goes on to say that "whenever the term is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality."

Techniques of balance of powers :

Techniques of balance of power means devices through which it is effected and maintained. These techniques are followed by states in competing for power advantage. Such techniques are necessary because balance of power itself is a very uncertain regulator and it creates an equilibrium which is at best temporary and improvised. Therefore, even under ideal conditions its operation requires good deal of skill and technique without which it will never be effective. Of the techniques of balance of power, following are important :

(1) The acquisition of allies—This is the process of alliance and counter-alliance. The acquisition of external allies to increase power is an old technique of effecting balance of power. It is perhaps the commonest device of the balance of power system. The famous Triple Alliance and Triple Entente are its examples.

Alliances are of two types : offensive and defensive. An offensive alliance aims at destroying the balance in favour of its members. A defensive alliance seeks to restore the balance or uphold it in favour of the states which make up the alliance. The third kind of alliance is called the 'Strange Alliance.' It is the joining of unlikes. It occurs in the face of desperate urgency and, therefore, has its temporary effectiveness.

There are two major pre-requisites for achieving effectively any of these alliances : first, power enough to secure the purpose for which it is formed whether that be aggression

or deference ; second, common fundamental interest between or among the allying states. There are some other factors like geography, cultural similarities, complementary economics etc. which sometimes make alliance possible.

Out of these alliances two kinds of balance emerge : regional balance created by localised alliance and general balance created by a big alliance including a number of countries and affecting a host of other countries indirectly. Before 1902 Japan and Russia formed a local balance while the Allied powers vis-a-vis the axis powers during the war period formed a general world balance.

(2) The acquisition of Territory-Division and annexation of territory provide the simplest means for any acquisition of territory. Examples include the partition of Poland, the partition of Africa, the Congress of Berlin etc. The territory which is acquired by a country may be either contiguous to its existing frontier or in colonial or non-contiguous areas. Territorial acquisitions are made some times in concert and sometimes at the expense of rival powers. Territory is also acquired sometimes as compensations. "The bargaining of diplomatic negotiations, issuing in political compromise", says Morgenthau "is but the principle of compensations in its most general form, and as such it is originally connected with the balance of powers".

(3) The creation of buffer states—The balance between two rival powers is effected by creating a buffer state. This is a very ancient technique of balance of power. This technique arises from the neutralisation through mutual consent of a strategic zone which neither power can afford to allow the other to occupy unilaterally and permanently. This balance of power technique does not come to force in a bipolar world where there are no neutral areas. Examples of buffer states include Afghanistan which maintained balance between Russia and British empire in India, Korea which was a balance between Russia and Japan and also Holland and Belgium in Europe.

According to Martin Wright "the most important buffer zone in the world is that dividing Russia from the British Empire." This is an area of weak states, rising nationalisms, formidable geographic barriers, vast distances and conflicting interests among great powers. This area includes a big part of the 'Inner crescent' of Sir Halford Mackinder and of the 'Rimland' of Nicholas Spykman. In view of the contemporary politics this area has achieved great importance. It may be of even greater significance in the future.

(4) Undermining enemy strength: This technique aims at producing or exploiting a weakening of the strength of the potential or actual enemy. This is accomplished through the use of propaganda and diplomacy or combination of the two. It has two major aims, weakening of the coalition of the prospective or actual enemy by detaching or semi-detaching one or more of its member from the coalition and destroying the hopes of the enemies of gaining new allies from neutral or uncommitted states. Achievement of the first depends upon a proper exploitation of the diverse tendencies in the enemy camp. These tendencies are suppressed if the peril is apparent and the coalition becomes hard to dissolve. If the coalition is a numerically large bloc, its unity is hard to preserve. Upon this depends the second, i.e., the detachment of the enemy's allies or exploiting any such detachment. Such detachment means that the enemy loses its power and his morale faces crisis as a result of the thought that his bloc is falling apart.

(5) Armament and disarmament—The general theory of this technique is that a race for armaments disrupts the balance while the balance is preserved by the reduction of the armaments. The achievement of this technique is a difficult task and history contains records of failures of several attempts at disarmament in the past. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 is an instance of this technique.

(6) **Intervention and non-intervention**—This technique was very effectively resorted to in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, particularly in Europe. This technique is generally employed countries which are in the position of balances. Great Britain did it very frequently in the past. There are different types of intervention, starting from a slight deviation from neutrality in the traditional sense to full-scale military participation in a major war. Non-intervention suggests a peaceful policy generally followed by smaller and weaker states or by those great powers which are more or less satisfied with the existing political order. Neutrality generally falls into this category of technique. Non-intervention is a peaceful method of preserving balance and its importance lies in its efficiency in keeping a war localized.

(7) **Divide and Rule**—It is a very old technique and was employed by the Romans to maintain their control over the scattered peoples. In the nineteenth and twentieth century it was followed by the imperialists powers to keep native population in subjection. The partition of Bengal in 1905, the policy of France and other powers towards Germany after its defeats, the policy of England towards the continent ever since the days of Henry VIII are some of the outstanding examples of this technique.

Q. 28. Is Balance of Power tenable in modern international politics ?

Or,

Write a note on Balance of Power today.

In the twentieth century, it is said, the concept of balance of power has declined. Therefore, this century cannot be regarded as an age for balance of power. Any power balance in the present day politics will tend to become a world system. Under the impact of new forces the system has become invalid of these new forces important are nationalism, industrialism, democracy, development of

international organisations, disappearance of colonial frontiers, growing economic interdependence of peoples etc. All these forces have made balance of power at once too simple and too difficult a policy.

Behind the decline of the concept of balance of power one can detect four major factors. These factors are : (i) The growing bipolarity of powers under which the disappearance of a balance in the balance of power system is logical ; (ii) the frightening implications of total war resulting from an increase in the power of the offensive or the defensive. This factor is important because it makes the balances hesitate to get involved in any struggle to right the balance ; (iii) the growing importance of ideologies and its gradual association with the concept of power ; (iv) the growing disparities in the power of states. Super powers are becoming more and more powerful and smaller powers are suffering increasingly in relative terms.

The decline of the concept of balance of power is very much substantiated by the falling of Britain from her old role of balances. Mr. Bevin declared in the British House of Commons on January 22, 1948 that "the old fashioned conception of the balance of power as an aid should be discarded if possible." He was probably the first man in the diplomatic circle to recognize the change in the British position. For a time after the Second World War, many thought that Britain who was still the ruler of a far-flung empire would emerge as a kind of "third force" and act as a balance between the rival giants, the Soviet Union and the United States. But the weakness of Britain and her commonwealth proved to be greater than was originally anticipated and the chances of her becoming a balance in International politics became highly remote.

From Britain's fall from the position of balances we have a simple inference : no one power in the present time can function as the regulator of the balance of power. It is difficult for any power in the present age to operate from a

detached position. It is, therefore, difficult for any particular power to act as a balancer in any system.

From this contention one point emerges. No power in the present age can assume or succeed to the position which Britain occupied in the past. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can succeed to Britain's former position as holder of the balance because both of them are very much involved in the bipolar politics of cold war. The simple balance of the mid-twentieth century revolves round the two rival poles into which the present day world is split. In this balance system the role of a balancer is superfluous. Moreover, no power seems to be particularly qualified to accomplish task of a balancer in the present day system of world politics.

If any system of balance of power can adjust itself with the present politics it will be a complex system of balance of power. The complex system of balance of power can emerge if certain condition are fulfilled. There are the restoration of western Europe, the development of potentially major States such as India, the recognition of China, the strengthening of the British orbit and the freeing of the Soviet and American blocs from the consequences of this commitments of ideologies.

It is believed in some quarters that America and Russia are not capable of playing the role of a balancer. The power of either states is greater than the power of any possible combination of other states. Moreover the concept of balance of power does not agree to any conscious policy for either democracy or dictatorship.

If it is accepted that the complex system of balance cannot emerge because its conditions cannot be fully satisfied and that Russia and America cannot play the role of a balances the legitimate question that arises is that whether the United Nation is fit to be the holder of a balance. Quincy Wright says that the United Nations could act as a balancer—a task which the League failed to

achieve— provided certain conditions are fulfilled. First, the United Nations should develop an independent power to serve as a balancer. Secondly, the United Nations must reduce the cold war tensions between Russia and America. Thus the United States faces difficult conditions and Quincy Wright himself admits that the task of the U. N. is "much more difficult than that of the League of Nations," "because the condition of the world have deteriorated."

The failure of the United Nations to fulfil the role of a balancer leads to another legitimate question : Is balance of power obsolete? Those who believe that the age of nationalism and sovereignty is ending, contend that balance of power must go with it because it is essentially the product of nationalistic policies. In future International Relations will be conducted on supranational level and on principles that would be very different from the concept of balance of power. Prof. William Carleton says that the outstanding phenomenon of modern international politics is "the epoch-making shift in the foundation of international politics from the nationalistic balance of power to ideology." True it is that ideologies are cutting across national boundaries and the old ties of nationalism are dissipating very fast. Under the pressure of this change balance of power is bound to lose its sway.

There is another moderate approach to the problem. Writers like Carl J. Friedrich say that balance of power has passed its hey-days but it is still a basic element in international relations. Friedrich says : "The value of the idea of the balance is, under present condition, rather slight, both for the purpose of explanation and as a guide to action. New difficulties have been added to the old vagueness..... one could damn the principle today for not offering any solution at all." Even then he admits that balance of power still exists today and an effective substitute of it has not yet been evolved. Such a substitute may be possible if a world organisation is created on a supranational level.

However modern politics is not favourable for such an organisation. Friedrich, therefore, ardently believes that balance of power is yet "preferable to the international anarchy which is prevailing at present."

Q. 29. Write a brief note on Collective Security.

Collective security has been regarded as one of the most promising approaches to peace. It aims at providing security to all nations. Its first concern, therefore, is to assure the failure of any aggressive use of force in international relations. Under any collective security system an aggressor is stopped not by any reason or human feelings but by the fear of a superior coercive power. Collective security, says Palmer and Perkins, "seeks to confront would-be aggressors with the concerted power of states determined to keep the peace ; it involves a commitment to go to war if necessary recognizing that the immediate peace is thereby jeopardized but assuming that future peace will be more secure if it has been clearly demonstrated that crime among nations does not pay." Hartmann writes that collective security originally "meant that all nations could be secure if all were guaranteed their 'territorial integrity and existing political independence' against 'external aggression' by any state or states. The idea was basically a mutual insurance plan, membership in which would be either universal or as nearly universal as possible. All the members of the security organization would assist any member attacked." The decline of balance of power facilitated the rise of the collective security system. The short-comings of the balance of power system have to be overcome by the use of a universal or quasi-universal alliance directed against any power that embarks upon aggression. This impulse has led to the collective security system.

Under collective security pattern peace is always indivisible. Therefore, any attack on any nation would cause a tear in the fabric of international law and order

which collective security seeks to establish. Thus in case of any aggression collective security must come into operation. Collective security is not a scheme to keep some nations in check and not others. It is rather a plan by which any nation which resorts to force illegally must automatically be defeated. About collective security Organsky makes the following observation : "Perhaps the most attractive feature of collective security is the fact that of everything goes according to plan, free will not have to be used at all. The mere threat of action by the collectivity will be enough. It seems reasonable to assume that a potential aggressor faced with the certainty of universal opposition if he attacks, would give up his aggressive plans, knowing that he was bound to fail.....In short, by committing themselves in advance to stand by one another in case of aggression against any nation, the nations of the world would not only be able to stop aggression in its tracks ; they would prevent it from occurring in the first place."

Underlying Assumptions :

The idea of collective security is based upon the assumption that peace is ensured by a preponderance of power, that the combined might of all the nations who fight against the aggressor must always be equal to such a preponderance, and that an aggressor faced with the overwhelming force of a united resistance would give up. The first two assumptions offer a subjective approach to the problem ; the third reveals the applied side of the concept. This assumption justifies the collective grouping of states for security purposes or any "universal mutual protection" approach to the problem of security.

Hartmann says that the concept of collective security rests upon three assumptions. "First, it was rooted in the hope that at the time of crisis such obligations [obligations undertaken] would be honoured by the members. Second, and even more fundamental, it assumed that the security interests of most states were fundamentally compatible,

Third, it assumed that the power of revisionist ('have-not') states, desiring the overthrow of the existing status quo, would be so small in comparison to the power of the 'law-abiding' states that none would dare war, or if they did, that they would be defeated in short order and with relatively small effort."

There are certain incorrect assumptions which undermine the concept. These assumptions result from a clash between the subjective assumptions of the problem and the applied aspects of it. Organski put these assumptions thus:

(1) "The assumption that nations would all agree on who was the aggressor, when in fact they have not done so; (2) the assumption that all nations are equally interested in stopping aggression, when in fact there are always some nations that side with the aggressor; (3) and the assumption that all nations are equally able to join in action against the aggressor, when in fact there are always nations that cannot do so because they are afraid of the aggressor, because they need his help, or because they are tied to him economically."

The Nature of Collective Security :

From an analysis of the assumptions underlying the concept of collective security a few points emerge with regard to the nature of the concept. (1) It is one of the most important measures for security under the system of present day politics. Schwarzenberger considers it to be the "machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order. Some believe that 'there is no alternative to collective action for the achievement of security. The opposite of collective security is complete insecurity.'" (2) Collective security implies far reaching commitments and obligations on the part of the majority of states. Palmer and Perkins stress this point when they say that "a collective security system to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be

involved if and as aggression occurs. It involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary, and even to go to war." (3) Collective security presupposes the view that national interests of the participating States can be preserved in the face of extreme emergency by collective actions which in its turn will involve a temporary limitations on the freedom of decision of the individual States. Prof. Friedmann makes this observation : "A successful system of collective security does not necessarily presuppose a complete abandonment of national independence or individuality. It does, however, require the submission of the individual national will to collective decisions." He speaks of "a severe restriction of national sovereignty" as an essential prerequisite for any effective international control of military forces and vital weapons without which collective security would be useless. (4) Collective security system, it should be noted, is something far more than an alliance. It urges "nations to go beyond aligning themselves with each other only to meet the threats emanating from common national enemies."

Collective Security and Balance of Power :

It is said that collective security and balance of power are two incompatible concepts. They can have some agreement only under most unusual conditions of balanced stability over a long period. Quincy Wright says : "The relations of the balance of power to collective security have "been at the same time complementary and antagonistic", "the fundamental assumption of the two systems are different. Palmer and Perkins explain the difference between two concepts. "Collective security and a balance of power policy are incompatible under usual circumstances because the object of the one is to align all other States against an offending or war-making State, whereas the other contemplates the maintenance of such an equilibrium of power that no State will dare undertake a resort to arms. The substance of the first is a world front against a

possible aggressor ; the substance of the second is too approximately equal and opposing fronts."

Collective Security and Regional Arrangements :

It is often said that regional arrangements which aim at collective defence establish a collective security system. This is not true. Regional arrangements are geographically very limited. With loose binding and limited military might they are not often competent to counter any attack against established order or face any combination of powers. Very often national interests cut across the obligations undertaken by the members of any mutual defence plan and in that case possession of adequate military might would not enable it to become an effective force in world politics because the members would shrink from their responsibilities. Regional arrangements, however, may become an important part of somewhat broader collective security system. In this capacity regional arrangements "constitute an important aspect of the universal collective security system of the United Nations."

Condition of Success :

The success or failure of a system depends upon its quality and also upon the conditions with which they are confronted in the fulfilment of their tasks. Even a properly instituted system cannot carry too much of burden. A best-devised collective security system likewise has to depend upon three cardinal factors : (1) "The attitudes among its members towards the fulfilment of their obligations ; (2) The confidence which they repose in each other ; and (3) The distribution of power among them. The first two are subjective, the third is objective, although difficult to measure." A favourable attitude of the members of the collective security system is a necessary precondition for the success of the system. Any absence of it would mean that the system has lost its *raison d'être* because under such a system it would not be possible any more to mobilise the

preponderant power required to deter or repress aggression. This is one reason why the collective security system of the League failed. The second condition, that of confidence is equally significant. The members of the system must repose confidence on each other. A State may for the time being agree to the suspension of sovereign national interests and go to war in defence of the collective security system. This she does because she thinks that others would behave likewise in case aggression is perpetrated against her. If this confidence is shaken she would resort to the traditional power game and thus contest in the race of armaments. The third condition, that of ideal distribution of power is a very important objective condition for the success of collective security. In the absence of a favourable distribution of powers the equilibrium of the system would be lost. A proper distribution of power facilitates the emergence of what is called a complex balance of power.

Q. 30. Write a brief note on the purposes and principles of the United Nation.

The purposes and principles of the United Nations have been stated in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Charter. They are also mentioned in the preamble of the Charter.

Purposes :

The purposes of the U.N. are set forth in Article 1. They are divided under the heads political and non-political.

The chief political purpose of the U.N. is stated as the maintenance of "international peace and security." This is the first objective of the organisation and without it other objectives have no meaning. (International peace is the immediate and fundamental objective and it leads to the ulterior objective of universal peace. So long as this objective remains more or less fulfilled the organisation has no power to interfere in internal or domestic issues)

In the event of any threat that causes a breach of the peace the U.N. in the first instance cannot step forward and

enquire whether the existing order is in conformity with the principle of international law. Such a measure must be deferred till the use of force or threat comes to a stop. Thus in the event of a threat of imminent war the U.N. has to act as a policeman before it can interfere as an arbitrator. The defence of international peace has to be ensured by a system of collective security—a principle set forth in the Charter. Sometimes open disputes lead to breaches of peace. Therefore, the U.N. must settle these disputes before they develop into ruptures. The methods of settlement are clearly explained in chapter VI of the Charter.

The second political aim of the U.N. is the development of "friendly relations among nations." This is a necessary complement of the first. The Charter, however, gives no pointer to any definite line of action in this respect but "the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" have been accepted as the necessary basis for the development of friendly relations. This, however, does not put the U.N. under any obligation to change the status quo in accordance with these principles. It simply means an extension of goodwill to people who have not yet achieved self-determination, either in political and legal sense.

The organisation has also the authority "to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." The concept of "international" peace, stated in paragraph 1 gets a wider scope in paragraph 2. This means that the U.N. which has been barred from interfering in essential domestic matters by Article 2 (1) has been authorised by the present clause 1 (2) to take note of domestic developments if that does not amount to intervention in technical sense.

Of the non-political purposes two are important: the achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems as well as the promotion of and the encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The first purpose forms an essential precondition

for ensuring international and achieving universal peace. The Economic and Social Council has been set up as a principal organ of the U.N. for this purpose. The human rights and fundamental freedoms generally imply certain minimum rights of the individual which at any given time are considered as inseparable attributes of the human individual. Article 1 Paragraph 3 however does not contain any guarantee that the U.N. would enforce the enjoyment of undisturbed human rights or fundamental freedom. It only means that the U.N. would strive for this unrealised goal.

The fourth and final purpose of the U.N. is "to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." This means that the U.N. must bring about a co-ordination of the actions of different states so that national interests do not cut across them. It must provide a forum for discussion of all matters of international relevance

The declaration of these purposes has one major significance. They create for the organisation a set of legal rights. But what would happen in case of violation of these rights have not been made clear in the Charter.

Principles :

Article 2 of the Charter of the U.N. makes member states and the Organisation bound by certain fundamental principles. These principles are stated in the form of definite obligations. The penalty of violation of these obligations would be expulsion.

The Paragraph 1 of Article 2 states that the "Organisation is based on the Principle of sovereign equality of all its members." The acceptance of such equality means that in the matter of policy formulation the dissenting minority must submit to the will of the majority. In other words the conception that states being equals cannot be bound by majority decision has no room in the Charter. The paradox is that some members—the five great powers—have

special privileges in view of their permanent seats in the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. By virtue of the negative veto they exercise extra-ordinary rights which others cannot.

The second Principle is that of "good faith." It has two implications: first, States must fulfil their obligations in order to make the organisation live upto its full potentialities; second, the obligations must be fulfilled in good faith.

The third Principle is that of "Pacific settlement of disputes." According to the Paragraph 3 Article 2 all members are to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. The procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes are stated clearly in chapters VI and XIV. This Principle has however its limitations. It relates to international disputes of domestic character. Again in case of international disputes only those that threaten international peace concern the organisation and not others.

The fourth Principle is stated in paragraph 4 of Article 2. It enjoins all members to refrain in their international relation from making any use of threat or force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State. Thus resort to force by individual States as a measure of redress of any action which is inconsistent with the Principles and purposes of the U.N. has been condemned by the Charter. Use of force is of course permissible in case of self defence and by way of participation in collective sanction under the direction of the organisation.

The fifth Principle speaks of assistance. Paragraph 5 of Article 2 says that every member must join if called upon, in sanctions which the U.N. may apply in case of necessity. A member State cannot render any assistance, even if bound by promise, to any State against whom the U.N. has applied sanctions.

The sixth Principle stated in Paragraph 6 of Article 2 shows the attitude of the U.N. to non-member States. The organisation undertakes to ensure such States in accordance

with the Principles stated in the Charter so far as it may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. This does not give the organisation authority of interference and there must be no interference with the non-members, except so far as it may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. Even if interference becomes necessary on such grounds the organisation can at best demand that non member States should act in accordance with the Principles of the U.N. by virtue of paragraph 6 of Article 2 is very limited.

Q. 31. Write a brief note on the composition and functions of the United Nations General Assembly.

Composition and Organisation :

The General Assembly of the United Nations consists of all the members of the Organisation. The Charter gives each member State a vote. Each member-State can send upto five representatives to the General Assembly. The Assembly meets once a year. This is the general practice but special session may be convened by the Secretary General at the request of the Security Council. He also does it if he is requested by any member who commands the support of the majority members. A President and seven Vice Presidents are elected by it for one year term.

Power and Functions :

As given in the Charter, the General Assembly has the status of the pivotal organ of the U.N. It is the legislature of the Organisation. The work of the Assembly is distributed among a host of committees. These are : Main Committees- Procedural Committees, Standing Committees and Ad-hoc Committees. The Main Committees are six in number and they consider matters such as the admission, suspension and expulsion of members. political matters, matters relating to security, registrations of treaties, privileges and immunities of the U.N. question affecting International Court of Justice

and a host of other different matters. Thus the most vital functions of the General Assembly are discharged through Main Committees.

The major powers and functions of the General Assembly can be thus summarised : (1) discussion of recommendations on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, (2) supervision of the international trusteeship system, (3) consideration of matters relating to non-self governing territories, (4) consideration and approval of the budget of the U.N., (5) consideration of matters relating to admission, suspension and expulsion of members, (6) participation in the election of judges of the International Court of Justice, of six non-permanent members of the Security Council, of the members of the Economic and Social Council and of some members of the Trusteeship Council, (7) appointment of the Secretary General on the basis of the recommendation of the Security Council and framing of the rules governing the Secretariat. Apart from these the Assembly supervises and directs international economic and social co-operation and receives and considers reports of the work of the U.N. It has the authority to set up some other organs for the fulfilment of the aims of the U.N. It has the power to adopt International Conventions.

The role of the General Assembly in the maintenance of International Peace and Security :

The Paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Charter of the U.N. authorises the General Assembly to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security. To these principles belong those governing disarmament and regulations of armaments. The Assembly has authority to make recommendations over such Principles. According to Paragraph 2 of Article 11 the Assembly may undertake any discussion on question relating the maintenance of peace and security. Such questions may be brought before it by the Security Council or by a member-State or by a non-member-State. Paragraph

3 of the same Article authorises the Assembly to call the attention of the Security Council to any situation that is likely to endanger international peace and security. Paragraph 1 of Article 12, however, debars the Assembly from making any recommendations with regard to matters over which the Security Council is exercising its authority. The Assembly can do it only when the Security Council so requests.

Under Article 13 the Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for certain purposes like the promotion of international co-operation in the political field, the development of International Law, the promotion of international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural and educational fields and the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without any regard to religion, language, race and sex.

The Charter gives the Assembly the sole authority in matters of economic and social co-operation. Even agreements negotiated by the Council are subject to the approval of the Assembly.

Finally, there is Article 22 which provides the Assembly authority to establish any other subsidiary organs which it may deem necessary for the fulfilment of its functions.

Voting in General Assembly :

Under Article 18(1) each member of the General Assembly has one vote. Under Article 18(2) decisions of the General Assembly must be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Such decisions will affect all vital questions over which the Assembly has authority like the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council, the admission of new members to the United Nations, the suspension of rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of members, the questions relating to the operation of the Trusteeship System, budgetary questions and the like.

Under Article 18(3) decisions on other questions may be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Under Article 19 a member cannot have any vote in the Assembly if that State is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organisation. .

Estimate :

It is difficult to take any estimate of the Assembly in a brief compass. Strake observes that "it is remarkable that in practice the General Assembly has been able to take a leading role in questions of international peace and security. It has discussed some of the leading political problems..... such as those relating to Palestine, Greece, Spain and Korea and also taken concrete action with reference to them." Prof. Goodrich says that the General Assembly "has not only provided a forum, but it has shown itself capable of taking decisions."

What the General Assembly has achieved is great and this partly explains the shift of importance from the Security Council to the Assembly. But what it failed to achieve is also vast. These failures are partly explained by limitations upon the powers of the Assembly. In the first place the Assembly has authority to discuss and make recommendations on international peace and security but it has no power to enforce it. Secondly, it cannot take initiative in matters over which the Council is exercising its authority unless it is requested by the Council to do the same.

Q. 32. Write a brief note on the composition and functions of the Security Council of the U.N.

Composition and Organisation :

The Security Council consists of 11 members. Of them five are permanent members...Russia, China, Great Britain, France and the United States of America. The rest six are non permanent members elected by the General Assembly

for a term of two years. They have no eligibility for immediate re-election. In electing six non-permanent members due consideration is given to two things : first, the contribution of the Members of the U.N. to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organisation ; secondly, the equitable geographical distribution of seats [Article 23(1)]. Generally two members are taken from South America, two from the Commonwealth countries and two from the rest of the world. These member States are represented by one delegate only.

Article 31 provides that any member of the U.N. without having membership of the Security Council and any right to vote, may participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that member are specially affected. Article 32 states that any member of the U.N., if it is a party to the dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without having any seat in the Council or any right to vote, in the discussion concerning the dispute. Each and every representative of the member-States takes for one month only the chair of the President of the Security Council.

Powers and Functions :

The Security Council is the principal executive organ of the U.N. In that capacity it performs almost all legally important function of the U.N. It does it either exclusively or in consultation with the General Assembly.

Under Article 24(1) the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In discharging these duties the Security Council has to act under Article 24(2) in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Chapter VI, VII, VIII and XII clearly states the specific powers which the Security Council may use for the discharge of these duties.

Chapter VI of the Charter authorises the Council to investigate disputes while under Chapter VII it takes action

against any breach of peace The Council has the authority under Chapter VI, to call upon parties to any dispute to "seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

According to Article 39 under Chapter VII the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression. It can make recommendations and under Articles 41 and 42 can decide what measures shall be taken in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. It has the right to apply 'sanctions' or coercive measures against a recalcitrant party. These measures would include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Thus measures taken under Article 41 do not involve the use of force. However, if the Security Council considers these measures to be inadequate then under Article 42 it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Actions of this type may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of the members of the U.N.

Article 52 (3) of Chapter VIII of the Charter states that the Security Council must encourage the development of Pacific Settlement of local disputes Finally Chapter XII provides that the Security Council is to control and supervise Trust Territories which are classified as strategic areas.

Voting :

The system of voting in the Security Council is stated in Article 27 of the U.N. Charter. Under this Article each member of the Security Council has one vote, but these votes do not have equal weight as in the General Assembly. On procedural matters decisions are made by an 'affirmative'

vote of seven members. On all other matters decisions are required to be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring vote of all the permanent members. In other words, no decision can be made on a substantive matter unless all permanent members agree. This means that any permanent member, if it so desires, can veto a decision favoured by a majority or even by all other members. The Charter also provides that a party to a dispute may abstain from voting.

In the Security Council the Big Powers enjoy two special privileges : (i) permanent seat in the Security Council and (ii) veto. These privileges are intended to safeguard their position and interests.

Estimate :

As the most primary organ of the U.N. the Security Council occupies the most important position in the settlement of international disputes. Strake says : "The main defect in the Security Council's working in the absence of a strict, clear and exact procedure for settling disputes, with the result that in its discussions, questions of substance becomes tangled with the questions of procedure to be followed in investigating or settling disputes, and further confusion arises owing to veto. But in certain instances, the provisions of the Charter have been applied by the Security Council in a flexible manner." Dr. Murray observes : I strongly suspect that the real strain on the construction of the New League will come when it attempts to give orders to some nations accustomed to freedom. It is a new provision that the Security Council should have the power to issue orders, while the fact that the Great Powers need not obey such orders will greatly weaken such moral authority as they might have had.....The Security Council providing the new Organisation with teeth of enormous size and instantaneous action have been generally applauded as patting the new Charter on quite a different level of practical efficiency from the old Covenant, and so it might well seem

on first reading, but reflection raises doubts and even suspicion.

Kenneth Younger makes a rational approach to the problem. "It was necessary," he says, "in 1945 to create the Council, with its peculiar composition and rules, only because very special considerations applied to a body which was to make military agreements with member-States and was then to have the power of ordering enforcement action. Since it is now clear that no such agreements will be made and that the Council will be unable to give 'orders' as intended, the need for a body in this particular form no longer exists. Moreover, the less will it be necessary to tackle the ungrateful and well-nigh impossible task of altering the Council's permanent membership from time to time in response to Kaleidoscopic and never ending changes in the pattern of world order."

Q. 33. Write a critical note on the veto system in the United Nation Security Council.

The word 'veto' customarily means a negative vote which can nullify any action or any measure. This word appears nowhere in the U.N. Charter. Its common use, though technically inaccurate, has been derived from paragraph three of Article 27 which refers to the voting procedure in the Security Council of the U.N. It reads as follows :

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [that is, on non-procedural matters] shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members ; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

This means that any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the U.N. can say 'no' to any decision favoured by other members or all of them. This negative vote by any permanent member on non-procedural matter is called 'veto' "A negative vote by one of the Big

Five is a veto only if one of this vote defeats an action which would otherwise have been approved."

Origin and Purpose :

The framing of Article 27 was based upon a formula accepted upon at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. The formula which was then informally accepted was that a state should not vote on substantive matters relating to a dispute in which it was involved.

At the San Francisco Conference this formula was left in tact. There are two basic assumption on which the formula rests : "The first was that in any enforcement action the permanent members of the Council would be those forces whose forces must necessarily bear the predominant burden. In consequence, it would be unrealistic to expect those Council-members to allow their own forces to be committed to an action which they, or any one of them, opposed. The other argument was that the organisation must depend for its strength upon the essential solidarity of the great powers. If this solidarity fails then the security of enforcement arrangements will as surely fail."

From the first assumption the veto system would be a natural deduction. But strangely enough the Yalta formula apparently involved a denial of a right of veto in procedural questions. It simply "clarified the process to be used in determining whether the status of a question was to be shifted from substantive to procedural. The San Francisco understanding provided that the veto could be used to prevent this shift. Consequently a permanent member of the Council could use its veto power to keep a motion from being declared proceduraland then use it again to defeat the substantive motion." From this arose the concept of "double veto". About this system of "double veto" Andrew Martin and John B. S. Edward make the following observation : "In border line case, the preliminary question whether a matter is procedural is itself subject to veto. In fact, this rule turns the veto into what has been

rightly called a 'double veto : first, a negative veto in cast to prevent the Council from treating a question as procedural and a vote is then cast for second time to defeat the substance of the motion." The incorporation of the veto idea in the Charter found its temporary grace in the assurance "that it is not to be assumed that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their veto power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council." Inspite of this assurance this sort of 'double veto' was exercised by Soviet Union on more than one occasion. It was also exercised in March 1948 when the Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia took place.

Use of Veto :

The U.N. experiment with veto had been most unfortunate. In the use of veto the spirit of the joint statement issued at San Francisco came to be defeated. In the first two years—1946 & 1947—the veto was applied for twenty-three times, twenty-one of these by the Soviet Union. By the end of 1956 the Soviet Union had used seventy-eight vetoes. Apparently it may seem that the Soviet Union has made a monopoly of the veto power. But then the interplay of other factors will be lost sight of " ...they [the western powers] can make the Russians appear as even more obstructionist than they actually are, simply by forcing votes on issues which they know will not be approved by every other great powers and by most of the non-permanent members of the Security Council." Professor Padelford rightly says that "the record plainly shows that the Soviet Union has no monopoly on negative voting." Palmer and Peekins make the following observation ; "In 165 votes in the security Council on substantive questions in 1946 and 1947, including the 23 vetoes, China voted 'no' 27 times, France 23 times, Great Britain 29 times, the Soviet Union 24 times and the United States 34 times ; The votes of Britain, China, and the United States, and all but two of those of France, were not classed as vetoes be-

cause in each instance others of the Big Five—and usually all or most of the non-permanent members of the Council—voted the same away ; whereas in 21 of the negative Soviet votes no other permanent member voted with the U.S.S.R., and in all these instances the measures proposed would have been approved if the Russian representatives had not voted against them."

The result of an excessive use of veto has been a tendency to evade the veto and in effect to bypass the Security Council. The General Assembly where the veto power does not exist, has in effect come to gather enhanced importance. Article 12 of the Charter which provides that the General Assembly should not consider a dispute with which the Security Council is concerned has been invalidated by the tendency to remove matters from the agenda of the Council by a procedural vote. This has facilitated the reference of even political issues to the Assembly.

Some Reflections on the Veto System :

Hartmann says : "the veto was a sensible idea provided its use could be kept within bounds." According to Ketsen, "The inevitable effect of voting procedure conferring the right of veto upon each of the permanent members must be that no decision of any importance can be taken against the will of the privileged States even if the State is involved in the matter to which the decision refers A permanent member of the Security Council may exercise this veto right not only in its own affairs but also in the interests of another State. Hence, the members which have no such rights may be induced to secure for themselves the friendship and protection of one of the Five Great Powers. Hence, the security Council is not bound strictly to comply with existing law. Brierly says that "the veto makes it impossible for the Security Council to use its power against a Great Power.....yet the only event today which can security endanger the peace of the world is aggression by a Great Power."

Q. 34. Write a brief note on the following :

- (a) The declining role of the Security Council,**
 - (b) The Growing importance of the General Assembly.**
- Or,**

The new role of the General Assembly.

Declining role of Security Council:

The U.N. Charter assigns a great role to the Security Council. But the role it has come to play in international affairs is less significant than what it was supposed to perform. In a general sense its role as the central executive organ of the United Nations it has failed to fulfil. It has even addressed itself less decisively than the General Assembly to the task of solving political disputes. During the years 1946 to 1961 it has dealt only 57 political and security questions. As against this the General Assembly has dealt with 206 questions. The Security Council has thus failed to discharge its functions though the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" was still legally vested in it [Article 24(1)].

The 'eclipse of the security council' has been declared as the result of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Morgenthau makes the following observation : "That conflict has paralysed the Security Council as an agency of international government. In the few instances when it has been able to act as an agency of international government, it has been able to do so either, as in the beginning of the Korean War, by the accidental and temporary absence of the Soviet Union, or, as in the Indonesian issue, by a fortuitous and exceptional coincidence of interests."

The conflict between the two super-Powers has been reflected in the exercise of the veto powers. Uptil 1961, 99 vetoes had been cast. Of these 92 vetoes were cast by Soviet Russia. More than 50 percent of these Soviet vetoes have been cast on membership applications. Out of this emerged the concept of Russian obstructionism in the U.N,

This "has been a persistent annoyance, and it certainly precludes the achievement of some of the goals set by the founders." The point of Russian obstructionism is a purely legal one. But it had other implications. "They [the Western Powers] can make the Russian appear as even more obstructionist than they actually are, simply by forcing votes on issues which they know will not be approved by the Soviet Union but will be approved by every other great powers and by most of the non-permanent members of the Security Council." "To the Soviets", says Hartmann, "the veto represents a vital defence against a hostile majority."

Strake makes a rational approach to the problem :

"The main defect in the Security Council's working is the absence of a strict, clear and exact procedure for setting disputes, with the result that in its discussions, questions of substance becomes tangled with the questions of procedure to be followed in investigating or settling disputes, and further confusion arises owing to veto. But in certain instances, the provisions of the Charter have been applied by the Security Council in a flexible manner. For example, by the common consent the President of the Security Council has taken a major responsibility for guiding the peaceful settlement of disputes, acting informally on the Councils above as conciliator between the disputant parties, besides, the Security Council has not hesitated to create subsidiary bodies for mediation or investigation as in the case of the Good Offices Committee in the Indonesian Dispute appointed in 1947, and the True Commission for Palestine appointed in 1948."

The process of the decline of the Security Council has been accelerated indirectly by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution [adopted by the Assembly in 1950 in connection with the Korean War] which had facilitated the Assembly's expansion at the cost of the Council. This resolution, strictly speaking, is an encroachment on the functions of the Security

Council and has been regarded as in many ways legally in consistent with the U.N. charter.

The 'Uniting For Peace' resolution had one importance. It showed that the ineffectiveness of the Security Council was fully recognised within the first decade of the establishment of the U.N. In 1955 Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger [who had helped to prepare the first American draft of the Charter].

Observed :

"It has been said that the decline of the Security Council at the United Nations principal peace-making organ and the emergence of the General Assembly is unquestionably the most significant constitutional development which has taken place in the United Nations. The General Assembly has now become the paramount organ of adjustment."

In 1955 two American authors, Wilcox and Marcy wrote :

"Probably the most important organisational problem confronting the United Nations is that of the future of the Security Council. The inability of the Council to act in the manner that the framers of the Charter had expected become manifest soon after the organisation came into being and has become increasingly apparent as the years have passed."

A British politician observed in 1955 : "The Council's prestige has constantly fallen during its ten years life....."

All these observations represent the true State of things in the U.N. and they hold good even today. In the intervening years (1955 onwards) the Council did nothing to recover its prestige. Even in this period it failed to work as a potent instrument of collective security. Naturally the question of resetting and reorganising the Council has become more pressing than it was before.

Growing importance of General Assembly and its new role :

The General Assembly has played in international relations a role which is far more significant than that

assigned to it in the Charter. With the decline of the Security Council the importance of the General Assembly came to be realised even in the first decade of the establishment of the U.N. Since 1948 the Assembly has largely replaced the Council as the chief organ of the U.N. to deal with disputes and other political questions. In the period 1946-61 it had dealt with 206 political and security questions as against 57 dealt with by the Security Council. As early as 1955 Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger [who had helped to prepare the first American draft of the Charter] observed that the General Assembly has now become the paramount organ of adjustment."

The emergence of the General Assembly with its enhanced power is, in a way, a direct response to circumstances. Writing in 1949 Goodrich observed: ".....It must be recognized that when conditions have deteriorated to the point that they have reached within the United Nation, when the world security organisation has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist as the result of the disintegration or perhaps better the absence of great power unity, it is obviously unrealistic and dangerous to rely on non-existent guarantees for peace and security. Substitutes have to be found." One substitute has been found in the the General Assembly the growth in the outcome of which has been a direct outcome of the need.

The framers of the U.N. charter had clear-cut ideas about the function of the General Assembly. In their thought the General Assembly was to be merely a deliberative body which could make recommendation but had no power to take action. This was because the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" was vested with the Security Council. The Charter stated explicitly that the General Assembly which was the most representative body of the U.N. "may discuss any question or any matters within the scope of the present Charter." But the Assembly cannot exercise in respect of any dispute

or situation with which the Security Council is seized, unless the Security Council so requests (see Articles 10 & 12).

Article 11(2) provides the Assembly with crucial functions. It says that (i) the General Assembly can discuss "questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" only when these are "brought before it" (ii) that its right to make recommendations is subject to the overriding right of the Security Council to exercise its authority commensurating with the Charter ; (iii) that whenever "action is necessary" the matter must be referred to the Security Council. Under Article 14 the General Assembly has the same 'broad authority' to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation" but it shall not make any recommendations" except at the request of the Security Council.

"Under the provisions of the Charter, therefore, the General Assembly can discuss, can make recommendations subject to certain conditions, but cannot take any 'action'. It is for the Security Council to take 'action', subject to the right of the General Assembly to 'receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council'..... ." Thus the Security Council, as Goodrich and Hambro observe, "is to some extent subject to Assembly influence" though it is made independently responsible for the maintenance of peace and security.

This aspect of the relation between the Security Council and the General Assembly came to be emphasised very much during the late 'forties and early' fifties. By that time it was evident that the Security Council could no longer be expected to perform its "primary responsibilities." The Security Council had many limitations and when the Korean crisis broke out its inefficacies stood widely exposed. J.F. Dulles's comment on the U.N action in Korea is an important observation on the point : "The Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council and the representative of the Chinese Communist regime had not been seated. Either, if present,

would have vetoed the action which produced the first peace-time demonstration of solidarity against unprovoked aggression."

The lesson taught by the Korean war "was that a single permanent member of the Security Council could effectively obstruct enforcement action supported by a majority of the Members of the United Nations." "The U.S. Government, warned by its Korean experience, decided to establish a machinery within the structure of the United Nations which would be an effective substitute for the Security Council in regard to enforcement action. As this new machinery had to be kept outside the sphere of the veto, the General Assembly was the obvious choice. The Western bloc had a decisive majority in the General Assembly. This was an additional argument in favour of Washington's choice. Moreover, the General Assembly had already taken strong action with respect to Spain (1946) on the basis of Articles 4, 10 and 14 and considered the Greek questions (1947) after its removal from the agenda of the Security Council. These precedents indicated—indirectly, of course—the manner in which the General Assembly could fill up the vacuum created by the Security Council's patent incapacity to take forceful action against aggression." This was the genesis, one may say of the "Uniting For Peace" Resolution which enhanced the importance of the General Assembly. This Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950. Only 5 Communist States voted against it and India abstained from voting [the Resolution was adopted by a vote of 52 to 5 with 2 abstentions.]

The "Uniting For Peace" Resolution "authorised the General Assembly to meet on short notice in an emergency in which the Security Council was prevented from acting, and to recommend appropriate collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary." This Resolution has been regarded as an encroachment upon the function of the Security Council. Political Scientists have also doubled

whether the resolution is legally consistent with provisions of the U.N. Charter. In some quarters it is regarded as the political response of the Assembly which was under the domination of America, to the situation created by the frequent use of veto by Russia. The Security Council was immobilised by veto and the General Assembly, therefore, took upon itself the responsibility of taking action in the interest of international peace.

Some reflections on the Uniting For Peace Resolution :

The Western case for the Resolution has been well-explained by Dulles. He plainly told the General Assembly that if the Security Council failed to discharge its 'primary responsibility', it would, the right and duty of the General Assembly to deal with the situation. Mr. Vyshinsky argued that Article 11 of the U.N. Charter set limits on the powers of the General Assembly. He added that the changes proposed could properly be made only by amendment of the Charter. Cheever and Haviland observe. : "Is the Uniting For Peace" resolution constitutionally valid? Since the Assembly was given a generous grant of authority under Article 10 to discuss and make recommendations, though not binding decisions, 'on any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter' the answer is, yes." Kelsen says, "viewed retrospectively with regard to the Charter.....these actions may, in some of their aspects, be considered unconstitutional. But directing our view towards the future, we may see them as the first steps in the development of a new law of the United Nations." He observes elsewhere : "However the questions may be answered as to whether and to what extent the Resolution 'Uniting For Peace' is consistent with the working of the Charter, it can hardly be denied that the United Nations under this Resolution assumes the character of an international organization very different from that which the framers of the Charter had in mind. The system of collective security established by this Resolution is much nearer

to that established by the Covenant of the League of Nations than to that intended by framers of the Charter." Goodrich also makes an almost similar observation: "while shifting of responsibility from the Security Council to the General Assembly which the Korean experience greatly accelerated, is understandably viewed with favour by many, it must be recognized that this also reflects a basic change in the character of the United Nations from a global organisation depending primarily upon process of negotiation and accommodation for the keeping of the peace to an organisation of states looking to the United States for leadership and primarily concerned with meeting threats from behind the Iron curtain—while this development may be necessary and desirable in the light of the conditions that now exist, it should be recognized as a different approach to the peace problem from that underlying the Charter as initially conceived."

Q. 35: Discuss the main techniques for the Pacific Settlement of disputes.

Under the U.N. Charter :

Chapter VI of the Charter of the U.N. provides for the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 33(1) provides that the parties to any dispute which may threaten to endanger international peace, should seek solution by peaceful means. Article 34 authorises the Security Council to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction. Any member of the U.N, says Article 35(1) may refer to the attention of the Security Council any such dispute as mentioned in Article 34. Under Article 35(2), a State which is not a Member of the U.N. may bring to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance the obligation of pacific settlement provided in the Charter under Article 36(1), the Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Art. 33, or of a

situation of like manner, may recommend appropriate methods of adjustment. Article 36(3) enjoins upon the Council to see that legal disputes brought under its attention is referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. Article 37 provides that should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Art. 33 fail to settle it by means indicated in that Article they are required to refer it to the Security Council. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it must decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Under Article 38, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendation to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of this dispute.

Chief Methods of Pacific Settlement :

Article 33(1) of the U.N. charter lists the chief methods of pacific settlement as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or arrangements. These conventional devices fall into two categories—(i) those based on persuasion and (ii) those based on the application of international law. The first group list political techniques with no binding force in them. The second group consists of those "which have a binding character by virtue of the fact that the parties commit themselves in advance to accept the findings of a neutral board or court. These can, therefore be termed as legal techniques. Negotiation, good officer, enquiry, mediation and conciliation fall within the first category ; arbitration and judicial settlement offer examples of the second. "When direct negotiation fail, conciliation and arbitration are the most commonly used techniques of peaceful settlement."

Political techniques run as follows :

1. **Negotiation :** Negotiation means the normal channel

of diplomacy through which disputes are settled. Negotiations between diplomatic representatives constitute the invariable first step towards solving any dispute. Instances where this method fails are relatively few and they are at once most serious ones, because the devices of diplomacy break down only in extreme crises.

2. Good Office and Mediation : In international disputes a State may offer to be of service in attempting to solve differences between two other States. This voluntary tender of service is called "good offices." "Good offices" may lead to mediation if the service of the third party is accepted by the two other States in dispute. "The difference between the two is that in 'good offices' the third State acts simply as a friendly 'go-between', whereas a mediator may make suggestions of his own". The offer of "good offices" may be made by one or more States. Sometime individuals acting in official capacity, such as the head of a State or officers of the principal organs of the U.N, may tender such offer. "The tender of good offices or of mediation is never to be regarded as an unfriendly act, and the parties to a dispute are not bound to accept the offer or to regard suggestions of a mediator as binding."

3. Enquiry and conciliation : Closely allied to good officer and mediation are enquiry and conciliation. But the latter devices are more effective than the former. Enquiry means that a commission investigates disputes to find out solutions. The first Hague Conference recommended the use of commissions of enquiry. "A commission of enquiry investigates the facts of a dispute, but largely confines itself to a statement of the facts and a clarifications of the issues. Although it may also present conclusions and recommendations, these are in no sense binding on the disputants." Commissions of enquiry has been a very ineffectual device and its use has on the whole been negligible.

' Conciliation differs from enquiry in that it assumes an obligation on the part of third parties to take the initiative

in the search for agreement. A Conciliation Commission may advance proposals, ask for compromise or concessions, and, in general, actively seek to effect an understanding between the contending parties. Conciliation is scarcely to be distinguished from mediation, the usual difference is that mediation is commonly performed by an individual and conciliation by a committee, commission, or council."

Conciliation is generally regarded as a very constructive approach to the problems of dispute. It is useful for disputes which are not exclusively political and are not very much justiciable in nature. In other words, conciliation is useful in those disputes which involve delicate question of national interests and prestige i.e., disputes which can be dealt with only diplomatic or power-political means. Into this zone falls many sorts of disputes and this makes the possibilities of conciliation very great, even though they have not been utilised to any remarkable extent.

Besides political techniques there are legal techniques consisting of arbitration and adjudication or judicial settlement. Legal techniques are much more formal than political techniques. They are also much more binding than their political counterparts because by resorting to them the parties bind themselves before hand to accept the verdict of the judges. In other words in political techniques the disputants retain their freedom which they lose in legal techniques. That apart political techniques may fail to solve disputes because their validity rests with the acceptance of their solution by the disputing parties. Any of the parties may refuse to accept the terms of these technique. But this is not possible in legal techniques because judicial verdict is always a finality under them and State cannot disregard them. Legal techniques are advisable means for solving disputes in so far as they rest on the reciprocal willingness of the disputants to adjust their disputes through a legal process. But the fact that legal processes insist on abstract justice and cancel all possibilities of compromise

make legal techniques somewhat less commendable than what they appear to be. (For details see the note on Arbitration and Adjudication in question No. 24 dealing with the settlement of international legal disputes.)

INTERNATIONAL RELATION

PART TWO --- **PRACTICE**

PART TWO

Q. 1. Make a brief survey of the events in Europe that led to the Second World War.

1. Developments in Germany and their impact on international relations :

The decade which preceded the outbreak of the Second World War was pregnant with events. The hopes of the twenties were dashed by the great depression of 1929-30. Europe emerged from its early optimism only to relapse again into the realities of continental politics. The democratic system of parliamentary government had already gone into eclipse. A trend towards authoritarian government was manifesting itself in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia and Poland. The economic blizzard of 1929-30 gave a stupendous impetus to this trend. Even in France and England respect for authoritarianism was strengthened in these years to meet the great depression. The result of this was that after 1930 Europe never witnessed a return to normalcy. A tragic period of crashes and crises was ushered in with the beginning of the thirties. It was the beginning of a period of lost opportunities.

The first two years of the 'thirties saw the European powers desperately trying to reset their own houses. But

normally was not the trend of the time. In 1933 Hitler came to power. In the same year Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and came out of the League of Nations. It meant that Germany would not co-operate with the League. It showed that Germany—the central European land-power which had caused the First World War—had no faith in the ideals of the League. Disarmament was proved to be utterly inconsistent with the trends of time and this happened at the time when the system of Collective Security built up under the League was struggling on its last legs. The German antagonism to everything associated with the Versailles Settlement became henceforth the most important factor in shaping German foreign policy. The fear that the continent would sooner or later relapse into a race of armaments engulfed the whole of Europe. The frenzied parade of Nazi agitation in Germany and the spread of Nazi doctrines among the German speaking people outside the Reich gave a tremendous fillip to this psychology of fear. It is from this sense of fear and insecurity that the entire political background of the Second World War took its origin.

During this period events were moving very fast and with dramatic turns. The Saar plebiscite in January 1935 was a German victory. This gave Hitler confidence. In March 1935 Germany announced her resignation from the military restrictions put by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany declared that she would resort to conscription and reconstruct an airforce. This was a direct challenge to the Versailles Settlement with the maintenance of which lay the security of some of the western powers. Britain and France lodged their protests but failed to present a solid stand to stop Hitler. Two tendencies now became apparent in European politics—one was to defy the League System led by Germany and the other was to uphold the league system championed by England and France. It is worth noting that the central European land powers gradually

made themselves allied with the revisionist tendency while the seapowers were associating themselves with the conservative trend of maintaining status quo. Thus the early signs of the European tendency to relapse into the pattern of pre-World War I power-politics were already apparent.

The inability of Britain and France to see eye to eye encouraged Hitler to experiment with his techniques. On 7th March, 1936 the German Government announced its repudiation of the Locarno Treaty. On the same day German troops marched into the demilitarized zone on the Rhine Land. This produced terrific sensation. In violating the Versailles Treaty Germany had at least the excuse that it had been a dictated peace; but to the terms of Locarno she had set her hands voluntarily and if the habit of repudiating freely contracted treaties should spread, international law would cease to exist. However "Hitler's first major territorial aggression" had been crowned with success. It was "perhaps the biggest gamble of his career" and "most crucial" of all his aggressions.

The German occupation of the Rhineland offered a "frontal challenge to the settlement of Versailles." It violated the Locarno agreement which Germany had voluntarily made. It was regarded as the "shield behind which his next step of aggression in South Eastern Europe could be prepared." The German mobilisation on the Western border was also significant because by a single stroke it shifted the gravity of the military and diplomatic situations to Western Europe. France stood exposed to attack and her Eastern allies were now decisively off from French help and at the mercy of Germany. Even in his own country Hitler's political institutions came to be vindicated and his military critics silenced. March 1936, says David Thompson, probably offered the last opportunity to avoid the Second World War.

In November 1936, Italy and Germany announced an agreement between them which subsequently came to be known as the Rome-Berlin-Axis. A few days later Germany

and Japan signed an Anti-Comintern pact. Italy joined the pact one year later and this gave point to the crusading aspect of the Axis policy. These agreements were, however, not formal alliances; nor did they involve any military commitments. But they signed their pact because they had one point of agreement in their general dissatisfaction. As dissatisfied powers they were drawing together to build a separate action against the western democracies. In Europe the central land powers once again organised themselves into a new camp. In the East the Fascist International was on the whole proving to be more effective than the Comintern.

In March 1938, Germany invaded and annexed Austria. The eclipse of Austria made the position of Czechoslovakia vulnerable. At the Munich Conference, Germany was given part of Czechoslovakia. "This is the last territorial claims," said Hitler, "which I have to make in Europe." But in March 1939 Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.

In August 1939 the Nazi-Soviet pact was concluded. Neutralisation of Russia gave Germany temporary peace on her Eastern frontier and helped her to conceal her ulterior intentions of an anti-Bolshevik crusade. In the meantime he demanded restoration of all territories handed over to Poland by the Versailles Treaty. This was only a pretext for Hitler's occupation of Poland which was the inevitable obstruction to his way to Russia. But England and France on their part gave assurance to Poland that in case of German attack they would go to war on her behalf. On 1st September 1939, the German army crossed Polish frontier. On 3rd September England and France declared war against Germany. Thus started the Second World War.

II. Developments outside Germany and their impact on international relations :

Italian Conquest of Abyssinia (1935): Italy's conquest of Abyssinia fulfilled Italy's long standing East African dreams. This fulfilment of Italian dreams came at the time when Hitler was undermining international confidence.

By this time the inefficacy of the League was proved, the weakness of Britain and France was revealed and it was not difficult for Mussolini to find out an excuse for the intervention in Abyssinia.

In December 1934 there was a skirmish between some Italian and Abyssinian troops near the village of Walwal in Italian Somaliland. A few of the Italians died in the skirmish and the Italian Government demanded an apology and indemnity. Abyssinia referred the dispute to the League. All that the League did was to endorse Italy's willingness to settle the matter in friendly way by arbitration as provided in the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty of 1928.

During the subsequent months Italy delayed the appointment of the representative arbitrators. On the other hand she kept sending large military reinforcements to Eritrea and Somaliland. Finally on 3rd September, 1935 the arbitrators—who got together at last—offered their verdict that neither government could be held responsible for the Walwal incident. Thus the whole business of the League and the arbitrators provided a convenient cover for Italian preparations to invade Abyssinia. On 2nd October, flouting all her responsibilities to the League and to other powers, Italy sent troops into Abyssinia.

The Italian move galvanized the League into action. Declaring that Italy had resorted to war in disregard of the terms of the Covenant, the League Council urged all members of the League to co-operate in applying sanctions, against Italy. Some fifty nations with significant exceptions of Hungary, Austria and Albania applied economic sanctions against Italy. France was in the embarrassing position of having to contribute to sanctions against the new ally whom she had gained less than a year ago. However, two things were significant. First, Italy, one of the two European land powers that embarked on a scheme of expansion, had been found guilty of aggression. Such a charge had never been framed against Hitler. Secondly, for

the first time in the history of the League sanctions—though only of an economic character and these imperfect—came into operation.

Sanctions applied by the League had never been effective. On the contrary as Italian mobilisation in Abyssinia quickened, France and Britain became apprehensive that an Italian failure in Abyssinia might react in Central Europe. Out of this fear emerged the notorious Hoare-Laval plan which aimed at giving Italy two-thirds of Abyssinia and a virtual protectorate over the rest. This plan never came into operation but it revealed the Franco-British policy of appeasement.

Mussolini understood the situation well. In the middle of 1936 Italian movement in Abyssinia was perceptibly rapid. The Emperor of Abyssinia left the country and both internal order and organized resistance broke down. The Italian army occupied Addis Ababa and the whole country was officially annexed to Italy.

"The Italian victory", says Carr, "was a grave blow to the League and an acute embarrassment for Great Britain. Although economic sanctions had paralysed Italy's trade and caused a drain on her gold reserve, they had not sufficed to hamper her military operations. It was clear that nothing short of war would compel her to release her prize; and Great Britain was not less firm than France in her resolve not to be drawn into war with Italy." In the League Britain proposed the withdrawal of sanctions. In spite of personal appeal by the Emperor, this was unanimously agreed to.

Germany had no direct involvement in any of these matters. She was no longer in the League and, therefore she did not have to participate in the application of sanction. The fulfilment of Italy's East African dreams meant the disruption of the Stresa Combination and the neutralisation of Italy in Europe. The complete falling out between the members of the Stresa front was highly

welcome and provided an unexpected opportunity for another demonstration of Hitlerian tactics.

The Spanish Civil War :—In the beginning of the 'thirties Spain was torn by increasing strife and violence which the government was unable to bring under control. At the outset this situation was essentially a concern of Spain. But on July 17, 1936 the army rose, in the Moroccan Zone first, then in most garrison cities in Spain. Within a short time a situation arose which found the country split into two halves, one under the control of the rebellious army led by General Franco and the other under the control of the existing government. In the uncertain situations of Europe in 1936 the Spanish Civil war could not unfold itself as purely Spanish affair and very soon Spain became the battle-ground of contending ideologies and interests.

General Franco began his operations by transporting his troops from Morocco to Spain. Initial successes carried him almost to the Gates of Madrid. There the resistance on the government side stiffened. It became difficult for Franco to make any further appreciable advance with his own unaided resources.

Very soon it became clear that General Franco had other resources at his disposal. Some Italian assistance was forthcoming very early. Evidence accumulated that substantial German help was also being sent to Franco. A change of government in Spain from the existing one to one more favourably disposed towards the Fascist outlook would obviously be pleasing to Italy and Germany. If a coup—at whatever cost—could be executed. Italy and Germany might gain the asset of a sympathetic regime which could be used as a potential pressure upon France.

This sinister international aspect of the situation was well-balanced by the attitude of the French Government which supported by Britain, secured an international agreement to non-intervention. Italy, Germany and the Soviet Russia assented to this agreement. But flagrant

breaches of it by Germany and Italy forced Russia to resign from the obligations of the agreement. Consequently large Russian supplies entered Spain and were an important factor in the Government's long defence of Madrid. Germany and Italy henceforth embarked upon a very active participation and landed thousands of 'volunteers' in support of Franco's army. Nothing that the other powers could devise was effective in preventing the intervention.

Throughout 1937 and 1938 Madrid remained the centre of the continually swaying battle-lines. At last on 28th. March 1938 Franco could stage a breakthrough and capture Madrid. The British and the French Governments had already recognised him as the ruler of Spain. In August he promulgated a new Constitution whereby he became Chief of the State. Thus another dictatorship was set up in Europe.

From the German point of view the Spanish Civil War was very important affair. It was, like the Abyssinian conquest, another wholly satisfactory occurrence. "If the testing of new war material was technically useful, far more important were the political aspects of the matter. The increasing Italian involvement had the combined effects of hampering the effectiveness of the Italian role in Central Europe as well as minimising the likelihood of Italy regaining the Western Camp. However, Germany did not seek to take advantage of the situation at the expense of Italy at once.....The outcome therefore was Italo-German co-operation" Out of this Co-operation emerged the Rome-Berlin Axis.

Q. 2. What led to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact in 1939 ? What led to the German invasion of Russia in 1941 ? How did the German invasion affect Russia's relations with the United States and Britain ?

The Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact :

The Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed on

23rd August 1939. Germany had reasons to welcome this pact. Hitler knew that to any attempt to conquer Poland Russia would be an inevitable bar. Therefore, to initiate any scheme of aggression Soviet Russia must be neutralised. There was another aspect of the thing. The Axis initiative in aggression had created bonds between Russia and the Western Powers. Following the German seizure of Prague, negotiations were undertaken by the West for an agreement with Russia. England and France desired to have Russia share in their guarantee of Poland and Rumania. Russia in its turn wanted that such guarantees should be extended to all its western neighbours, the Black Sea as well as the Baltic States. Any combination between Russia and the West would frustrate German design of aggression. Therefore it was necessary to immobilise Russia before any action was undertaken. That apart Germany knew from her experience in the First World War how difficult it was for Germany to fight simultaneously on two fronts—on the West against an Anglo-French combination and on the east against Russia. In order to direct the German military machine against France or Britain it was necessary to remove all upcertainties in the east. Besides this Germany was economically in need of import of raw materials from the Soviet Union. On the basis of these considerations Hitler began negotiations with Russia in the middle of 1939.

The German overtures were reciprocated by Russia with equal earnestness inspite of the widely advertised ideological difference between the two. In the middle of 1939 Russia was in the desirable position of being courted by two opposite sides, Germany and the West and Russia acknowledged the advantages of an understanding with the former. There were reasons for this choice. The appeasement policy of the West made the Soviet Union just as suspicious of Britain and France as she was of Nazi Germany. This suspiciousness of the people who were cut off from the main stream of development in the West was backed by the fear

that the "Socialist fatherland" would find it difficult to survive in a "hostile capitalist environment" when it was confronted by actual contact with the Western World. The desire of immediate self preservation led Russia to Germany with whom she had common ideological opposition to the democratic states and which could offer more in comparison with Britain. Again in Spain, France and Britain failed to support Russia. This confirmed Moscow's belief that France and Britain subscribed to Hitler's idea that Nazism was the real bulwark against Communism. The four-power pact at Munich gave Russia the impression that Britain and France together with the fascist powers were trying to become the arbiters of the continent. "The Munich Agreement and still more the acquiescence of France and Britain in the Nazi occupation of Prague served as a warning to the Soviet that the Western Powers had agreed that Communism was their common enemy, against which Hitler should now be left free to enter upon a holy crusade. In the light of this, the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland, Greece, and Rumania in March—April 1939 were rather inconsistent and difficult to explain and assess." England and France, Stalin believed, were applying the Machiavellian technique of inciting Germany to invade Russia, so that after Germany and Russia had exhausted themselves it would be easy for them to intervene in the name of peace and dictate terms.

Russia was thus making a correct assessment of her position. In this situation the Hitlerite offer to get back to the Rapallo policy of co-operation gained ground in Russia. The Treaty of 23rd. August, 1939 was the result of this understanding.

German Invasion of Soviet Union :

The destruction of Soviet Union was one of the major objectives of Hitler. He believed that Nazism was the only effective bulwark against Communism. The weakness of the West which was manifested in the policy of 'appeasement'

gave stimulus to this view. The fall of France created a situation in which this idea could conveniently be taken up. The Soviet Union's Western Frontier had been extended approximately to the line of 1914. Therefore, prior to directing the German military machine against Britain, Hitler thought it necessary to remove all uncertainties in the east. That apart, "direct access to the raw materials of the Soviet Union would be satisfactory compensation for the aid being rendered to Britain through growing United States lend-lease activities." Hitler also believed that a successful war against Russia would create differences between Britain and America and this in its turn would impair the strength of the West. With this end in view Hitler sent Rudolf Hess, his deputy as leader of the Nazi party, to England to facilitate peace-making between Germany and Britain.

There were other aspects of the thing. The grand German strategy had two foci, Central Europe and the Mediterranean. Hitler believed that Russia wanted complete control of the Black Sea and the Baltic. Russia's intervention in Central Europe would frustrate German designs. Therefore possibilities of such intervention must be destroyed. Germany also wanted to consolidate the control of Central Europe and the Balkans. Hungary and Rumania were Axis satellites and Italy was locked in a war with Greece. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia adhered to the tripartite pact in March 1941. An Axis offensive in Libya in the spring of 1941 had exposed the weakness of the British forces which were depleted as a result of Balkan developments. In this situation it was natural that signs of German preparations against Russia would multiply. The invasion of Britain had to be abandoned for the moment. Germany, therefore, turned east in order to acquire there vital space and get hold of the resources of that region for a protracted war. On June 22, 1941, German troops moved across the uneasy line of demarcation between the zones of German and Soviet control.

Effect of German invasion on Soviet relation with the United States and Britain :

The major effect of the Nazi invasion of Russia was to bring the Soviet Union back into European affairs. This attack was a heaven-sent opportunity to which Britain responded promptly. Churchill declared that Britain would give all possible help to Russia. Thus commitment was formalised in an agreement which took place on June 13, 1941. The United States formally joined the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Russia, Britain and America became the signatories of the Declaration by United Nations (January, 1942) which stated : (i) that the signatories were now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world"; (ii) that none of them would make a separate peace with the enemy. One may say that this was just the beginning of the inter-Allied co-operation in military and political spheres which lasted till 1945. For sometime Russia had to depend upon the supplies that flowed into the Soviet Union from America. But this collaboration contained the sources of future conflict and the germs of Cold War. The Communists were increasingly playing important role in the resistance movement and this stimulated the Western Powers' suspicion that the Soviet Union was utilising the inter-Allied co operation for the purpose of extending and consolidating her influence on Eastern Europe. In this suspicion lay the elements of Cold War.

Q. 3. Why did America joined the Second World War ?

Conflicting trends in American policy :

When the Second World War broke out America stood on an awkward dilemma. Whether she would go to war or remain neutral was the most decisive question. There were two conflicting trends of thought in American policy, isolationist and interventionist. A debate over the American

attitude to war, which was very much precipitated by the fall of Greece, was conducted in the Congress, in the press as well as among the private circles of the citizens. The interventionists advocated full entry into the war. They argued that the security of the American people required for the defeat of Hitler. For this the Americans should give the British all possible help. From the beginning the sentiment of the people was pro-Ally because Hitlerism stood for the destruction of everything the Americans believed in. As against this the Isolationists maintained that Hitler would never be in a position to consolidate his conquests and even if he was the victor there would be sufficient room for accommodating matters with him. Under no circumstances would America be in danger of attacks. Therefore, America should not go to war.

It is generally believed that at the outset the majority of the people in America favoured neutrality. But Roosevelt who was eager to retain power by concealing the failure of the New Deal was probably on the side of intervention and pulled the country into war against its will. In the course of 1940 the opinion of the people began to change and the majority of them began to feel that defeating Hitler was more important than staying out of war.

Forces working against intervention :

To begin with, the Americans had a long tradition of isolation. It was deeply rooted in American history. The Americans were the migrated Europeans and they had a natural tendency to keep away from matters purely European. Washington's attitude only confirmed this American way of thinking. The same attitude found its revelation in the Monroe Doctrine which prohibited the coming of the Europeans in American hemisphere. The Act of May 1937 which prohibited the sale of munitions or lending of money to any nation at war, was simply an expression of the same policy. But such policy had far-reaching consequence. It implied that America would not help Britain

and France if they went to war. Its effect was to encourage Hitler and thereby hasten the Second World War.

This attitude was supplemented by new trend of thought which made a revisionist interpretation of all that followed the First World War. The Americans began to think that they had been pulled into the war by British propaganda on the one hand and the pressure of a group of industrialists and financiers on the other. They also believed that Wilson's idealism had committed America to European politics and introduced her to unnecessary complications.

The peculiar conduct of the Allied powers after the First World War also shaped the American mind. Selfishness and narrow national interests of the Allied powers baffled Wilsonian ideals at every turn. The reluctance of the European countries to pay back the amount of loans that was advanced by the U.S.A. exasperated the Americans.

Besides these, certain internal developments offered points against intervention. The failure of the New Deal had its impact on American foreign policy. There was a great social and economic distress in the country. President Roosevelt was preoccupied with this and, therefore, he seemed to have abandoned his earlier belief in Wilsonian interventionism.

At this time a struggle was going on between the Executive and the Legislature. The Congress said that any resolution towards the participation of war would strengthen the hands of the President. Naturally in case of war, the President would exercise much of his power which the legislative authority did not like. In this situation intervention was not possible.

Forces working in favour of intervention :

In spite of the non-interventionist trend of thought, United States intervened in the war. This was to some extent due to the influence of the liberal radicalists of America. These people believed that the ideal of democracy had been threatened by the rise of Hitler. They were distressed

by the Nazi philosophy, particularly the racial theory of Hitler. This group was led by President Roosevelt himself. Naturally they were powerful enough to dictate administration.

That apart all information coming from the American ambassadors and diplomatic representatives stationed abroad, contained notes of caution and warning about German expansionism. Even the State Department kept record of the German army. Thus the United States was quite aware of the danger from Germany.

A powerful Jewish element in America had been exerting great influence on the administration. They had taken an anti-German stand.

It was widely believed in some quarters that the Atlantic was no longer a shield behind which the American could hide. A mere natural frontier could not be an effective safeguard of independence and integrity. If it were the fact that Germany was in control of Europe, then the next logical step will be the attempt to bring America under domination.

The material clash of interest between America and Germany in South America gave points to realisation. The United States had always been very sensitive to the foreign influence in South America. During the 'thirties' Germany's economic relations with some of the South American States like Brazil improved. By the late 'thirties' America had been replaced by Germany as the chief purchaser of commodities of these countries. This alarmed the Americans very much. A large German population lived in Brazil, Argentina and some other places where America had great interests. This German population represented the Nazi element in South America. This made the Americans shaky of their position.

Another centre of material clash of interest was the Pacific. There the United States was confronted with Japan. The American possession in the Pacific came to be

threatened by the Japanese expansionism. This baffled all non-interventionist approaches to war. With the Japanese expansionism was involved the vital question of safeguarding American imports. America imported tin and rubber from Malaya and Indonesia. The American Navy was determined to safeguard the trade route of South-East Asia. Here again was a conflict between America and Japan inevitable. It was this tension in the Pacific and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (December 7, 1941) which ultimately pulled America into the war.

Circumstances leading to the American intervention in war :

When the war broke out in September, 1939, America was in the heyday of its isolationism. On September 5, neutrality was declared. For further insulation of the entire American Continent from conflict, the Pan-American Conference declared on 2nd. October the existence of a 300-mile zone over the Atlantic in which hostilities could not take place. The situation in the Far East was in the meantime becoming desperate and debates were raging between those who advocated neutrality and those who pointed to the undesirable effects of abstention, particularly in the Far East. In this situation the Congress tentatively removed in November the embargo on arms which was imposed a few years ago. This was the first breach in the policy of non-intervention.

The collapse of France brought to head the question whether America had any stake in the outcome of the war in Europe. Popular opinion had by this time become sympathetic to the Allied cause but was still against direct intervention. In spite of this a policy of compromise was evolved as a first step on the road to involvement. Churchill after assuming Prime Ministership had requested President Roosevelt to give Britain forty to fifty overage destroyers. After some negotiations Britain got fifty of such ships and gave America in return ninety-nine years leases for naval and air bases in a number of British possessions. In the cir-

cumstances, the destroyers were of great importance to Britain while the bases were advantageous to the American defence. This measure, it is said, constituted a great degree of American involvement. Churchill considered this measure as a transition from neutrality to non-belligerency. It was indeed a great setback for the policy of neutrality.

The sweeping victory of President Roosevelt in the Presidential election was another blow to the isolationist tendency. Roosevelt was in favour of giving Britain all assistance in war. His victory gave him increased freedom to pursue this policy. This trend was manifested in the Lend-Lease Act which soon became law. Under this Act "any country whose defence the President deems vital to the defence of the United States" could receive American help in almost any form. In return the State concerned had to give any compensation the President would judge adequate. The implication of this Act was that Britain could be assured of unlimited assistance.

Three months after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, Germany invaded Russia. The result of this was that the defence of Russia came to be considered as vital to the defence of the United States. Roosevelt's representative Harry Hopkins soon visited Russia and Britain. Very soon the arrangements for American and British aid to Russia were formalized.

Out of this unity developed in the face of emergency, emerged the concept of Grand Alliance. America was gradually accepting responsibilities for the shape with which the world would emerge after the war. This was evidenced by the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill on August 9-11, 1941. From this meeting emerged the joint declaration of peace aims known as the Atlantic Charter. This declaration envisaged the type of world that would exist after the war. In a way this was a reminiscent of the Wilsonian Fourteen Points and, therefore, marked one step advance towards the American involvement in war,

In the meantime the Japanese activities in the Pacific were increasing. Positions on the American side were assuming rigidity. Roosevelt declared that the Japanese expansion by force would compel America to take measures for safeguarding her interests. Churchill pledged to be on the side of America if conciliation failed. Churchill's statement indicated the intensification of Anglo American co-operation on a world-wide basis. Japan was already preparing for a showdown with America and also with Britain if she came to her assistance. The Japanese demands were too far-reaching for the United States to entertain. America offered counter proposals for settlement with Japan in the Pacific. These were equally unacceptable to Japan. Negotiations were futile. On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked the American base of Pearl Harbour. This finally pulled America into the war.

Q. 4. Briefly review the problems discussed at the Yalta Conference.

The Summoning of the Conference :

The Yalta (in Crimea) Conference took place in February 1945. It was attended by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. This Conference was the final outcome of the military and political forces that shaped the Allied mind. These forces may be thus summed up. First, the Allied powers were not vague in their outlook so far as their military position was concerned. Yet their future military plan had not yet been evolved. The major part of Eastern Europe was under the control of the Soviet troops. They had penetrated deep into Germany and found themselves posted near Berlin. In the West the Allied powers were preparing for a new attack that would end war in Germany. In the East Japan was still very strong. The Russians had not yet moved against her. A quick end of the war in the Far East had not yet been conceived of by the American experts.

Politically, the condition of Europe was not very

satisfactory. An uneasy tranquility had been achieved in Greece ; but the Soviet military influence had spread over Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland. The presence of the Soviet army right in the heart of Europe was a source of great anxiety for the Western powers. They were, therefore, eager for an early solution of the East European problems. The settlement of Poland was particularly of great concern to the West. The recognition of the Lublin Committee by the Soviet Government in January 1945, shocked both America and Britain.

That apart, some differences there were between Britain and America on the score of France or Italy or on the question how to deal with the underlying forces struggling for control. Roosevelt was, of course, more inclined than Churchill to place reliance in Stalin's promises but certain Russian actions, as those in Poland, unmistakably caused concern.

America and Britain were anxious to get from Stalin an exposition of the role likely to be played by Russia in the final overthrow of Japan. They were also eager to know their respective share of responsibilities for the shape with which Europe and the world were to emerge from the conflict. The establishment of a world organization as an apparatus for the maintenance of peace was also in the catalogue of their considerations.

Problems discussed in the Conference :

The Conference dealt with two types of questions : (i) the establishment of a world organization—the United Nations ; (ii) the settlement of territorial claims and privileges. United Nations—Britain, America and Russia agreed that a world organization must be created to keep the wartime solidarity of Big Powers. Beneath the apparent pledge of co-operation lay the reciprocal distrust of the East and the West. Russia had the risk of being isolated in the world organization. Naturally she clamoured for more than one vote by virtue of which she could muster her strength

against a hostile West in the event of any dispute or crisis. The Allied Powers were eager to be equipped with privileges that would ensure their predominance in the organization. Out of this emerged the concept of veto. It was agreed that no executive step would be taken in the Security Council without the concurrent votes of the Big Powers. It was agreed that Russia should have three votes of which two went to Byelorussia and Ukraine.

Of the political problems three came up for solution.

Problem of Eastern Europe—This problem had two aspects, one was the Polish question, and the other was the future of the Balkans.

"Poland", remarks Churchill, "had indeed been the most urgent reason for the Yalta Conference" It presented a very complicated problem which revealed the contradictions of the Grand Alliance beneath the apparent show of co-operation. Poland, said Stalin, was a question of honour to the British. To the Russians it was a question of security. Naturally difference arose over the question of the nature of the Polish Government as well as the question of the Polish frontier.

The Allied agreement, which was extensively vague, said that the Polish Provisional Government should be "recognised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders" abroad and then granted Western recognition. There was good deal of ambiguity in it because the East and the West had no fundamental agreement as to what democracy meant. With regard to the question of frontier the Allied chiefs agreed that the eastern frontier of Poland would follow the Curzon Line with a little digressions advantageous to Poland. The final delimitation of the western frontier awaited the Peace Conference.

The agreement was reached that Germany was to be divided into occupation zones. Owing to the British urgings it was decided to give France an equal voice in future

German arrangements. She was also to share in the occupation of Germany. Her zone was to be carved out of what was to have been the American and the British shares. The figure of 20 million dollars was accepted as a basis for discussion on German reparation. No concrete arrangement, however, was made on the score of either dismemberment of the country or the content of reparation. On the whole the principles of dismemberment and denazification were accepted.

The Soviet Union promised to enter the war against Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. In return Russia was to regain in Asia the status she enjoyed before her defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. The status quo was to be maintained in outer Mongolia. Russia was to reacquire Sakhalin and Rurile islands. The interests of Russia in Manchuria would be recognised. Port Arthur was to be leased to the Soviet Union. The South-Manchurian and Chinese Eastern railways were to be jointly operated by Soviet Russia and China. Stalin's conditions were recognized in a secret personal agreement between the Big Three. This agreement, says Churchill, was "an American affair"

The affairs of South-Eastern Europe and Iran also figured prominently in the Yalta talks. But no tangible arrangement emerged from it. The Big Three agreed to assist all liberated countries in Europe "to create democratic institutions of their own choice." This was called the Declaration on Liberated Europe

Such were, in broad terms, the problems dealt with at Yalta. The nature of discussions entertained at Yalta showed that the period of war planning was definitely over and the period of peace planning was ushered in. The relation between Russia and the West had not yet hardened and there was still room for flexibility. Churchill noted, "Yalta has turned out very well". There were differences between the Allies, but their anxiety to maintain the

Grand Alliance was great. The war had to be won and it was believed in American circles that the Russian participation in the Pacific War was necessary. Therefore, the show of unity was preserved. But underneath the unity were latent seeds for future dissensions.

Review of agreements reached at Yalta :

Churchill noted that the British and the Americans did not want that "some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union." The general British reaction to the work of the conference, he said, was "unqualified support for the attitude we had taken." Yet the Yalta decisions were to create great many complications in world politics. They produced misunderstandings which subsequently hardened the relations between Russia and the West. In retrospective analysis some western critics considered the conference as the second "Munich settlement" in European history. In other words they meant that the Conference marked an outright surrender of the West to Russian demands.

Fleming puts together the arguments of the critics of the Yalta Conference. First, the concessions which were given by the West to the Soviet Union were definitely against the Chinese Nationalist. The decisions affecting China were embodied in a secret protocol. This act of the Yalta Powers was very selfish and later it was argued that the Chinese interest were sold out to Russia. In fact, the later debacle of the Chinese Nationalists was attributed to the Yalta Concessions to the Russian Communists. Second, President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill definitely allowed the Russians to spread this influence over Eastern Europe. The ambiguity in the Polish settlement went in favour of Russia. No positive step was taken to prevent the Red Army from consolidating their position over Eastern Europe. Third, the solution of the German problem was definitely to the advantage of Russia. Stalin's concessions with regard to the French occupation in Germany terribly

reacted on the strength of the British and American zones. Fourth, the recognition of the Russian demand of three votes in the United Nations was regarded as the complete resignation of the Western Powers to the Russian will. Russia exploited this weakness of the West and became the successor of Japan in the Far East and the heir of Germany in Central Europe. The London Poles denounced the Yalta Communique as a violation of the principle of self-determination. The President of the Polish American Congress declared the Yalta Conference as "a staggering blow to the cause of freedom".

Considering all these arguments Fleming has arrived at the conclusion that the Yalta papers were published with great fanfare and they had revealed no betrayal by any one. Harry Hopkins said later, "we really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we have all been praying for and talking about for so many years".

Fleming has justified the Yalta Concessions on the following grounds: First, Russia had contained a large part of Japan's best troops in Manchuria during the time when America was fighting with Japan-American military prospects both in Europe and Asia were still grim. Second, time and manpower were becoming crucial factors. America's man power resources had reached the lowest ebb during the Yalta. Third, the American people were increasingly becoming 'war-weary'. Fourth the American Commander in China repeatedly informed Washington that Russian participation in the Far Eastern War would precipitate American victory. Fifth, the secret protocol of the Yalta agreement has been justified on military ground. Fleming says that secrecy was 'essential' in view of the fact that the communication of this agreement to Chiang Kai-Shek would have revealed the plan and this might complicate the position of Russia and Allies.

Stalin wanted assurance of secrecy so that nobody could know the blow before it was dealt at Japan. Putting all

these arguments together Fleming remarks "since our interest in Russian participation against Japan was believed to be great, there is little basis for the charge that Yalta was simply another case of appeasement." So far as East Europe was concerned Yalta only recognised a fast accompli. The State Department had made it extremely clear to the President, even before he left for Crimea in January, 1945, that time had passed when the United States could control events in Eastern Europe. The "so called Yalta Charter was Roosevelt's final and futile effort to prevent the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in Europe". There may be other way of interpreting things. Roosevelt wanted "to build a structure of co-operation with the Soviet Union on the foundations which he had laboured so hard to lay". Roosevelt realised the powerful position of the Soviet Union in Europe and its potential power in the Far East. Thus his decisions only reflected the realities of the situation. The Russian attitude to Roosevelt's policy was reflected in Stalin's message to President Truman : "The American people and the United Nations has lost in Franklin Roosevelt the great politician of the world significance and a pioneer in the organisation of the peace and security after the war". Refuting the "the cold war historians" Fleming notes : "Roosevelt was everlastingly right in his gallant, sustained effort to break out of the ancient cycle of national rivalries, arms, race and war. He saw that there was no objective reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to fall out immediately and to fight for world masteryIt was not Roosevelt who failed, it was his successors who were unable to make peace."

All these facts prove that Roosevelt had no responsibility for the beginning of the cold war. It was Roosevelt who fused the wartime coalition together and neutralised the wartime differences. It was his purpose to be firm with the Russians but to minimise the inevitable post-war disagreements. But Roosevelt's successor "was quick to maxi-

mise the difficulties and to be tough with the Russians." If Roosevelt had been able to continue his office during the next three years there would have been no cold war. But his successor had failed to build up a system where co-operation with the Russians was possible. His innate distrust for the Russians and his suspicion about the Russian motive behind their friendly behaviour made all understanding impossible. By the time the Big Three met at Potsdam relations between Russia and the West had hardened. A split in the Allied camp had become almost a mathematical certainty.

Q. 5. Briefly review the problems discussed at the Potsdam Conference.

The summoning of the Conference :

The Potsdam Conference was summoned in July, and continued till August, 1945. It was the longest but the least satisfactory of all the war-time conferences. The conference took place at the time when the Allied Army had made considerable progress in different sectors in Europe and Asia. Vast territories outside their national frontier were under their control. Neither the West nor the Russians were willing to yield to the other any share of control in the countries occupied by them. Military questions which figured so prominently in the Teheran discussions had sunk to a marginal place. Political problems dominated the Allied mind.

At the Potsdam Conference the three chiefs of the Allied Governments could not draw together in the same warm personal association and in a common cause as at the two wartime meetings at Teheran and Yalta. Previously they had enough flexibility to adjust or defer the issues which might estrange them. At Potsdam that flexibility was lost. National diplomacy was relapsing into old thoughts and traditional habits. Conflicts of desire and opinion were assuming shape. To the fear of broken Germany combined with the fear of Russian advance to stir the West. The

Russian distrust in the true goodwill of the West was reinforced by the belief that the West was bent on depriving the Soviet Union of the benefits of victory. These with other turns of time frustrated all possibilities of close contact between the Allied chiefs and their advisors.

The antagonism between the Soviet Russia and the Western democracies had started on the question of Poland. The problem of the administration of the German eastern territories added new points to the conflict. From the Spring of 1945 the Soviet Union began to shut herself off from the West. The newly acquired satellite countries were quickly brought into the line. In the aftermath of the Yalta Conference the nature of Soviet activities in East Europe began to unfold to the West. Thus misgiving came into play when the world was transforming itself. Walter Lippmann asserted on May 8, 1945 that Europe was actually divided into two exclusive spheres of influence.

With this state of relationship Churchill, Truman and Stalin met together at Potsdam. Yalta had been a conference of Commanders-in-Chief. Potsdam was a meeting of political leaders' endowed with the power to establish the foundations of peace. Churchill who had better understanding of the problems of Europe than any leader of the West was replaced by Attlee. Truman had a genuine distrust of the Russians. As a result flexibility was gone. Co-operation was lacking. Yet new arrangements had to be carved out for reconquered Europe.

Problems discussed in the Conference :

The Potsdam Conference concerned itself with matters primarily European. These matters break into three groups : (i) agreements over the framing of the peace treaties, (ii) settlement of the European problems, and (iii) decisions reached with regard to the acute problem of reparation.

Framing of the peace treaties—The Potsdam communique laid down procedures for the framing of peace treaties with all the satellite states together with Italy. It was

agreed that each treaty should be drafted by the representatives of the nations which had signed the armistice with the particular enemy in question. France was to be regarded as a signatory of the Italian armistice.

European settlement : The Polish and German problems figured prominently in the Potsdam discussion. It was agreed at Yalta that Poland's eastern boundary should be extended as far as the Curzon line and that she would be compensated at the expense of Germany. But there was no agreement as to how much German territory should go to Poland. At Potsdam Stalin insisted that Poland's western frontier should advance as far as the Western Neisse. Churchill opposed it on the ground that the Soviet plan would lead to the shifting of more than eight million Germans. But fortunately for the Russians, Churchill was replaced by Attlee and the British opposition to the Soviet plan was relaxed. The Big Three agreed that Poland would get Königsberg and its hinterland in East Prussia. She would administer upper and lower Silesia as well as portions of East Prussia. Poland's western frontier would finally be delimited in the German Peace Treaty.

The Potsdam Conference also set forth different zones of occupation in Germany. Germany was to be disarmed, demilitarised, de-Nazified, democratized and "treated as a single economic unit." Thus the Conference laid down certain broad political and economic principles for governing Germany.

With respect to the status of Italy and Russian satellite countries a meaningless formula was evolved. The preparation of a peace treaty with Italy was declared to be the first task before the Council of Foreign Ministers. With regard to Finland, Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary, the three Governments agreed to examine in future the establishment of diplomatic relations with these countries.

Reparation—The reparation problem was perhaps the most important single issue at stake. There was a long

struggle between Anglo-American desire not to depress the German economy and the Russian desire to have her share, a decision was reached. It granted Russia ten percent of surplus German industrial capital equipment outright and an additional fifteen percent in gratis. For the first ten percent Russia had to provide food and coal to the West. Thus a balance was effected between the British demand for reparation. The Yalta figure of 20 milliard found no place in the settlement.

Other minor agreements : Other minor problems concerning the future of Europe also came up for discussions at the Conference. Stalin wanted the United Nations to cut off relations with Franco of Spain. Churchill rejected the proposal. Equal distribution of the ships of the German navy and merchant marine between the three Allied Powers was accepted. It was agreed that peace treaties with the lesser Axis powers should be negotiated before those with Germany and Japan. The task of preparing drafts of these treaties was entrusted to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers occupying Germany. On the basis of a Soviet proposal, the Conference resolved that the trial of Fascist war criminals would be expedited.

Review of the agreements reached at Potsdam Conference :

The decisions reached at Potsdam certainly did not constitute a long term settlement of European affairs. For the time being settlement was reached on the most pressing of all problems namely the treatment to be acceded to a defeated Germany. In the content of the time this was a considerable achievement. Fleming has rightly remarked that the Potsdam Conference certainly did not prove that the East and the West could not agree. They could not agree on all points, but the amount and range of agreement was impressive indeed.

The Potsdam agreement, however, suffered from two major defects. In the first place there was no definite meeting of minds among the Big Powers on European issues as a whole.

For the time being Russia appeared to have defended successfully her dominations of Eastern Europe from threatened interference by Britain and America. But the West never recognized the new order in Eastern Europe as the final settlement. In this difference lay a patent source of future troubles.

The exclusion of the French from the Conference—a second anomaly as it was of the Conference—threatened to undo the effects of the decisions so painfully reached at Potsdam. The French were not bound by this agreement. She was therefore free to veto Allied action in Germany by virtue of her membership of the controlled Council. The fact that the French were more afraid of the Germans than were the Russians made this danger almost a reality.

These defects, however, were not very evident at the time. Nevertheless, events were drifting very fast, and, as Churchill has pointed out, frustration was bound to the fate of the Potsdam Conference. In the aftermath of Potsdam a feeling was gradually taking shape in the West that a big concession had been given to Poland under Stalin's pressure. Poland had secured large chunks of German territory. What distressed the West was the fact that the Polish government "was a puppet government of the Soviet Union." The Russians were happy that the liberation of Eastern Europe by the Red Army had been a reality. On the side of the West the fear was raging that a new reality had been posed in Eastern Europe by the advance of the Red Army. A new situation had arisen in Europe. International situation was changing fast. The cold war was indeed in the offing.

Q. 6. Write a brief note on Russia's relations with the Western Powers during and after the Second World War.

Background :

Eversince the Bolshevic revolution in 1917 the relations between Russia and the Western Powers had not been

friendly. In the period between the two World Wars Russia deliberately remained behind an iron curtain in order to defend herself from Western interventionism. On the other hand the West considered the communist ideology of the Russians a dangerous contagion which should not be permitted to infiltrate into the civilized society of the West. To the West Russia was a riddle—a mystery wrapped with enigma. To the Russians the West was the unmistakable enemy of world proletarian revolution. This antagonism characterised the relation between the Soviet Union and the West during the peaceful days of the twenties.

In the general unrest of the thirties there were enough occasions for misunderstanding between the Russians and the West. The Anglo-French policy of appeasement with regard to Germany and Italy confirmed the Russian belief that the Western Powers regarded Nazism to be the only bulwark against Communism. The failure of the Western Powers to back the Russians in Spain stimulated Russian suspicion. When Russia was left on the doorstep at Munich her fear of being sunk in a hostile capitalist environment became acute. The Munich agreement suggested to the Russian mind that the Western Powers were trying to become the arbiters of the continent.

The Russian bear had made a correct estimate of its own position. Addressing the Eighteenth All Union Communist Party Congress, Stalin openly complained that England and France had been "retreating and retreating" and 'making one concession after another' to the Dictators. They were repudiating as a result the policy of collective security and the plan of a united front for protection against the 'bandits'. He openly accused England and France with the Machiavellian policy of inciting Germany against Russia. If Germany and Russia had exhausted themselves in fighting they would intervene in the name of peace and dictate conditions of peace solely on the basis of their own interests. In the face of this Russia needed security. This she found

in the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. For the time being the estrangement between Russia and the West was complete.

Relations during & after the War.

The German attack on Russia (June 21, 1941) and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (December 7, 1941) opened a new phase in the relation between the East and the West. These two events pulled America and Russia directly into the war. The immense Western relief at Russia's entry into the War combined with the common immediate object of defeating Hitler and their effect was to bring the Allied Powers close together. On the morrow of the German attack on Russia Churchill declared : "We shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people...The Russian danger is therefore our danger". Stalin in his dire strait also showed himself willing to give up some of his "purblind prejudice and fixed ideas". This was the real beginning of the 'Grand Alliance' against the fascist powers.

This union of the Big Three Powers was a very significant development. The United States is not a European power. Yet even before Pearl Harbour she was becoming increasingly entangled with the belligerents. All aid to Britain short of war, Lend-Lease, the Atlantic Charter, the eligibility of the Soviet Union to Lend-Lease aid—all these indicated the American stake in the war. Britain and Russia had suffered great injury. The Allied Unity on the basis of a common programme of action against a common enemy was, therefore, a logical phenomenon. But since both Britain and Russia were European powers with marked qualifications, the effect of the Allied unity was unique and unprecedented, for Europe, perhaps for the first time in history, war essentially at the mercy of forces which were to a large extent extraneous to her.

This apparent union could not conceal internal differences which were too difficult of adjustment. From the Western point of view the Soviet Union was operating

under a political system which was very akin to their totalitarian enemies. She was long confined in relative isolation. She was also dedicated to an ideology that forecast the eclipse of the systems for which the West was fighting. On the other hand the Russians had viewed the Western involvement in the war as the inevitable result of imperialistic contradictions. The Russians were struggling for existence in a 'hostile capitalist environment'. They would welcome for a time all aid, from British declaration of June 1941 to the American Lend-Lease aid. But the long-standing distrust could not easily be eradicated. "There was, therefore, throughout the conflict an element of reticence and mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, more particularly the fear on either side that the other might find accommodation with the enemy at its expense."

The Yalta Conference demonstrated the inner working of the Russian and the Western minds. At this Conference certain problems emerged which blocked all avenues to mutual Allied understanding. War-time controversies over divergent issues such as Lend-Lease, the question of the second front or the Russo-Japanese frontier of 1941 showed how touchy the relation was. New quarrels over Poland, Germany and liberated Europe offered points to existing differences. The settlement of the Polish problem had much vagueness in it. Stalin's demand that Poland should be compensated at the expense of Germany was not conceded although the eastern frontier of Poland was accepted. There was no clear-cut settlement over the question of future Polish government. The inherent ambiguity of the Yalta Settlement was simply an attempt to conceal the divergences between the East and the West. This ambiguity in future led to the polarisation in the Allied Camp.

The problem of the future set up of the countries of the liberated Europe and also the problem of future Germany provided new sources of troubles. The problems arising out

of the two ambiguous expressions of 'free election' and 'democratic government' which were differently interpreted by the Russians and the West caused unusual breach in the Allied Camp. The problems of German reparations, the methods of exacting it, the setting up of an Allied Controlled Commission in Germany and the inclusion of France into it were some of the new sources of divergence.

The developments after Yalta marked a departure from the so-called war-time co-operation. The meeting between Truman and Molotov on 23rd. April, 1945 led to no accommodation. Churchill's messages to Truman dated 6th and 12th May, 1945 drew pointed attention to Russian position in Europe. On the top of it the Lend-Lease was abruptly cut off on 12th May, 1945. All these had vitiated the Russian mind. Harry Hopkins's mission to Moscow (May to June 1945) only revealed the area of disagreement between the Soviet Union and the West. The attitude on both sides hardened. What Roosevelt wanted to avoid had come to pass.

In this situation the Potsdam Conference took place. Disagreement was bound to follow. At the outset there was deadlock over East Europe. Difference arose over the question of disposition of American and British owned industrial equipment in Rumania which had been seized by the Russians. Problems of forming government there and the old disagreement over 'free election' and 'democracy' gave rise to further troubles. Difference also arose over the question of disposal of Italian Colonies and German Navy and also over the establishment of a Soviet base in the Turkish straits. The result of these differences was that certain vague promises were reached at Potsdam. The major issues were shelved for the future.

After Potsdam things drifted very fast. Japan was defeated and the American Atomic explosion only reinforced the 'tough' school in the American decision-making circles. America wanted to use its superior strength gained from

Atom Bomb as a lever against Russia if she proved obdurate. The complete Communist takeover in Poland made situations worse. The travelling circus of foreign ministers which began after the Potsdam Conference failed to break any new sources of accommodation. The failure of the three Foreign Ministers' Conference (in London in Sept. 1945, in Moscow, Dec. 1945 and finally in Paris, April, 1946) demonstrated that the relation between the West and the Russians went beyond all points of compromise. In his famous Fulton Speech Churchill gave an open call to crush the Communist spectre before it was too late. Since May, 1946 all reparations to Russia was stopped. This rudely shocked Russian mind.

The confrontation had begun. Molotov's speech of July 1946 and Byrnes' rejoinder in September 1946 showed that the two sides were engaged in a new drive for winning the Germans to their side. In America Dulles with the Republicans behind him emerged as the most formidable force in the policy-making level of American administration. The policy of containment had gained ground and the republican cry to resist the appeasement of Russia met with some success. In the Communist Camp there was the growing suspicion that America and Britain were "coming out in a bloc against the Soviet Union." The Communist success in the Polish election of 1947 was simply a reply to this new situation. President Truman's Bayler Speech of March, 1947 offered new incentive to Russian suspicion. When this was the situation came the news of the disturbances in Greece and Turkey. President Truman grabbed this opportunity to promulgate his famous Doctrine. The division in the Allied Camp came to receive clear recognition. The Cold War had raged in full swing. Inter-Allied relations would henceforth become expressions of bipolar politics.

7. Write a brief note on the Truman Doctrine,

Background :

The Truman Doctrine was promulgated in March 1947. It was the first significant western offensive to counteract the expansion of Soviet communism in Europe and Asia. In this sense it can be regarded as the high watermark of cold war. But in itself the Truman Doctrine was not an isolated phenomenon. Rather it was the culmination of all that had come to pass during the war and its immediate aftermath.

During the war Russia and the West came close together but their internal contradictions were not resolved. The inner working of the Russian and the Western minds was largely influenced by a reciprocal mistrust for each other. The Russian apprehension of a "hostile capitalist environment" was always balanced by the Western fear that Russia stood for the complete demise of the system for which they were fighting. Even at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 and also at San Francisco the Allied unity showed unmistakable signs of imminent break-down. At Yalta old feuds over the Lend-Lease, the question of second front or the 1941 Russo-German frontier combined with new problems like the Polish problem, the problem of liberated Europe and that of Germany. In spite of Rooseveltian moderation the Yalta aftermath saw a steady increase in the cautious Western antipathy for Communism which was the psychological legacy of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Under the impact of this, wartime cooperation was gradually breaking down.

After Yalta a high level conference took place in Washington (22nd April 1945) in which the famous 'tough' school in American administration emerged. This school was a positive anti-Russian force and pressed the administration to adopt a tough policy towards Russia. The exponents of this policy were Harriman, Stettinius and James Forrestal. The White House Conference was followed by a meeting between Truman and Molotov (23rd April, 1945). The failure of this meeting demonstrated the fundamental divergence between

the East and the West. Poland was the bone of contention and its problem was not resolved.

On the top of this disagreement came the two messages from Churchill to Truman dated 6th and 12th May, 1945. In the second message the term 'iron curtain' was used for the first time. Here was Churchill making frantic appeal to the American President not to withdraw the American troops from Europe until a political agreement with Russia was reached. The weakness of Britain and France together with the presence of the Red Army on the European soil had rendered almost impossible an understanding between Russia and the West.

Following the British cry for American help against Russia, came the ignominious American declaration of 12th May, 1945 whereby the Lend-Lease was abruptly cut off. This had rudely shocked the Russian mind. Coming in the wake of this Harry Hopkins's mission to Moscow was a failure. Thus everything Roosevelt tried to avoid came to pass.

In this situation the Potsdam Conference took place. Vague promises were reached and major issues were shelved. The 'tough' school in America wanted to use Atom Bomb as a lever against Russia. Consequently Russian attitude stiffened. The three successive Foreign Ministers' Conferences in London, Moscow and Paris proved simply to be the travelling circuses of representatives. Churchill's Fulton speech in which he gave an open call to crush the communist Spectre before it was too late once again vitiated the Russian mind. Things were going wrong. Since May 1946 reparation to Russia was stopped. In a speech delivered in July 1946 Molotov appealed to the sentiments of the German people. The American rejoinder came in Byrnes' speech of September 1946. The East and the West were engaged in a drive for winning the Germans. In the meantime in America Dulles with the backing of the Republican Party emerged as a formidable force in the policy-making level of

the American administration. The policy of containment had already gained ground. Even man like Acheson who tried to avoid provocative utterances, had labelled Russia as "aggressive". In the United Nations the Baruch plan which envisaged the establishment under the U.N. Security Council, of an international authority that would control all phases of atomic energy production and use came to be opposed by Russia. On the top of this came the news of the complete Russian management of the Polish election in January 1947. The Republican cry to resist the appeasement of Russia was raised once again. In his Bayler Speech (March 1947). President Truman talked of fighting communism. Co-operation between the East and the West broke down. Confrontation had begun.

The immediate occasion for the Doctrine :

Two events provided immediate occasion for the Doctrine. In January 1947 a severe storm caused great devastation in Britain. British life as a result came to be paralysed. Britain was already weak and now she seemed to be terribly incapable of resuming her former role as a great power.

The second event was a political one. Britain was saddled with her commitments in Greece and the burden was of such magnitude that it was debated in London whether the means existed to sustain the load. A civil war began there in 1936 and the communists were leading a tough struggle against the Government. In Turkey also there was the problem of "Russian expansion". The Anglo-Americans were doing their best to crush all communist uprisings and forestall the expansion of the Russian influence in the Middle East. But Britain was in economic throes and could not continue the intervention in Greece (this was made clear by the declaration of February, 1947) The outcome of the British renunciation was the taking over of the British responsibility in that quarter by America.

Authorship of the Doctrine :

The problem of authorship has occasioned great debate

in intellectual circles. According to one school of thought President Truman was the real author of the Doctrine. In an authoritative article (published in New York Times on March 23, 1947) Arthur Krock who "had unexcelled access to the minds of the highest officials in Washington" stated that the doctrine had been in the President's mind a long time. As long as the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945, the President had abandoned all hopes of achieving peace and security by a continued policy of appeasement and official treatment of Russia as a government friendly to the United States.' "He made up his mind then that, when a fitting opportunity arose he would proclaim the new doctrine." Fleming writes: "The evidence is accordingly quite conclusive that Mr. Truman decided on the substance of his doctrine soon after the London Conference in September 1945, at which the Russians had refused to agree to any thing." But in his own memoir the President says that the first draft of the message "was not at all to my liking." The apologists of the President point out that the essentials of the Doctrine were framed as early as the time of Roosevelt.

There is a second school which ascribes the authorship to George Kennan. Kennan had been attached to the American embassy in Moscow and from there he sent messages urging a stiffening of the American response to Russia in the post-war period. In March 1947 he was in Washington and came to be regarded by no less a person than Marshall himself as head of a new policy planning staff. At the moment he was occupied with lectures to the War College and knew that the Doctrine was in preparation. Apart from all these, Kennan wrote in July 1947 an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." This had caused him to be regarded as the father of the Doctrine.

This view is probably not correct. Fleming says that he had no participation in the formulation of the Doctrine.

It is said that he strongly objected both to the tone of the message and to the specific action proposed. "He favoured economic aid to Greece, but wanted to keep the military aid small. He was opposed to aid of any kind to Turkey." "Kennan was rationalising and softening the doctrine rather than fathering or inventing it. On the contrary, his initial reaction was that the proclamation of a head on collision between two ways of life and two great powers was much too sweeping, and that it was dangerous."

The Doctrine :

In a message to the joint session of the two Houses of Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman declared that in Greece "a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery was able to create political chaos which until now, has made economic recovery impossible". He said that a new situation has been created in Greece by the "terroristic activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists." The United Nations, he declared, was incapable of extending help "of the kind that is required." He firmly declared that the time had come when "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life", one based on free institutions, the other on terror and repression. The President believed "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."

Significance of the Doctrine :

The Truman Doctrine was the unmistakable notice to the world at large and to the Russians in particular, that the United States would henceforth make all endeavours to contain further Russian expansion. It envisaged American intervention in any part of the world to forestall the supposed danger of communism. Relinquishing its revolutionary part the United States chose to become "the world's anti-communist, anti-Russian policeman." The question

was never asked whether Revolution was an internal development of a state. Fleming observes that it "forbade the very kind of revolution, democratic or otherwise. It would be difficult to find a revolution anywhere which had not been the work of an armed minority. The people might later come to the support of the fighting rebels, but revolutions were notoriously made by comparatively small groups of determined armed men." Fleming says that status quo was not sacred but the President made it so. By placing the Americans to the 'antislavery', the President "conceded all dynamism to the Soviets and condemned his countrymen to a world-wide defence of the Western social order, including for many years the dying colonial empires."

By the declaration America was distinctly tending towards individual rather than collective action in international affairs. Peace, the status quo, the integrity of nation and such things were not the exclusive American interests but the concerns of all. For the sake of these there was no need to by-pass the United Nations. Such a declaration simply impaired the authority of the organisation and gave a rude shock to the confidence and hopes of free people everywhere. (Also see notes on Cold War).

Q. 8. Write a brief note on the development of Cold War from the end of the Second World War to the establishment of NATO.

One of the outstanding features of international politics in the period following the end of Second World War is the steady breakdown of the war-time co-operation of the Allies. This co-operation was built up in the face of a common enemy and once the enemy was laid low, the old ideological differences between the East and the West, their mistrust and the fear of aggressive intentions of each other flared up. Russia's emergence from the war as a great power was a shock to the West. The assumption of vital role by America in European politics was a matter too diffi-

cult for the Russians to adjust. The war had conclusively sealed the demotion of Europe. Her displacement as the prime mover in international affairs was the final outcome of the war. There was no third power in the post-war era that could balance the position of the two super powers, Russia and America. The U.N. was sadly incompetent as a balancer. Old feuds rapidly merged with new problems. Divergent aims were too irreconcilable and points of friction multiplied. The result of this was that the war-time unity broke down and the East and the West relapsed into the bipolar pattern of opposing blocs. The struggle between the two blocs is called the Cold War.

Origins of the Cold War :

Hartmann observes that the roots of the Cold War lie in the "great differences in outlook and philosophy between the two super powers" which had been "soft-pedalled by common consent during the war." The two sides had no "incentive for adjustment" and naturally differences in outlook flared up. This absence of 'incentive for adjustment' was a very significant thing. Professor Penrose has discovered the role of well-organised anti-Communist groups which maintained a continuous pressure on the Government, on educational institutions, and on Sections of the public in the United States. These pressure groups wanted their government "to mobilise support for an anti-Chinese, anti-Russian policy, and for intervention in Latin-America and South Eastern Asia in order to forestall the supposed danger of communism in those areas."

Russian historians offer a new approach to the problem. They trace the beginning of the Cold War in the aggressive intention of the United States in the new world situation : "The American imperialists unleashed the so-called Cold War, and sought to kindle the flames of a third World War."

Factors which shaped Cold War :

The Russian historians believe that certain developments of the changed international scene shaped the Cold War,

In the first place, they point out, eleven states broke away from the capitalist system after the war, and "radically changed the international position of the Soviet Union." The same point has been stressed by Hartmann when he says that the fate of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria which emerged as Peoples' Democracies increased American bitterness against Soviet Russia. In the second place, the growth of national liberation movement led to the disintegration of the colonial system. As a result of this there was a change in the balance of forces. In the third place, the United States "decided to take advantage of the economic and political difficulties in the other leading capitalist countries and bring them under its sway." This is American aggressiveness in a changed situation.

Western historians have their own approach to the problem. They point out that the most important fact of the world politics after the Second World War was the failure of the Allies to guarantee a definite peace settlement. This failure had two elements: First, the Allies failed to make any definite treaty of peace with the defeated powers. Some were started but never reached completion. Secondly, they failed to evolve a basis for their own peace-time operation. The result was that the relation between Russia and the West kept getting critical from 1945 onwards

To these were added the realities of the situation. In 1945 and onwards it was proved that Russia had the largest and most invincible land army which had helped her to consolidate her grip over Central Europe. All other European countries were in chaos or in partial breakdown and so nothing was in the way of Russian advance. By contrast to the position of the Red Army, the decline of the West appeared to be tragic. The sharp appearance of the U.S.A. in the world scene was an undeniable phenomenon. America is not a European power but her presence in European political scene was a menace to Russia. Russia and Britain could count them European only with qualifications but the

devastation they suffered during the war made them intrinsically interested in the European problems of reparation and territorial readjustments. Since America suffered no direct consequence of the war in their homeland, the American economy still remained powerful and more so than that of any other country. This together with the fact that America had commercial centres and military bases beyond their national frontier and some in Asia and Europe, made Russia apprehensive of America's position as the leader of the anti-communist bloc. On the other hand the Russian position in Central Europe and the Russian pressures in countries like Greece, Persia, Turkey shocked the American mind. The fear of communist advance on one side was balanced by the apprehension of encirclement on the other. The split between the East and the West was the direct outcome of it.

The idea of competitive co-existence put forward by Khrushchev contributed to the rift. He propounded the idea that Russia and the Western powers would compete to win over the neutral powers without permitting any drift to war in the process. This stimulated the rivalry between the East and the West. Henceforth this rivalry operated on a wide global basis.

Development of Cold War before 1945 :

The roots of Cold War can be traced back to the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Western powers including the United States intervened in the civil war in Russia in aid of counter-revolution and sought to nip Bolshevism in the bud. During the twenties a somewhat workable relation was maintained between the two but the Russian distrust for the West remained to be a permanent outcome of the intervention. In the thirties the Western policy of appeasing the fascist powers, the failure of Britain and France to back Russia in Spain, the Western role in the Munich agreement which suggested to the Russian mind the possibility of a usurpation of the role of arbiters by

Britain and France—all these made the Russians conscious of their 'hostile capitalist environment'. On the other hand the Russo-German Non-Aggression pact exposed to the West the inner working of the Russian mind. For the time being the totalitarian outlook of Russia and the so-called free and democratic attitude of the West was complete. During the war a shabby unity was maintained between Russia and the Western powers in the face of a common enemy. The necessity of co-operation only cloaked their contradictions. Yet they had points of disagreement and friction was bound to be the consequence. The question of second front, the Lend-Lease or the Russian frontier of 1941 had vitiated the Russian mind. Each conference during the war added new points to old frictions. The Potsdam Conference amply proved that the Allied co-operation was a hoax. America's insistence on keeping to herself the secrets of the manufacture of the atom bomb and the tendency of the American policy-makers to use atom bomb as a lever against Russia rudely shocked the Russians. On the top of these there were problems of free election and democracy. The West could not reconcile itself to the new order created in Central Europe. Russia was reluctant to relinquish her position there which developed as the outcome of the war. Between the desire of the West to prevent Russia from establishing her grip in Central Europe and the Russian determination not to allow the West to undo what had been achieved, there could be no compromise. A conflict was inevitable.

Progress of Cold War after 1945 :

The Sovietization of Poland—Poland had always been a bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the West. The Western Powers had gone to war with Hitler to save Poland from extinction. Naturally they expected that after liberation Poland would join their orbit. On the other hand, Poland, was vital to Russian interest because, as Stalin declared "throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia". A

Sovietized government in Poland would ensure Russian security in Europe. But the Western Powers expected that by the application of the Yalta Formula Poland would eventually have a western-type of democratic government. This misgiving was never solved. When the Red Army moved into Poland they handed over the administration to the Lublin Committee which was formed behind the Russian lines and was, therefore, communist in composition. At the Yalta Conference it was agreed that the Lublin government should include representatives of other parties both within Poland and from London (the Polish government in exile was operating from London) and in this capacity it would be recognised. Subsequently, the Western Powers recognised it on the understanding that it would be a provisional government pledged to hold free election as early as possible. It was with this understanding that Mikolajczyk, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party joined the new government. The Yalta hopes were later proved illusory. The dominant communist majority in the government were becoming more and more powerful. Stalin took every measure to ensure the liquidation of the non-communist elements in the Polish government. The flight of Mikolajczyk meant that the period of organised resistance to the Communists was over. In their handling of the Polish question the Russians, however, showed respect to legality. True to his words Stalin arranged for the holding of a referendum in June 1946. The result was that the programme of the dominant Polish party was accepted by the voters. Poland had not yet gone to the Russian Camp but it had definitely refused to be Western. In January 1947 a general election was held. The Polish Communist Party returned to power with overwhelming majority. Poland was protected for good from all possibilities of Western interference.

Truman Doctrine :

[Truman Doctrine has been discussed elsewhere. Here we shall discuss the Cold War implication of the Doctrine]

The Doctrine had stupendous Cold War implications. It envisaged American interference in any part of the globe, wherever there would be a threat of communism. In the phrase of its author, the Doctrine marks "the turning point in America's foreign policy which now declares that wherever aggression, direct or indirect, threatened peace, the security of the United States was involved." This had certain implications. In the first place, the Doctrine meant that America had decided to break away from the Rooseveltian tradition of reaching a lasting understanding with Russia. Secondly, the Doctrine put a final end to America's policy of isolation and her detachment from European politics. President Truman declared that in any part of the globe where aggression took place the security of the United States would be involved. This was a kind of universalisation of the Monroe Doctrine. Finally the Truman Doctrine acknowledged the fact that Britain had fallen after the Second World War as a great power and that the British withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean would be followed by American commitment there and elsewhere. In this sense the Doctrine was the forerunner of the Eisenhower Doctrine formulated in January 1957.

Thus the Doctrine had wide implications from the Cold War point of view. The question is legitimately asked whether the international political situation required the issuance of the Doctrine. To the apologists of the Doctrine who believe that there was a political vacuum in Greece which was going to be filled by communism, Fleming offers a reply. He says that the Soviets had achieved great political success as a result of the War. They were now busy consolidating their hold on East Europe. They had no eyes on Greece. The Truman Doctrine was promulgated on the assumption that the Soviet Union had become aggressive and was following an expansionist policy. The Americans were shocked by the spread of socialism in Eastern Europe. They were under the fear that the fall of Greece "under

the control of an armed minority" would cause widespread "confusion and disorder" in the entire Middle East.

The main assumption behind the Doctrine was wrong. In 1947 the Soviet Union wanted peace because she had just passed through the devastations of war. Fleming writes, "the Kremlin had been well satisfied with the world at the start of the year. The satellite treaties had from its standpoint been successfully concluded..... The Moscow Conference was meeting to attempt to settle the real question what to do with Germany.....The Russians were not likely to disrupt a major diplomatic Conference, at which they were hosts, by any rash, aggressive moves in Western Europe, or in Greece." The Russians wanted to safeguard their interests but that was to be done through negotiation. As the Russian historians point out, the Soviet Union wanted to adhere to the Leninist policy of "peaceful co existence." That is why, even after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine the Russians went on discussing the issues in Germany. Fleming had rightly observed that "the Russians had amply proved that they were tough, long, hard bargainers, but they had no thought of abandoning diplomacy and risking their remaining lives and resources on political war."

The fear of Russian expansion in Turkey was the outcome of exaggeration. The Russians were simply pursuing their traditional "warm water" policy. Stalin had reverted to the aims of Peter the Great. The Russian need for warm-water ports was long-standing. Lippmann rightly observes that the control of the Dardanelles was "the permanent Russian objective, dictated by Geography." The Russians had always insisted that the Straits should be controlled only by the Black Sea Powers. Fleming observes, "The Straits are the Soviet Union's principal outlet to the sea, yet they have been closed for extended periods by war three times within the last fifty years, first during the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-12, then during the World Wars." Thus the

only way to neutralize the so-called Russian menace in Turkey was a genuine internationalisation of the water way" which could be worked out through the United Nations and applied to the Suez and Panama Canals.

The Marshall Plan—In a speech delivered at the Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Secretary George Marshall announced the necessity of American aid in order to "place Europe on its feet economically." In this speech he referred to the breakdown of Europe's economy under the destructive rule of the Nazis and proposed to break the vicious circle created thereby, by granting to European Governments substantial aid from the United States over a three or four-year period. This, he believed, would prevent "economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character" which might have produced serious consequences on the economy of the United States. He insisted that there must in the first instance be an agreement among the European powers with regard to their own necessities and also the part they themselves will take. He desired that the initiative must come from Europe and "the programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations." He declared, "our policy was directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, chaos." He invited all countries including the Soviet Union, to co-operate.

The Marshall Plan of assistance to Europe was not the same as the Truman Plan of assistance to Greece and Turkey. The aim of direct containment of Communism was not there in the Marshall Plan. But it had more general and effective attributes of a cold war weapon.

The Marshall Plan got a favourable reception in Europe. Sixteen European countries together with Turkey and Iceland were roped into the Marshall Plan. In Britain the Labour Government decided to accept it. Bevin's firm conviction was that Britain's future lay in close co-operation with Western Europe and in the "Atlantic Alliance." In fact

Bevin's initiative was largely responsible for the drawing of the European countries to the Marshall Plan. France was faced with grave economic problems and social unrest. She was, therefore, willing to accept American aid, despite the opposition of the French Communists.

The Marshall Plan was worked out without the co-operation of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the first Soviet assessment of the Plan could not be favourable. Pravda denounced it as an "extension of Truman's Plan." Molotov met Bevin and Bidault at Paris on June 26, 1947 to discuss it. He was distressed by Bevin's "take it or leave it" attitude with regard to the Anglo-French agreement about the Marshall Plan. On July 2, he announced his rejection of the Plan.

It is generally argued that the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan frustrated the last attempt "to bridge the East-West conflict." This criticism has no substance. Coming after the Truman Doctrine the plan was read in the context of the Doctrine and legitimately appeared to the Russians as a means of supplementing it. That apart there was real objection to the Plan. Fleming observes that "Russia could not risk opening up Eastern Europe to Western capitalist influence and control." After the Second World War the Red Army succeeded in removing "Eastern Europe from its colonial relationship to Western Europe and from Western capitalist investment." Russia could not permit Eastern Europe to relapse once again into its former position of "West Europe's economic hinterland." Thus, "for Moscow the Marshall Plan presented a real threat."

The chief result of the promulgation of the Marshall Plan and the Russian rejection of the American offer was to heighten the tension between Russia and the West. On the Russian side attempts were made to bind the satellites with a new series of trade treaties. The formation of the Cominform (a new international organisation of all the East European communist parties including those of France and

Italy) on October 5, 1947 was the Russian rejoinder to the Marshall Plan. The enunciation of the policy of 'containment' was severely criticised both in America and abroad but the American administration found solace in the fact that with the exception of the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, no further Communist advance could take place in Europe. In April 1948 the American Congress passed the famous Economic Co-operation Act. This Act embodied the Marshall Plan with an initial appropriation of \$ 5.3 billion. All European countries that took part in the European Recovery Programme (E.R.P.) [This was the official name of the Marshall Plan] signed agreements with America. On 16th April, 1948 the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) was set up for the development of economic co-operation among these states. These moves to strengthen the American bloc had substantial repercussions in Russia and in the tensions which resulted from these, one may trace the beginning of bipolar politics. [Add to it a brief note on the Czechoslovakian coup d'etat, the German problem and the NATO. These problems have been discussed in the following pages.]

Q. 9, Write a brief note on the Sovietization of Poland.

The attitude of the Allied Powers :

The Polish problem was one of those outstanding European problems which were responsible for the breakdown of the war-time alliance between Russia and the West. Poland occupied a strategic position in the European main land and Russia had traditional interest there. Stalin declared at the Yalta Conference that "throughout history Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia". Russia had also other interests. In the early twenties the Poles took advantage of the Russian weakness and the Polish leaders, backed by Britain and France, sent an army of intervention to Russia. By this inter-

vention they wanted to recover the disputed part of the territory lying between the two countries (Ukraine and white Russia). They succeeded in occupying 150 miles east of the so-called 'Curzon Line' proposed by the Allies. The Treaty of Riga (1921) merely confirmed this occupation. The Russians had never reconciled themselves to this loss of territory. Stalin was on record saying several times that the imposition of the Treaty of Riga with the active connivance of the Western powers was a great injustice to Russia.

In the unrest of the thirties Stalin succeeded in retrieving the lost territories. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 threw Riga to the wind. The partition of Poland was quickly effected before the Western powers could intervene. The Polish government went into exile. During the war it operated from London. But Russia remained firmly saddled in her captured territories. This occupation was necessary to the Russians because they knew that their Balkan interests were difficult to achieve without a strong foothold in Poland. Once the Russians succeeded resisting the western attempt to use Poland as a cordon sanitaire, their thrust in Eastern Europe became irresistible.

The Russian interests in Poland were not unrivalled. Britain and America had their own case. The British attitude from the beginning was sentimental. She went into war to save Poland from the Nazi invasion, but she never seriously doubted that Poland would fall into Russian sphere of influence after the war. Even man like Churchill persuaded his nation to accept Stalin's terms on Poland with regard to the East and the West. The American stand on the other hand was clear and simple. She had a genuine sympathy for Polish aspirations towards liberty. The new Poland was to a large extent the creation of Wilsonian Fourteen Points. Naturally the extinction of Poland in 1939 caused deep feeling in America.

Development of events :

Over the question of Poland trouble had always been there. But it became very much apparent since 1941. In July 1941 there was a treaty of friendship between Russia and Poland. This treaty laid down that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 had "lost their validity". The British government promptly sent a note to Poland stating that it did not recognise any territorial changes that had become effective in Poland since August, 1939. The treaty was itself ambiguous. Whether it envisaged a restoration of the previous boundary was never made clear in it. It also contained no guarantee that the Russians would not insist upon a change. Anthony Eden visited Moscow. He was followed by General Sikorski, the moderate Polish Prime Minister. But no tangible settlement emerged out of it.

At the outset the Russian demand was very moderate. In December 1941 Stalin made it clear to Sikorski that he wanted a slightly modified 'Curzon Line' as the frontier between Poland and Russia. The Polish leader refused to regard the Polish national frontier to be negotiable. With the rejection of this Russian feeler in 1941 the Poles lost their most favourable opportunity to come to a settlement with the Russians.

The second important attempt at settlement made by the London Poles when they initiated discussions on a projected Eastern Central European Federation of all the countries bordering on the Baltic Seas, the Black Sea, the Aegian Sea and the Adriatic. The London Poles were backed by the American Poles and the American administration was not in a position to ignore the Polish American opinion altogether. The Russians naturally interpreted the move as simply a revival of the western idea of cordon sanitaire of the twenties and thirties. On such dubious point, therefore, understanding could not be reached. On the other hand the difference between the London Poles and the Russians was widening. The Katyn murder issue had shocked the Russian

mind. In April 1943, Stalin withdrew his recognition from the London Poles and the point of no return in the Russo-Polish relation was reached.

From this time events drifted fast. The war situation was grim for the Western powers. They could not afford becoming partisans in the Polish question to the extent of alienating Russia. They openly told the Polish leaders in London that they should not expect the Allied powers to bring pressure on Russia on the question of frontier. Churchill brought pressure upon the Polish government insisting at every stage that compromise was necessary. In January 1944, he told Mikolajczyk that the Western powers would never fight for the earlier frontier between Poland and Russia. Stalin, on the other hand organised the Polish National Council in Moscow and entrusted it with the task of administering the Polish territories freed from the Nazis. He also brutally persecuted the Polish Home Army. In the wake of all these came the Warsaw uprising of the Poles against the retreating Germans in August 1944. The Western powers were not in a position to help the Poles. The Russians adopted a policy of "wait and see". The result was that the London Poles became more embittered against the Russians. The prospect of a settlement between the Russians and the Polish government-in-exile was nowhere near.

In December 1944, the Lublin Committee declared itself a provisional government and came to be recognised by the Soviet government on January 5, 1945. The London Polish government protested but with no effect. Previously the Polish government had rejected Mikolajczyk's offer to accept the 'Curzon Line' as the Polish frontier. Churchill, who believed that the attitude of the London Poles with regard to the frontier question was destructive, reproached the Poles. But nothing could retrieve their position. The formation of the Lublin Government made it clear that the London Government had been driven "out of business."

At the Yalta Conference a faint attempt was made to tide over the situation. Taking a realistic view of the situation both Churchill and Roosevelt brought pressure on the anti-Russian Poles and they were obliged to accept a slightly modified 'Curzon Line' as the frontier between Poland and Russia. This was perhaps the first great surrender of the Poles. It was also decided that a reorganized government would be installed in Poland and this government would be in power till a 'free and unfettered election' on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot took place. This was hailed as a victory for the West. Churchill expressed his relief at Stalin's moderation.

The Yalta-hopes were illusory. Troubles cropped up over the question of formation of the reorganised government. Truman despatched Harry Hopkins in his last mission to Moscow. Hopkins' intervention resolved the deadlock and led to the formation of the Polish Government of National Unity on June 28, 1945. The government was dominated by the Lublin Committee but a few Polish leaders including Mikolajczyk were included in it.

At the Potsdam Conference Earnest Bevin brought pressure upon the anti-Russian Poles and they recognised the 'Curzon line' as final. But there was a trouble over the Western frontier. The Polish Government was allowed to administer a wide part of Germany comprising Silesia, Eastern Pomarenia and a part of Brandenburg. The Russians and the Poles subsequently interpreted it as a final transfer of German territory to Poland. The Western powers had on the other hand considered this decision to be a temporary one. But they had no power to reverse this unilateral action by Russia. After 1945 they threw innumerable notes in protest against this occupation of German territories. But these left no impression on the Soviet policy.

With the disposal of the frontier question, the problem of government in Poland remained to be resolved. The Government of National Unity was already formed. It was

packed mainly with the Lublin Committee. Subsequently steps were taken for the liquidation of the non-communist elements in the Polish Government. This stage was over by the flight of Mikolajczyk and his followers from Poland. The Soviet Government, however, maintained legality in its handling of the Polish question. Stalin kept his promise and arranged for the holding of a referendum in June 1946. The result of the referendum was that the programme of the dominant Polish party was accepted by the voters. In January 1947 an election took place in Poland. It returned the Polish Communist Party with an overwhelming majority. This sealed for good any scope for Western intervention in Poland.

Q. 10. Write a brief note on the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia.

Background :

The Communist seized power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. This was a very surprising, though not an unexpected development. Czechoslovakia which in many ways resembled the Western powers offered little chance of a Communist take-over. As a highly industrialised country Czechoslovakia continued a viable urban middle class and a self-sufficient peasantry in the industrial sector. The level of education there was also high and parliamentary democracy had taken deep root in the country. Moreover, the Czechs always considered themselves to be the Eastern outpost of the Western culture and this had always kept them away from the Russians.

In spite of all these the events of 1948 were pre-determined by many things that had gone before. The Western betrayal at Munich and the memories of six years of servitude to the Nazis turned the Czechs to the Russians for they had genuine sympathy for the lamentable lot of Czechoslovakia. The memory of the Russian stand at Munich had subsequently disabled the Czechs to resist the

Communists in time of crisis. Stalin on his part was most sympathetic and was well disposed towards the Czech leaders-in-exile. In 1943 President Benes journeyed to Moscow. There he was recognized by Stalin as the head of the Government-in-exile. Naturally Benes wanted to develop a close relationship with Russia. The Russo-Czech Treaty of Friendship (December 11, 1943) underlined the type of relation these two countries liked to have in the post-war years. Benes admitted that this treaty laid the foundation of cooperation between the two countries.

When Benes was busy outlying the course of post-war Czechoslovakia, the Czech communists inside the country played a very important role. They denounced all the exiled Czech leaders including Benes as agents of British imperialism. After Stalin's break with Hitler resistance was organised by the Communists. After the war the Czech Communists were placed in an advantageous position by the presence of the Red Army. A substantial part of Czechoslovakia was surrounded by the Red Army. This made western intervention in Czechoslovakia difficult.

Development of events :

In 1945 Benes returned from exile. A provisional government including the Communists was formed. But situation in Czechoslovakia was already in favour of the Communists. With the help of the Red Army the local Communists succeeded in taking over administration both in cities and in villages. After the expulsion of the Nazis there was no other organised political group that could oppose the Czech Communists. The Czech Jews had already been eliminated and the Czech collaborators were promptly dispossessed and done away with. The Communists redistributed the expropriated lands to the poorer sections of the community and thereby increased their political influence. That apart the police force in Czechoslovakia was nearly 80 percent Communist. This meant that the Communist

take-over with the full support of the masses could take place any time.

This was the situation in Czechoslovakia at the time of the general election in 1946. Apparently a Western type of government came to power. But this was led by the Communists who together with the Czech Social Democrats formed the bare majority. At this time Czechoslovakia was a marvel—a democratic country led by the Communists. This was somewhat a realisation of Benes' dream that Czechoslovakia should serve as the bridge between the East and the West.

For nearly two years from the time of the general election the Coalition government ruled the country. It was also the first phase in the seizure of the power by the Communists. The Communists used this interim period to prepare their ground for the final take-over.

The second phase in the seizure of power by the Communists saw the transformation of the so-called genuine coalition into a bogus coalition. In the Coalition Cabinet the balance was maintained by the Socialist Party. Their leader Fierlinger saw eye to eye with Stalin. With his active help the Communists began to intervene in the selection of leaders of other constituent parties and monopolised the power of decision-making. In the Coalition the Communists became predominant and other parties only maintained their identities. Crisis could be a logical outcome of this precarious balance. In the Social Democratic Party Congress (November, 1947) Fierlinger, the leader of the left-wing of the Social Democrats, was ousted by the rightist and centrist members of the party. But the association of the leftists and the Communists was great because the former represented more in the government than did the rightists and the centrists. Thus Fierlinger's expulsion gave a handle to the Communists.

In February 1948, the Communists decided to precipitate a crisis. The promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and the

Marshall Plan compelled the Communists to act. In the context of the American policy of 'containment' Russia certainly did not intend losing control over this Bohemian bastion which was "a great forward fortress of her defence." The western commentators say that the Russians had a hand in bringing about the Coup. The presence of Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Premier at Prague on February 19, the day before the democratic ministers resigned, was significant.

The crisis began with the dismissal of eight high police officials from this office and the installation of the Communists in their place. The non-Communist members of the Cabinet condemned this action. They mustered a majority and demanded reinstatement of the dismissed officials. This demand was refused and thirteen of them resigned. But in doing that they could not take the Socialists with them. This meant that thirteen members were still left in the Cabinet and there was still quorum. Premier Gottwald, the Communist leader (who along with Fierlinger was trained under Stalin), requested President Benes to accept the resignation and the latter acted accordingly (25th. February, 1948). The success of the Communists upset all calculations of their adversaries. The expulsion of the non-Communist elements from the government was a staggering reality. Very soon the democratic non-Communist parties offered this co-operation to Gottwald and agreed to purge their parties. Benes presided over the death of a democracy, however western and precarious it might be. The Communisation of Czechoslovakia was complete.

Q. 11. Critically discuss the German problem in the post-war era.

Background :

At the end of the Second World War Germany posed to be a problem to the Allied powers. She was also a problem in 1919; but in 1945 the German problem was very poignant. In the War the German military performance had

been very impressive. The French fear of German power played its usual role. The Bolshevik belief that Russian security in Europe needed a control over Germany gave a new edge to the problem. Russia suffered devastations of wide magnitude and she was genuinely interested in collecting reparations from Germany. Britain also suffered losses which however could not compare with that sustained by the Soviet Union. America emerged from the war uninjured. But both of them agreed with Russia about the desirability of keeping German power destroyed. They acknowledged the right of the Soviet Union to collect reparation from Germany but they also knew that by contrast with France of 1919 Russia of 1945 had a wonderful recuperative capacity which was very much gift of her political systems. The presence of the Red Army in Europe giving Russia a direct control over a substantial position of Germany was a distressing phenomenon. Germany was at the mercy of forces which were very much extraneous to Europe. America was a non-European power while Britain and Russia were European with marked qualifications. Germany was simply a pawn in the famous East West conflict. The internal weakness of Germany also contributed to the problem. By May 1945 Germany surrendered to the Allies in all fronts. The German collapse was complete. The last vestiges of social and political institutions crumbled into pieces and there was not a single rallying force inside Germany which could form a nucleus around which a future Germany could grow. The Allies ruthlessly imposed the policy of unconditional surrender upon the Germans. This they did because at the end of the war they had no idea as to what they would do with Germany. This was the real problem in 1945. For Germany there was the immediate problem of survival and the distant problem of reconstruction. For Europe there was the problem of reconstruction of territories looted by the Nazis. There was also the necessity of eliminating all totalitarian tendencies from German body politic. The

doctrine of unconditional surrender for the time being released the Germans from all responsibilities. The doctrine meant that the immediate as well as the distant German problems were the concern of the Allies. A rift in the Allied Camp already baffled a common approach to the problem of Germany. The vagaries of the German problem mingled with the differences among the victors. This gave the problems a gigantic dimension.

The attitude of the Allies.

During the war the British and the American statesmen often talked about post-war Germany. Roosevelt on more than one occasion expressed himself in favour of splitting Germany into several units and thereby destroying for good her war-potentials. Churchill was not quite sure about breaking up of the German Empire. The Russians until 1944 had no clear idea about the future political set-up in Germany. But the three Allies were unanimous over one important point. They were determined to destroy the German military war potential for good and this meant total demilitarisation and denazification after the German surrender.

The German problem between Yalta and Potsdam :

The German problem between Yalta and Potsdam had three important aspects: The frontier question, the reparation question and question of political control of Germany until the signing of the final Peace Treaty.

The frontier question—This question arose with the Russian demand to compensate Poland with German territories. Stalin demanded that the part of Germany under the Red Army should be given to Poland as a compensation for a cession of Polish territory in the east. At Yalta Churchill opposed it. Roosevelt also objected to the Russian demand on the ground that no frontier question should be settled before the conclusion of the final Peace Treaty. At Potsdam Conference it was agreed that the East German territories would be handed over by the Red Army to the

Polish government for the purpose of administration. The Russians subsequently took it to be the final outcome of the agreement. This transfer of territory led to a tremendous one-way movement of population from East Germany to Western Zones of occupation. These refugees constituted themselves into a powerful pressure group in West German politics

The reparation question—At the Yalta Conference Russia gave it that she had set a round figure of 20,000 million dollars as reparation out of which 50 per cent should be allotted to her. The Russian figure meant physical removal of 80 per cent of German industrial output. Churchill and Roosevelt shuddered at this figure although they were sympathetic to the Russian cause. At the Potsdam Conference it was clear that Russia was not prepared to make any concession on the question of reparation. After hectic negotiations Russian claim was accepted in principle. Russia was allowed to take 15 percent of industrial and capital equipment from the Western Zone in return for supply of food grains from the Soviet Zone. Immediately after the German surrender the Russian occupation authorities started dismantling and shipping German plants and equipments to Russia. Subsequently the Americans demanded an account of all reparations exacted by Russia. The Soviet Government refused to submit any account and as a retaliatory measure America stopped all further payment of reparation from the Western Zones.

The Control Commission—At the Yalta Conference it was decided that a Control Commission should be set up to regulate the activities of the Allied Armies of occupation in Germany. Difficulty cropped up over the question of membership of this Control Commission. Britain and America proposed that Germany should be divided into four zones of occupation and the Control Commission should be composed of the representatives of the four powers. Stalin opposed the allocation of a zone to France on the ground

that France in view of a surrender to Nazi Germany had forfeited all rights to sit in the Allied Council. Eventually Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to carve a zone for France from their respective zones and after persuasion made it possible for the French participation in the Control Commission on Germany. The controversy indicated the coming difficulties over the German question between Russia and the Western Allies.

Post-war attitude of the Allies :

After the Japanese surrender when Russian collaboration was no longer a paramount consideration the true proportion of the rift over Germany became clearly visible. The immediate aftermath of the war showed that the German problem was essentially a problem of security to both Russia and the West. Germany had invaded Russia twice in course of thirty years. In view of the devastations suffered by Russia, her concern over Germany appeared reasonable. On the other hand the memory of Nazi invasion was fresh in the French mind. The smaller European countries had not yet fully recovered from the shock of Nazi invasions. But their concept of security contradicted the Russian idea. If Russia did not want to see Germany, the newly acquired frontier fortress of Communism, fall under the influence of Western democracy, the Western powers were equally reluctant to permit Communism to advance into Germany, the very core of Europe. The Russian distrust for the West which was highlighted by all that had happened during the war, hardened the Russian attitude towards Germany. On the other hand the records of Russian activities in liberated Europe, that is the fate of Rumania, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria had convinced the West that if any concession was given to Russia, the iron curtain would also fall upon Germany.

Post-war developments upto the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany :

Immediately after the war it became clear that Germany was going to be a centre of East-West conflict. In 1946

Molotov accused the Western Powers of harbouring pro-Nazi elements in Germany and thereby mortgaging the rights of German people. The American rejoinder came from James Byrnes, the American Secretary of State. He assured the German people of their right to manage their own affairs and declared in unambiguous terms that the question of the Eastern frontier of Germany was far from settled. He also expressed the American intention to stay in Germany so long as there would be an occupation army there. The two speeches of Byrnes and Molotov had strong cold war verbiage. They revealed the fundamental incompatibility of the Allied powers in their post-war problems. The Allies had engaged into a campaign of winning the moral support of the vanquished in their desire to implement their respective policies. In the Autumn of 1946 the German people were invited to participate in a war of nerves between Russia and the Western Powers.

Since the Autumn of 1946 events moved rapidly. The London Conference of Foreign Ministers (December 1947) which was to draw up a Peace Treaty for Germany was a failure. On the other hand the success of the Marshall Plan required that the three parts of Germany occupied by Western Powers should be governed as a single economic unit. Britain, France and America met in a conference in London (February, 1948) to discuss the future of Germany. While the conference was in progress the Communists seized powers in Czechoslovakia. The Western Powers decided to take no further chance in Germany. On June 7, 1948, they announced their decision to set up a West German Republic which would play its part in the European Recovery Programme.

Stalin from the beginning tried to forestall the establishment of the Federal Republic by imposing the famous blockade on Berlin. The Western Powers resorted to a massive air-lift to keep the Western sector supplied with food and fuel. The Western Powers betrayed great unity in their

camp. Bevin was determined to rally the British support in favour of the American policy in this critical moment. For 323 days the historic air-lift continued. In May, 1949 the Soviet Union was compelled to lift the blockade. Thus ended the Berlin crisis.

The net result of the Berlin problem was the strengthening of the Western decision to set up a West-German State in the Western zones of occupation. In September, 1949 the Republican Constitution was proclaimed in Western Germany. Restrictions were imposed on the Federal Republic both in political and military spheres. A High Commission was installed there for the perpetuation of the Western control over the Federal Republic. Dr. Adenauer undertook on behalf of the people not to rearm the Republic.

Rearmament of West Germany :

From the beginning the Federal Republic began to reveal its pro-Western bias. With the blessings of the West, particularly that of America, it launched into a campaign of propaganda to revise the Oder-Neisse frontier. The new state in Germany appeared to be a pawn of the Western Powers in their cold war politics. The Russian propaganda against the 'U.S.-German Clique' was not all bogus. Her propaganda against the bog of Nazi insurrection produced some concern in France and other small European countries. In fact the German recovery was very fast and American money was producing 'economic miracle' there. Dr. Adenauer's chief aim was to consolidate the political and economic bases of the Republic. In view of all these the Russian fear and the French concern seemed understandable.

The Korean War and the question of German rearmament :

In the context of the Korean War the German problem assumed new dimension. The prospect of Russian aggression had produced some concern in the West. Dr. Adenauer wanted this situation. He appealed to the occupying powers to strengthen the forces in Germany. Considering the decline

of Western Europe after the Second World War and the military weakness of Germany in 1950, Adenauer's appeal seems understandable. The United States agreed with the Chancellor's appraisal of the military strength of the West and in September, 1950 the American State Department called for immediate German rearmament to forestall any threat of aggression. The United States also made it clear that it would not take any part in the Integrated European Command if the NATO members did not agree to German rearmament. In the NATO Council meeting in Paris (December 1950), the German rearmament was accepted in principle.

The main opposition to German rearmament came from France. In Britain the Labour Party was equally opposed to German rearmament. But the moderate elements in France were trying to find a way out over this impasse. The idea of European Defence Community (EDC) was evolved. France agreed to the implementation of this scheme on the condition that Britain should be a part and parcel of the proposed EDC. In May, 1952 the EDC Treaty was signed. To remove the French fear America and Britain guaranteed that "if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the Community, the two governments will regard this as a threat to their own security. They will act in accordance with the Article 4 of North Atlantic Treaty." In spite of this the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty. From 1952 to 1954 endless negotiations were conducted to secure the French ratification. But it was of no avail. Meanwhile Stalin died and there was a thaw in East-West relations. This situation was utilised to secure the French consent for German rearmament. Anthony Eden proposed an extension of the Brussels Treaty to include Germany and Italy as the first step towards German rearmament. A Conference of nine powers was held in London on September 28, 1954. The Eden proposal was accepted in this Conference. The British government

guaranteed to maintain on the mainland of Europe including West Germany British forces in effective strength. The West German Government gave a unilateral undertaking that it would not manufacture any Atom Bomb or any other chemical bombs. This allayed the fear of those who were troubled over the question of future German military resurgence.

Effects of the rearmament of West Germany :

The Russian historians believe that the rearmament of West Germany "further deepened the division of Germany and made her reunification exceptionally difficult". In reply to the admission of West Germany into the NATO the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Alliance. The German Democratic Republic became a member of this Alliance. In 1956 an East German Army was formed. A new crisis on the German question was becoming inevitable. The Soviet Government continuously opposed the proposal of all German free elections. In 1957 a proposal to create a confederation of the two German states on the condition that they should come out of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact was advanced by East Germany. It was turned down by the West. In 1958 the Soviet Government proposed that Berlin should be a 'free city'. In November, 1958 Russia gave the Western Powers "six months ultimatum" for the evacuation of West Berlin. A second Berlin crisis threatened European peace.

In this situation the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference was summoned in 1959. The Western Powers gave a new "Peace Plan" and their attitude was marked by a "distinctly increased flexibility". On previous occasions they insisted on free elections. In the Geneva Conference they offered a somewhat moderate proposal of forming a "Mixed German Committee" for the drafting of an electoral law. An agreed electoral law would provide the basis for an all-German government. This government would be free to be neutral or to join the NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

This plan was not accepted by the Soviet Union. She feared that the plan was designed to absorb East Germany into the capitalistic system of the West. In the meantime West Germany backed by the Western Powers refused to admit the Oder-Neisse line which was recognised by the Allies at Potsdam. Russia refused to recognise any change in the Oder-Neisse line. In July, 1959 Khrushchev said, "We regard this border of GDR as our common frontier, as a line dividing the world of socialism from the world of capitalism we have said more than once that we shall fight for that frontier against any foe who may try to encroach against it."

The frontier problem was thus creating another impasse. But this was not all. There was the problem of the refugees. Over years the influx of refugees from East to the West Germany had caused serious embarrassment to the GDR. The so called Berlin escape-route provided the refugees an easy way to West Germany. To prevent this one way movement of population the famous Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 and this closed off West Berlin. The erection of the Berlin Wall had created stupendous tensions between two Germanies and made adjustment difficult.

Reality of Partition :

After the failure of the Geneva Conference Soviet Russia decided to form a 'separate peace treaty' with East Germany. This was opposed by the Western Powers. Meanwhile the rearmament of Germany was going on in full swing. America decided to create a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MNF) for the NATO. This move was very disturbing in the sense that if West Germany became a nuclear power it would seriously affect international relations. The increasing attempt of the Western Powers to rearm West Germany provides the context in which the question of "separate peace treaty" with East Germany must be studied. Prof. Penrose has clearly pointed out that the rearmament of Germany "on U. S. insistence" had contributed to the developments of

cold war. A reunified and rearmed Germany under the guidance of the West was a real threat to Russia. The Western Powers are pressing in this line and it is not likely that the Russians "will agree to it, and an attempt to coerce them would bring war". Thus the position of Germany cannot be easily undone and this partition remains to be a dangerous reality.

Q. 12. Write a critical note on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Background :

The NATO owes its birth to the post-war pattern of politics. In the immediate aftermath of the war there was no doubt that priority must go to the question of integration of West Europe. The decline of France and Britain, though staggering, was a reality. Russia, a European Power with many qualifications, had emerged as a formidable power in European politics. Over a large part of Europe her voice was dominant. The extension of the Russian influence upto the Oder-Neisse line meant the spread of communism to the very core of Europe. There was no power around which Europe could rally to fight the Russian colossus. In exhausted France and a weak Britain only looked to America, a non-European power that had recently found herself committed in European politics. But West Europe could not wholly depend upon an extraneous force for its own defence against communism. The weakness of the world body, the UN, had manifested itself even within a few days of its birth. Some West European leaders like the British Foreign Secretary, Bevin were already thinking of the necessity of a general European integration. They also felt that the active participation of America in the scheme was necessary for its success. The association of America in West Europe's recovery and defence was essential.

Genesis :

The first step towards the formation of the NATO was

the Brussels Pact of 1948. It was initiated by Britain. The failure of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947, the events leading to the enunciation of Truman Doctrine, the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan, the formation of the Cominform, the Sovietization of Poland, the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Russo-Finnish Treaty negotiations in February 1948—all these formed the immediate background of the Brussels Pact (March 17, 1948). The members of the Treaty were France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). On the day the Treaty was signed, President Truman in an address to the joint session of the American Congress said: "It (the Treaty) is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilisation. The development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure, that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves." On a previous occasion the President authorised Marshall "to inform the British Foreign Secretary that we agreed with them on the urgent need for concerted measures by the nations of Western Europe." Thus the Brussels Pact was formed with the blessings of the United States.

When this was the situation in Europe full rearmament was going on in the United States. On May, 21, 1948 President Truman signed the Appropriation Bill. It raised the airforce to 70 groups. On June 11, 1948 the American Senate passed the famous Vandenberg Resolution by 64 votes to 4. This Resolution promised military aid to all defence pacts made between other members of the U.N. provided that aid was in the interest of the United States. On July 2, the President issued a policy statement. It revealed the American determination to implement the Vandenberg Resolution to the fullest extent possible. It also disclosed

the American decision to send its representative to London to take part in the five-power military discussion. Meanwhile preparations were going on in the U.S.A. for the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. Cold war tensions were mounting over the problems of Germany and the Berlin blockade. A strict secrecy was maintained in all correspondence between America and the Western Powers. In this atmosphere of secrecy the State Department began talks with the Brussels Powers on July 6. Discussions centred on the general situations of Europe. The United States and the Brussels Powers discussed means "to counteract the fear of the peoples of Europe that this country would be overrun by the Soviet army before effective help could arrive." It was agreed that Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Portugal should be invited to join the Security system. If necessary Spain and West German were also to be invited. Thus plans were made to rope almost all the free societies into the European security system. Meanwhile fighting in Greece gave rise to a problem and a new urgency was added to the situation. In view of this America, Canada and the Brussels Powers decided to conclude a treaty which would emphasise the determination of the countries of Western Europe and North America to resist aggression in the North Atlantic area. Accordingly a treaty was signed (April 1949) in Washington by the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Canada, Italy, Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Portugal. Turkey and Greece joined in October 1951. In December, 1954, West Germany was admitted into the alliance.

Provisions of North Atlantic Treaty :

As described in the Preamble the primary object of the NATO is to ensure international peace and security and promote conditions of stability in the North Atlantic region. The Treaty also accepts the peaceful settlement of international disputes as its major aim. It binds the parties

to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The parties are to consult together if the independence or security of any member is threatened.

The NATO is primarily a military organisation, though it has other principles to cover its main object. Its provisions for military co-operation are very important. One important provision says that an armed attack against one or more of them (the members of the NATO) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." That apart Articles 3 and 5 contain some important military preparations among the signatories while the latter admits the principle that "an attack on one is an attack on all."

NATO and the U.N. :

According to Articles 52-54 the NATO falls into the category of 'regional arrangement.' Under Articles 1 and 51 it can be regarded as an arrangement for 'collective self-defence.' The U. N. Charter admits the scope of 'regional arrangements' as a factor in the maintenance of international peace and security. "Resort to regional agencies or arrangements" has been approved by Article 33 as a procedure for the settlement of international disputes. Under Article 1 members can "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Regional security arrangements have also been permitted by Article 51 for "collective self-defence."

Rival views have developed over the question whether the NATO as a military alliance can be consistent with the obligations enforced on the members by the Charter. According to one interpretation there is no inconsistency under Articles 1, 51 and 52-54. Others point out that the aim of the U.N. Charter is "to substitute collective preparation and collective action by the United Nations for uncontrolled preparation and action by an individual State or group of States for the maintenance of international peace and security." Looked from this point of view the NATO or any other military alliances between groups of Powers seem irreconcilable with "the pitch and substance of the Charter."

Apart from the legal interpretation about the consistency of the NATO with the U.N. Charter, there is one other practical problem. The declared intention of the NATO of using force in the event of aggression betokened doubt about the capacity of the U.N. to act with adequate efficacy and promptitude in case of crisis. This had the practical effect of bypassing the U.N. just at the time when reliance on it was most essential for reducing the tension of cold war. The issue has not yet been resolved whether regional arrangements tend to detract from the function of U.N. or enhance its capacity as a peace promoting body. In this context the parallel existence of the NATO and the U.N. tend to cast unholy influence on the course of international developments.

The impact of NATO on International Relations :

In a very general sense the Atlantic Pact is "a military alliance of the classical type for the common defence of its members who professed their peaceful intent." But accepting the authenticity of the peaceful and defensive intent of the organisation, the Pact still remains to be an instrument designed for Russian containment. Naturally the Pact provoked Russian reaction. Immediately after the signing of the pact the Russian Government sent a memorandum

to each of the signatories charging that "the treaty had an obviously aggressive character, that it was aimed at the U.S.S.R., that it ran counter to the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter, the Anglo-Soviet alliance treaty of 1942, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements." Gromyko pointed out that "the United States and Great Britain are building up a series of military bases and staffs which can only be justified on the basis of aggression." Side by side with this Soviet charge the statement of Paul Henri, the Premier of Belgium is worth considering. "The new pact is purely defensive : it is directed against no one." Commenting on this Fleming says that "throughout history 'defensive' alliances have always seemed highly offensive to those at whom they were directed." He added that "the thesis that the Atlantic Pact would strengthen the U.N. was equally doubtful. Though it was a multilateral treaty, its purpose was the creation of a balance of power."

Fleming raises two important questions. First, was the Russian threat military? Second, was military defence feasible or required? As to the first question Fleming agrees with some contemporary observation that the people of America and Europe in this period were much less frightened than their governments with Communist spectre. James P. Warburg who visited Europe in 1948 and extensively toured America said that the governments were "deliberately promoting anxiety among the people," because they wanted to secure mandates for their "fear-inspired policies." In Europe he found that the people were more advance than the Americans about "Russia's weaknesses and needs" and were less frightened of the Soviet Union than the Americans. He believed, and Fleming agrees with him, that the people were interested in the North Atlantic Alliance solely as a means of preventing war.

As to the second question Fleming also sees eye to eye with Warburg. The latter discarded the American programme of arming West Europe as unsound on three grounds:

(1) "no amount of feasible rearmament by Western Europe could stop the Red Army from marching to the Atlantic seaboard"; (2) "rearmament would place an intolerable burden upon already overstrained economics" and (3) finally "it would be likely to provide the very attack against which it was intended to insure, especially if West Germany were included." He feared that the Americans might be committed beyond the point of no return if they indulged in a military adventure of rearming West Europe. Another military critic Max Werner wrote articles in 1950 "registering his disbelief in the practicability of defending West Europe against a Soviet attack." Fleming points out that the Soviet military power in 1950 was immeasurably superior to that of Hitler in 1939. He, therefore, questions "how then could the Germans believe that forty or fifty or sixty Atlantic divisions could defend Germany? They would be unable to believe in their defence, unless from 100 to 150 American divisions were fully deployed on the European continent before the battle started." That apart Russia at this time instead of launching her armies was making heavy investments in long-term projects. "This decade was 'decisive for Soviet industrialisation'. It was unlikely that Soviet leaders would willingly imperil it by invoking the devastations of war of which they had recent first-hand knowledge."

Weakness of NATO :

The basic weakness of the NATO springs from its primary aim of containing communism. The organisation lacks the political base which is very much necessary for the fulfilment of this object. The members of the NATO are not equally afraid of Russian aggression and therefore, cannot attach equal importance to the problem. The dread of Russian aggression cannot produce equal impact upon Norway and West Germany. West Germany can consider itself to be the target of Communist attack. But the possibility of Norway's involvement in a global conflict

against communism is very remote. The result of this is that the importance of the NATO in recent years has gone down. The members of the NATO have new interests and are involved in new pursuits. France initially was apprehensive of Russian expansions in Europe as well as Russian intervention in Algeria. But this view has recently changed as a result of De Gaulle's opposition to American ascendancy in Western Europe. De Gaulle's attempt to develop a strong and integrated West European Community to speak on equal terms with Russia and America has virtually scrapped the NATO. The economic recovery of West Europe has reduced their dependence on the United States and has increased this confidence about their capacity to defend themselves. There is also a marked change in the Soviet policy in the post-Stalin era. As a result of this the western fear of the Soviet aggression which was the basis of the NATO has diminished to a considerable extent. Finally America in recent years has become conscious of the huge responsibility which is the result of her preponderant role in the NATO. These international developments have introduced the NATO in its new dimension. New realisations among the members of the NATO have the basis of the Alliance weak and its future uncertain.

Q. 13: Write a brief note on the Sovietization of Eastern Europe.

Or,

Discuss briefly the growth of the Soviet orbit from the end of the Second World War to the death of Stalin.

Or,

Write a brief note on the condition of the Communist Camp from the end of the Second World War to the death of Stalin.

Background : the origin of the Soviet bloc :

One outstanding development in the post-war world politics was the steady Sovietization of Eastern Europe.

By 1951 the whole of Eastern Europe was under Stalin's control. Only Yugoslavia stood out. According to the western critics this control was based on economic exploitation and slave labour. This is an exaggerated criticism. They try to show that Russia subjugated the whole of Eastern Europe at the time when the West was weak to retaliate. Out of this argument emerged the later concept of Russian imperialism. The theory of subjugation, although it was incorrect, had some truth in it. The Russian control was maintained on different levels, economic, political, military and ideological. Out of this Russia succeeded in creating a watertight bloc in Eastern Europe.

The creation of Russian bloc in Eastern Europe was the outcome of a necessity. The weakness of the Russian strategic position during the period between the two World Wars had impressed her the necessity of creating an advanced fortress in East Europe in order to forestall Western intervention. The Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 ensured Russian control over the Baltic States, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia and provided Stalin with a jumping-off boat. Since this time onward the Russian effort was directed not only to the strengthening of defence forces but also to the securing of a direct access to the seas. Russia also wanted to prevent the revival of a strong Germany in the West and a strong Japan in the East and sought to establish friendly regimes in neighbouring states. In pursuance of these aims the Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939 and occupied the Baltic states in 1940. Thus the process of absorption of the countries in East Europe into the Soviet orbit was very much initiated before the Cold War came into shape. The Communist-led partisan movement were already making headway in Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia. Side by side with these attempts were made to organise such movements in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. These movements derived encouragement from the advance of the Red Army in Europe. As early as 1942

attempts were made to consolidate the Russian gains in Poland, Rumania and in the Baltic states. In that year Molotov tried to make the British recognition of the Russian position in these countries a necessary condition to the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. This attempt, however, failed. Immediately after this the Soviet Government turned its attention to the East European Governments-in-exile. The Russian object was to rope them into the Soviet orbit through the conclusion of treaties with them. These moves were very important. Given the nature of the general condition of Europe during this period and the manner of operation of the Western Powers, there was logic from Russian point of view in understanding such moves. To what extent Russia moved into Europe for territorial gains is a debatable point.

From the beginning the Western Powers were aware of the implication of these Russian moves. Churchill who always suffered from an apprehension of Communist expansion wanted to develop a Danubian and Balkan Federation as a counterpoise. In this he met no success. In 1944 an agreement was concluded between Russia and Britain.

Britain recognised the Russian interest in Rumania and Bulgaria while Russia recognised the similar British interest in Greece. A joint Anglo-Soviet influence in Hungary and Yugoslavia was also agreed upon. Thus the Churchill-Stalin agreement rarely divided the whole of Eastern Europe into two distinct spheres of influence. This was very important. At the Tehran Conference the Allies had already taken the decision to divide Europe into two zones of occupation—the Anglo-American forces in charge of the West and the Soviet army operating in the East. Churchill insisted on opening a second front in the Balkan region whereby the Western forces would be secured in the core of Eastern Europe. But his cry went unheeded. In later years Churchill lamented over the unwisdom of those who

opposed him at Tehran. In the context of the Tehran decision the Churchill-Stalin agreement appeared to be momentous. In later years Churchill declared that he meant the decision to be purely temporary whereas Stalin took it to be a permanent division of spheres of influence between Great Britain and Russia. Stalin's judicious non-interference in the internal affairs of Greece only supplied additional strength to his argument that he expected the British government to refrain from interfering in the Soviet zone in Eastern Europe.

The American approach from the beginning was very cautious. When Roosevelt met Stalin at Yalta his overriding consideration was the contemporary military situation. The Russian troops were moving across the Oder River near Berlin. Eisenhower had not yet moved across the Rhine. Japan was still the master of Korea, Manchuria, the coast of China, Indonesia and the whole of South-East Asia. Secretary Forrestal records in his diary that MacArthur was pressing for the intervention of 60 divisions of the Russian Army in Manchuria. All these shaped Roosevelt's mind and also explain his eagerness to pin down Russia to any commitment for whatever price. Walter Lippmann rightly observed that "the over-riding fact was that the Western democracies had become grossly dependent for their security upon the power of the Red Army. In February, 1945 they had not yet become able to make themselves secure without, much less against, the Red Army. This is the key to Yalta." What was true of Roosevelt was also true of Churchill. "When Roosevelt and Churchill went to Yalta, Stalin already held in the grip of the Red Army virtually all the lands that lie now behind the iron curtain. They went to Yalta compelled to deal with what was an accomplished military fact."

The result of this was in the logic of things. At Yalta Stalin operated from a position of strength and with greater stamina. Eastern Europe was already left to the Russians.

In 1944-45 when the Red Army occupied more or less the whole of Eastern Europe, the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe became an accomplished fact. The developments from 1941 to 1944 proved beyond doubt that the defence of Western Europe largely depended upon the Russian strength to absorb the German army in the East. This Western dependence upon Russia was reflected in the Allied decision to grant to the Soviet High Command the complete power in the armistice terms with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The decline of the West made the development of a Soviet orbit in the East a mathematical certainty. C. E. Black has rightly noted : "The Soviet orbit was born in the winter of 1944-45, when the standards of the victorious Soviet armies were firmly implanted by their bearers into the soil of Eastern Europe. By May, 1945 the flag of the Kremlin flew from Stettin in the Baltic to the frontiers of Greece and Turkey."

Internal condition of the Soviet bloc in the post-war years :

By May 1945 the Russian army by its presence had created a watertight zone in Eastern Europe. Winston Churchill grasped this significant fact. In his two famous iron curtain telegrams of 7th and 12th May, 1945 to President Truman he expressed his concern over the presence of Russia in the Balkans. His cry did not produce the desired effect. The war had sealed the demotion of the West and Russia certainly took advantage of it. But Stalin was wise not to give any provocation to the West. His critics agree that in 1945 the Russian leader followed a cautious policy of slow advance in Europe. The Russian people genuinely needed some respite after the war. Moreover Stalin did not want to frighten America by a speedy movement into Europe because that would have stopped or postponed the withdrawal of American troops from Europe.

In 1945 Stalin pursued two aims. He wanted to rebuild the Russian economy. For this he exacted heavy reparations from Germany. He also wanted to maintain a line of commu-

nication between Russia and the Red Army in Europe. These economic and strategic questions were primary and ideological questions were subordinate to them. This subordination of the ideological consideration was to a large extent responsible for Stalin's break with Tito. Isaac Deustcher thus sums up the immediate post-war policy of Stalin : "He (Stalin) was approaching the problems of Russian zones of influence in a manner calculated to satisfy nationalist Russian demands and aspirations and to wreck the chances of communist revolution in those territories. He was prepared to exact and did in fact exact heavy reparations from Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania". This was the initial policy of Russianization of Eastern Europe.

The pace of Russianization increased as the cold war developed. For Russia Stalin wanted to build up a strong sphere of influence in East Europe as a bulwork against the so-called Anglo-American bloc. This sphere of influence consisted of states which fell in three categories : (1) The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These were annexed in 1940 ; (2) Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania and Poland. These states fought against the Nazis. Of these Czechoslovakia and Poland were the bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the West ; (3) Finland, Hungary and Rumania. These states fought on the side of Nazi Germany. To these states were added the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany and Austria. It was very difficult to bring these states to the Russian line. For example Czechoslovakia considered herself to be the outpost of the Western culture. President Benes always drew the picture of post war Czechoslovakia as a bridge between the East and the West. Similarly over Poland the Western powers had an eye. England went to war to save Poland. So from the outset Stalin had to be very cautious in his attempt to bring these states into the Soviet orbit.

Stalin met great obstacles in fulfilling his aims. The character of the East European Communist parties was a

perpetual hindrance. During and after the War these parties went through different experiences and had no common approach to post-war problems. Some parties were affected by the war while others by the pre-war purge by Stalin. Some parties lived in an atmosphere of parliamentary democracy while others were stifled. Some dreaded the Russians while others (like the Yugoslav party) were intransigent. The slogan of patriotic resistance influenced the different parties in a different way and the rank and file came to be shaped accordingly.

The result of this was that there was extreme diversity in the party set-up and this was reflected in the party leadership. The conflict between the Moscowvites and the Nativists revealed the inner working of the Russian bloc. The former took up international proletarian revolution as the primary consideration and therefore, demanded active co ordination with the Russian line. The Nativists put the specific needs of the countries above other international ideological consideration. They were aware of the need for collaboration with Russia but they were apprehensive of unguarded collaboration.

This conflict on the ideological level reflected in the interpretation of the term "Peoples' Democracy". To Stalin Peoples' Democracy meant a complete transition from a government collaborating with the Allies to a government which would be very much a part of the world proletarian movement. To Tito Peoples' Democracy meant a full-fledged Communist state—a dictatorship of the Proletariat and a state with Communist ideology. To the Nativists the term meant simply a system of government which would enable their parties to occupy the key positions in the state and thus remain in power.

Whatever be the real interpretation of Peoples' Democracy one thing was clear. Each of the Communist parties of East European states was thinking in its own line. Between 1945 and 1948 these parties were indeed demon-

trating this spirit of independence. This spirit was a barrier to Soviet integrationist move. Out of this spirit developed the vague idea of an East European Communist group. In fact some East European leaders like Tito, Demetrov, Gomulka, Razk were thinking in terms of evolving their own national Communist policies. They claimed that the free Balkan peoples should form a strong monolithic unit.

Stalin realised the danger of this narrow nationalistic outlook of the East European leaders. To him this attitude amounted to a treachery to the greater cause of proletarian internationalism. He must have realised that the situation could not be saved without eliminating persons like Tito and his cliques.

The first step towards regrouping the Russian orbit was taken in Czechoslovakia in 1948. A coup d'etat was staged and the Communists came to power. In Rumania King Michael was deposed and the last vestige of opposition to the Communist Party was removed. In June 1948, the Yugoslav Communist Party was excommunicated. "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties"—so ran the Cominform expulsion notice. But Tito mustered the support of the Western powers and no successful headway could be made against him and his party.

The success of Tito constituted the first major breach in the concept of monolithic Communist bloc of Eastern Europe. The presence of the national Communists in the peoples' democracies was a danger of which Stalin was increasingly becoming aware after 1948. In June 1948, the Rumanian party was purged. In August of the same year Gomulka of Poland was dismissed from the secretaryship of the party. In June 1948 Hoxa was eliminated from the Albanian party. In September of the same year Rajk was driven from the Hungarian party and executed. Rostov of

Bulgaria suffered a similar fate in 1949. In 1950 the Czechoslovakian party suffered a similar purge.

Thus by 1951 the nationalist elements in the peoples' democracies came to be thoroughly purged. Stalin felt the necessity of enforcing the control and supervision of Russia over the East European satellites. He placed the leaders of the East European countries under political control. A kind of permanent supervision was exerted through the Soviet ambassadors. Frequent visits of Soviet advisers in these countries paved the way for ideological control. All governmental institutions in these countries were packed with Moscow-trained personnels. The Cominform and the COMICON did their function and maintained the cohesion of the Communist bloc. Stalin undertook a gigantic scheme of control. But all was not well in consequence. The impact of the Korean war was keenly felt in the satellite countries when Russian demand of food-grains and raw materials increased considerably. There were signs of unrest in these countries. Unrest invited reprisals and reprisals increased hatred for the Russians. Czechoslovakia and East Germany were in visible unrest. Stalin could have risen to the occasion but death laid its cold hand on him. He departed from the arena of world history. The Russian sphere of influence relapsed into a state of severe strain.

Q. 14. Write a brief note on the Korean War.

Background :

In course of her history Korea has enjoyed a secluded existence. At times it had full independence and in others it remained under the nominal suzerainty of China. Her unfortunate geographical position gave her an unhappy national life. Situated in the Asian continent she jutted into the Pacific as a peninsula. This geographical location gave her a close proximity to Japan. As 'a dagger pointed to Japan's heart' she became an innocent victim of greater

interests and their clashes. During the end of the war Korea emerged as a battleground of power conflicts. It was decided at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) that Korea should be split into two parts. The part to the north of 38th parallel would be placed under the Russians while the other to its south would remain under the Americans. The Russian and American troops entered Korea in August 1945. The Japanese regime was quickly liquidated and in its place two different systems came to be introduced there. The result was the Russo-American wrangle which divided the Korean nations into two, strangled it economically and made it a battleground for violent ideological warfare. Korea came to be denied for many years to come the dignity of national existence.

The Korean War :

Towards the end of the forties a new situation developed in Korea which in many respects resembled the German stalemate. With the failure of the Russo-American Commission to arrange countrywide elections, there emerged two separate units in Korea in 1948 : a People's Republic of Korea to the north of 38th parallel and a Republic of Korea to the south of that line. The free exercise of American and Russian vetoes prevented the admission of these states into the United Nations. In the summer of 1949 American occupation forces were withdrawn from South Korea as a result of the termination of military government there. On June 25th news reached American and the Western circles that the North Korean forces had crossed the 38th parallel. This was the beginning of the war.

The American reaction was very swift. She asked for an immediate convocation of the Security Council. In its meeting the Council passed a resolution condemning the North Korean aggression. This was matched by President Truman's immediate decision to furnish armed assistance to the Republic of Korea. But the association of this decision with the action of the Security Council gave an inter-

national character to the whole operation. America shared the major and overwhelming burden of the whole operation. From the Russian side protests were launched against the illegality of this alleged American-led 'aggression'. But these left no impression on the whole operation.

Since this time onward the United Nations began to play a secondary role in the Korean War. In September the American and South Korean forces launched an offensive. This brought them back to the 38th parallel. This gave rise to the most vital issue of the war: whether or not to cross the 38th parallel. An ultimatum was sent to the North Koreans but it met with no answer. Following this General Mac Arthur who was in charge of the U.N. forces in Korea, marched his army across the line. This crossing of the line was significant. It underlined the possibility of the Chinese intervention in the War.

Mac Arthur's crossing of the 38th parallel increased the prospect of a vast enlargement of the conflict in Korea. There was also great alarm resulting from the possibility that America might resort to the use of atomic weapons against Communist China. Towards the end of 1950 the British Prime Minister Attlee visited Washington. There he tried to impress the American Government the desirability of caution. In April 1951, President Truman recalled MacArthur because there was increasing tendency on his part to take independent action in disregard of instructions from Washington. The recall of MacArthur prevented the war from becoming extended. It was, therefore, hailed everywhere abroad although it created some sensation in America.

The Korean problem in the middle of 1951 was thus reduced into a stalemate in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. No stabilization was possible without an armistice. Negotiations were initiated in July 1951. Protracted as they were, they could not reach success until July 1953. "Their result, broadly speaking, was to create in Korea a situation similar to that which had developed in Germany, crystallising the

division of the country into two segments the prospects of whose reunion was indefinitely adjourned."

Responsibility of the war :

In the first few days of the war the North Korean radio in its broadcasts repeatedly accused South Korea of having launched an aggression against North Korea. According to John Gunther, MacArthur's biographer, there was an impression at the General's headquarters when the war broke out that the South Koreans had begun it. Gunther of course dismisses it as the result of the "blatant.....lies of the North Korean radio." Commenting on this Fleming says that "it would seem a little strange for MacArthur's organisation to be getting its information from the North Korean radio, though that could have happened. But it is still more strange that.....MacArthur's officers should believe the South Koreans had attacked."

The belief that South Korea had begun the war had its background. On October 31, 1949 the South Korean Minister of Defence announced in Tokyo that the South Korean army was ready waiting to invade Communist North Korea. He added that the army was restrained by the American officials. On the same day President Syngman Rhee announced in bold terms that his government would no longer tolerate a divided Korea, "and if we have to settle this thing by war we will do all the fighting needed." In fact Rhee's threats to unify Korea by force were long-standing and in view of this there seems much reason in North Korea's argument that South Korea had begun the invasion.

There is also other side of the picture. The generally accepted view is that the North Korean troops had first crossed the 38th parallel and begun the war. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) spoke of an extensive build-up in the North. It exonerated the South Korean Army and said that it was "organized entirely for defence." The fact that the report was signed by Szu-Tu, a Nationalist Chinese, left room for dispute. Fleming

points out that the war began the night after U.N. field observers returned to Seoul. Therefore, there is reason to believe that the observers did not see the war begin. Moreover, the "UNTCOK had to rely on the reports of the South Koreans. Its first report to the Secretary General quoted the radio allegation of North Korea that "the South Koreans had invaded during the night." In spite of these limitations the UNTCOK report was hailed in the western circles and the view came to be circulated that North Korea had invaded South Korea.

There is a middle ground between these two extreme views. The vigour and speed of the North Korean invasion of South Korea and the adequacy of the preparation behind it indicate the possibility of an initial North Korean invasion of South Korea. "Yet it is increasingly probable," as Fleming points out, "that the invasion may have been touched off by an attempt by Rhee's forces to march to the North, or to provoke an invasion." Rhee and his Defence Minister had been threatening to invade North Korea and they were on record stating to do the necessary fighting for bringing about the Korean unification. "Rhee did everything he could to prevent a truce being signed and to sabotage its operation," "Rhee's burning passion to unify his country by force was demonstrated throughout the war. There has probably never been more complete proof of the adamant nature of one man's will." But Rhee was decisively defeated in the election of May 1950 which was enforced upon him by the American Government. Thus, as Fleming points out, "his regime was 'left to tottering.' He had no political future unless war broke out, and his will power was entirely sufficient to bring war about."

There was also another aspect of the Korean problem and this was the cold war aspect. Korea had for a long time been the place where cold war rivalries were most apparent. The unhappy Koreans wanted to get rid of the foreigners. Both the Russians and the Americans pounced upon this senti-

ment of the people and instigation from both sides brought the country on the verge of a civil war. The attack of South Korea by the North Korean army was simply a sequel to this situation. Once the war broke out Korea became the battleground of full-fledged cold war conflicts.

Russian involvement and cold war aspects of the war :

When the Korean War broke out it was widely believed in America and in other western circles that "the Kremlin had pushed the buttonthe North Korean Republic, would never have moved otherwise. Moscow had ordered it." Fleming says that this was the basic assumption on which the entire Korean war was fought. This assumption impelled President Truman to alter suddenly the basic American strategy and to fight a land war in Asia which the-policy makers in America expressly and deliberately decided not to do. Fleming writes : "Our entire Far Eastern policy, carefully considered on the basis of American military security was reversed in a day or two, because it was felt that the North Korean invasion was a blow in the Cold War ordered by Moscow and that it must be met " Acheson also expressly, said : "It was fully realized that the timing of any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin." This was the logic behind the American intervention in the war.

The American observers also tried to explain Stalin's motives behind this attempt to risk a World War. According to some observers the Korean move was "merely a diversion move prior to the major Soviet blow, possibly against Iran." The State Department believed that the Korean attack was the consequence of Russian probing for soft spots. Again some sources close to top American policy-makers were certain that the North Korean attack was similar to Hitler's early moves. The Dulles theory said that the attack was a strategic move to put Japan "between the upper (i.e. Sakhalin) and lower (i.e. Korean) jaws of the Russian bear." Dulles was sure that the Korean war was a

Russian move to dislocate America's "positive" and "hopeful attractive experiment in democracy"—Rhee's South Korean regime.

"All of these theories," says Fleming, "were so plainly suppositions that they soon merged into the attrition theory. Stalin had decided to bleed us white by a series of small wars around the vast rim of the Red world, always using his satellite troops, not Soviet men. Thus Korea would be followed by Indo-China, Iran..... as Stalin sat in the Kremlin calmly calculating when the time had come to push the next button and send United States troops flying into another bloodletting operation thousand of miles from here." "This theory had the merit that it was logical. It accepted that full logic and consequences of the Truman Doctrine and the containment policy."

In spite of all these theories the charge of Soviet responsibility of the war had no substantial proof behind it. When the war began there was no evidence of Soviet complicity in it. "Numerous commentators noted the unwillingness of American official spokesmen to charge the Soviet Union with direct responsibility for unleashing the attack." Fleming writes: "The charge was never made officially, as it certainly would have been if evidence had been in hand and, to the best of my knowledge, no substantiation of the assumption of Russian complicity in starting the war has ever been produced." In another place Fleming writes: "The motif of the Cold War so dominated us that the civil war character of the Korean War was almost totally ignored. The fact that Koreans on both sides of the line felt strongly enough about the unification of their country to be willing to fight for it was not mentioned. Indeed the fact that the two antithetical regimes in Korea hated and despised each other, was not considered. In a word, the strong probability that this was a true civil war, which both sides were itching for and either might have begun, was not weighed."

The Cold War aspects of the war had kept the American leaders so much pre-occupied that until the middle of 1951 no one thought of the probability that North Korea might act without Kremlin orders. In an article published in *Current History*, March, 1951, Wilbur W. Hitchcock pointed out that as a result of the outbreak of the war the Communist lost four real advantages or prospective gains : "a favourable rearming ratio ; the neutrality of certain peoples, the element of surprise ; and the imminent recognition of Red Chinese delegates by the United Nations." After studying the whole problem Hitchcock came to the conclusion that the invasion of South Korea was ordered by the Premier of North Korea. This was done without the instructions from Moscow and without its knowledge. According to him this was the reason why Malik, the Russian delegate at the U.N. did not attend the Security Council meeting and veto U.N. action. But unfortunately this carefully reasoned explanation of Hitchcock made no headway until subsequent events of the war falsified American conviction that Stalin had planned to suck the Americans into the Korean trap.

American involvement and the cold war aspects of the War :

American interests in Korea were long-standing. In Seoul in August 1948 General MacArthur said of the 38th. parallel : "This barrier must and will be torn down. Nothing shall prevent the ultimate unity of your people as free men of a free nation." Referring to "issues of the most complex nature known to political experience," he said : "The manner in which those issues are resolved will determine in large measure not only the unity and well being of your people but also the future stability of the continent of Asia." "The future stability of the continent of Asia" was a general American 'goal which involved the destruction of Communist power in Asia' In 1949 MacArthur told Syngman Rhee, "You can depend upon it that I will defend South Korea as I would defend the shores of my own motherland". In the middle of 1950 MacArthur was joined by Dulles in his drive

for a stiff policy in Asia. In June 1950 Dulles addressing the South Korean National Assembly said: "As you establish here in South Korea a wholesome society of steadily expanding well-being, you will set up peaceful influences which will disintegrate the hold of Soviet Communism on your fellows to the North and irresistibly draw them into unity with you." The next day Dulles visited the 38th. parallel frontier. He together with the American Ambassador to South Korea was photographed in the midst of a group of South Korean military officers looking over into Red Korea. "This photograph carried the unfortunate suggestion that a military campaign into North Korea was being planned. It enabled Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko to hint strongly that the signal for the alleged attack by South Korea on North Korea had been given by Dulles." From Korea Dulles went to Tokyo and there on June 21 he told the reporters that he expected "positive" results from his talks with MacArthur. The next day he held long talks with MacArthur and predicted "positive action by the United States to preserve the peace in the Far East." Another report from the American circles spoke of MacArthur's intense preoccupation with a possible Russian War. The topmen at Washington were given the "most accurate information available here on the Soviet Union's military position on the mainland and its potentialities for aggression in the Pacific in case of war."

All these evidences show that the policy making circles in America had knowledge about the activities along the 38th parallel. Yet it was said that the war took the American people and the President by surprise. John Gunther, the biographer of MacArthur also reported Tokyo's total surprise at the South Korea's invasion by North Korean army. This view was contradicted by MacArthur's first report to the U.N. There he said that "the character and disposition of the Republic of Korean army indicated that it did not expect this sudden attack."

However, when the North Korean army plunged across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, President Truman at once made up his mind to repel the attack. This decision was swift and all discussions as to how to fight Russia and where were stilled. Immediately the United Nation was activated. On the day of attack the Security Council adopted the U.S. resolution condemning the attack and demanding an immediate withdrawal. It called on all members to render every assistance to the U.N. in the implementation of this resolution. This resolution was possible because Russia had boycotted the Security Council which had refused to offer a seat to Communist China.

On June 27 the President ordered the American air and sea forces to give the Korean government adequate support. He also commanded the Seventh Fleet to neutralise Formosa. Increased military support to the Philippines and the French troops in Indo-China was also ordered. General MacArthur, after a personal reconnaissance in Korea recommended the use of American ground force. Accordingly the ground force was committed on June 30.

"These moves were clear evidence that the Korean war had precipitated a decision in the Truman Administration to reverse it carefully reasoned policy in East Asia and halt the advance of Communism all along the line in that region, steps which appeased temporarily the Republican opposition which had been bitterly combating the Administration's decision not to prevent the seizure of Formosa by Red China." The President's decision sharply promoted internal unity but America's allies in Western Europe "disagreed strongly with the wisdom of this unilateral decision on Formosa, taken without consultation with them or benefit of UN. The President's statement of June 27 appeared to draw a Truman Doctrine line in the Far East, rather than to concentrate on defending the authority of the United Nations Charter."

The cold war character of the American action in Korea

was further highlighted by the American note to Russia of July 27. By this note America wanted an assurance that the Soviet Government "disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack andwill use its influence with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately." The Soviet reply was very sharp. It squarely put all responsibilities on the South Korean Government, refused to interfere 'in the internal affairs of Korea' and denied the legal validity of the Security Council's decision.

From the standpoint of the great power struggles there were sound reasons for defending South Korea. Fleming writes : "It was believed that if the North Korean aggression succeeded, Indo-China would be almost certain to fall under Communist control, with the aid of whatever Chinese forces were necessary. The snowballing effect of Communist triumphs might make Thailand and Burma relatively easy conquests. Since Indo-China is strategically the key to all South East Asia, the stubborn Communist guerrilla movement in Malaya might be expected to gain momentum, with aid from the North, and gun-running to the Huks in the Philippines would not be too difficult. Both in the Philippines and Japan, also, the psychology of Red success would operate powerfully. In the end it might be difficult to hold Japan" A Communist sweep in Asia of this magnitude would tend to 'paralyze the defense of Europe' because there existed doubtful economic situation coupled with unstable social condition." In West Asia the belief may gain ground that resistance to a red sweep would be hopeless. "Thus far the Truman Doctrine had been enforced in Europe, but it had been a dismal failure in East Asia. If now the tremendous triumph of Communism in China were capped by further Red gains in Asia the effect on Europe might be decisive. In the United States, too, the result might well be decisive politically for the Truman Administration. Its foes were already making capital bitterly

about the non enforcement of the Doctrine in China. If it collapsed in Asia there would be a mighty outcry indeed. A stage in the cold war had come which seemed to compel a defense of the Doctrine in Asia."

These considerations were sound and had induced resolute action in Korea. The American intervention so long as it was confined to repelling North Korean aggression was justifiable from this cold war standpoint. Fleming says that "the original snap decision to defend South Korea was justifiable." But the American decision to cross the 38th parallel was a "cardinal error" in American policy to date. "It was a plain invitation to disaster." In the first place it challenged and ignored the strategic and other interests of Russia and China in Eastern Asia. Secondly, it committed America in a distant field within a marching distance from Russia. Thirdly, it turned a successful defence of collective security into a long-drawn out war of attrition. "This extension of the war laid Korea in ruins from end to end and the final stalemate was a victory for the Communist powers." Fourthly, it destroyed all prospects of ending 'communist' aggression in Asia and offered ground to Russian cry against 'American-led' aggressions. It made the Americans unable to do anything about the conquest of Indo-China by Communism. Fifthly, it fed the fire of Macarthyism in America. Finally, it impaired the prestige of the U.N. as the promoter of peace and turned the collective Security system as an instrument for combatting Communism all over the globe

Q. 15. Discuss the Hungarian Crisis of 1956.

The Revolt in Hungary is a significant episode in recent history. As a revolt against the tyranny of the existing government in Hungary and the Russian control of all policies there, it marked the climax of events that had gone before and showed the inner working of the Communist bloc in the post-Stalin era. This Revolt in itself

was a failure ; but it produced significant repercussions on international relations in the fifties. With the outbreak of the Revolt there was an imminent danger of an eventual clash between the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. The episode also demonstrated the helplessness of the United Nations as a peace-promoting body and an effective machinery to resolve turmoils and conflicts. This Revolt coincided with the Suez Crisis. It meant that Russia could not secure maximum advantage from the Suez Crisis. Finally, the Revolt exposed the European Communist bloc to western scrutiny and put into open the relation between the East European satellites and their parent state, Russia.

Factors which led to the Revolt :

The Revolt was not a sudden episode. The factors which caused the Revolt were manifold and worked for many years. Hungary's fate was very much linked up with the general pattern of developments in Eastern Europe. After the Second World War, the Red Army over ran almost the whole of Eastern Europe. The presence of this Red Army accelerated the process of Sovietization of Eastern Europe. Pro-Russian Governments were set up in different states. Hungary had no escape from this. But there was a traditional hostility between Russia and Hungary. So it was historically difficult for Hungary to accept Russian occupation. The outrageous conduct of the Red Army who occupied Budapest left a permanent impression upon the popular mind. When the war was over the Red Army stayed on. This shocked the sentiment of the people. The Red Army put into power its own government from among the Hungarians. Then came the Warsaw pact. With this the Soviet control over Hungarian policies stiffened and the Soviet military pressure in Hungary increased. This political and military pressure from Russia caused widespread discontent among the Hungarians. A feeling was gaining ground that the Russian troops should be withdrawn and Hungary must be left to herself.

Added to this there was the consequence of Stalin's policy which only contributed to popular discontent in Hungary. Stalin's policy of control was enforced on two levels—political and economic. On the political level Stalin's aims was the ultimate control of satellite states from Moscow. Such a policy in the economic plain produced severe repercussions. East Europe and the Soviet Union were treated as a single economic unit. Towards the end of Stalin's rule signs of discontent were visible in Eastern Europe and unrest was reported from more than one state. Stalin took up the policy of favouring one important sector of the economic unit at the cost of others. There was continuous shipment from agricultural Hungary to other parts of Eastern Europe. The result of this was a perennial food shortage in Hungary. Again there was no provision for consumer goods as a result of excessive emphasis on heavy industry. Hungary was one of those states which bore the major share of Stalin's white elephants. As a result of all these there developed an acute economic distress in the country.

In the next place there was the nature of the government imposed by the Russians. The regime of Rakosi, who was installed as the head of the Hungarian government, relied on Stalinist methods to accelerate socialist development. His instrument was terror. The result was that after an initial good start in 1945 his regime degenerated into a tyranny at its worst. Over years Rakosi wanted to apply mechanically Soviet methods of planning and "the nation found itself in the grip of paralyzing police terror" and under ruthless pressure of work. The dogmatic band of Party leaders led by Rakosi refused to study the specific conditions in Hungary and take lesson from mistakes. Rakosi was an excellent Party manager and a relentless tyrant. He ruled through his secret police organization. Evidently the Rakosi regime evoked tremendous opposition in Hungary and there were leaders who quickly moved into spotlights.

The most important of them was Imre Nagy. In the middle of 1953, the Soviet leader Malenkov forced Rakosi to turn the premiership over to Nagy. But Rakosi remained head of the Party, a powerful post from which he could intrigue against the much humane policy of Imre Nagy. He did use the Party apparatus to discredit Nagy. Then there was a change in Soviet leadership and in February 1955 Rakosi was reinstated to premiership with Soviet Russia's approval and apparently with the belief that only he could prevent the collapse of "the whole structure" in Hungary. This turn of events created a new situation. People began to feel the differences between the two administrations of Nagy and Rakosi. Their feeling ran high when they came to be subjected again to the relentless tyranny of Rakosi. Fleming rightly comments that events in Hungary would have assumed a very different course if Khrushchev had not made the monumental mistake of restoring Rakosi to power after his fall in 1953.

All these events formed the background of the Hungarian Revolt in 1956. This background had a cultural aspect. At this time there was a genuine educational and literary revival in Hungary. The Communist Party achieved miraculous success in making education widespread. The students read the Russian revolutionary and humanitarian authors of the nineteenth century. The vast educational expansion in Eastern Europe had the effect of waking the young people up to new ideas. Consequently, a great revolutionary mood prevailed in East European universities.

Finally, there was much wider factor behind the actual explosion in Hungary. At this time there was general unrest in other East European countries, such as East Germany and Poland. The Polish revolt had profound effect in Hungary. The Polish leader Gromulka began to follow a fairly nationalist line. When this was the situation Khrushchev enunciated the new policy of de-Stalinization in the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. In their speeches delivered

at this Congress, the Soviet Premier Khrushchev and the First Deputy Premier Mikoyan denounced Stalin and his line and pleaded for liberalism. These speeches had electric effect in East European countries. The general feeling of revolt that existed in popular mind as a result of the relaxation following Stalin's death now received additional impetus. A new move was unleashed to expel the Stalinists from power and a growing sense of opposition to Moscow's control developed. A successful revolt in favour of 'de-Stalinization' was staged in Poland in October, 1956. Immediately afterwards a similar kind of revolt broke out in Hungary. But this time the outcome was different.

Events :

In October, 1956 the news of the revolt in Poland stirred up popular sentiment in Hungary. There was a general cry for liberalization of the regime and the writers and the students took the lead in it. A mass demonstration was staged in the Hungarian capital on October 22 in support of the general demand for democratization of the government, withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the return to power of Nagy. On October 23, Gero, the Party Secretary, made a broadcast. He invited the Russian troops and martial law was announced. This was the "fuse that set off the explosion". On the next day Imre Nagy took over as the Prime Minister. There was a new pledge for the democratization of public life. Two members of the Soviet Presidium Suslov and Mikoyan immediately flew to Hungary. Gero's handling of the situation was disapproved and he was sent off to Moscow.

In the meanwhile the Hungarian Revolt assumed wider magnitude. In the open streets fighting broke out between the Hungarians and the Soviet troops. Anti-Russian sentiment ran high. Nagy's appeal for peace and order had no effect. He entered into negotiation with the Soviet Government for the withdrawal of Russian troops. The Soviet Government agreed and began to withdraw its troops.

On October 28, Nagy made an announcement stating the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. This was followed by a statement issued by the Soviet Government. It admitted that "downright mistakes" had been made. It stressed that relations between Socialist states must be based upon "the principles of full equality, respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of one another."

When this was the situation a serious crisis faced the Hungarian Communist Party. There was a powerful move against the Stalinist inside the Party. Gero and Rakosi were expelled. The only rallying force in the Party was Kadar who advocated liberalization. Kadar endeavoured in the face of heavy odds to restore the unity of the Party so that a common front could be offered to the pro western rightist section who were organizing a counter-revolution in the country. But the task was difficult. Nagy had no firm stand. He was yielding to the rightist pressure for a pro-western orientation of Hungary. His cabinet was broadened. Members of the old political parties were invited. The one-party system was abolished and pledge was made for free elections. The Nagy Government was steadily drifting away from the Warsaw Pact

All these developments radically changed the Russian mind. Moreover, Anglo-French aggression against Egypt had begun. In this situation Russia could take no more chance. On November 1, Mikoyan flew to Budapest. On the next day Cardinal Mindszenty appealed to the West for all out support. This was the last permissible step. Huge influx of Russian troops began. A new government was formed under Kadar. This government invited—or was forced to invite—Russian troops. The Russian army re-entered Budapest. In a few days the Hungarian Revolt was ruthlessly crushed.

The most tragic role in the Revolt was played by Imre Nagy. He was, as Fleming points out, not the man to ride

a revolution which had to be restrained. Events marched rapidly but his decisions "tended always to be too late." The propaganda of the American radio "undermined his efforts to restore order and spurred the revolution on to attempt more than it could accomplish". Imre Nagy was captured and denounced as a traitor in the red world. According to Isaac Deutscher his execution was decided upon in Peking and Moscow although Janos Kadar objected to it. In June, 1957 he was executed. His execution, says Nehru, was "tragic in itself as well as in its consequence".

Reflexions on the Revolt :

(The Hungarain Revolt failed to achieve its aims. The Russian historians claim that the Russian troops were sent to Hungary explicitly on the request of the Hungarian government. Russia intervened in support of the Hungarian people against a fascist government and to check its subversive activities. Her professed object was to liberate Hungary from a new rightwing tyranny. If Russia had not intervened, counter-revolutionaries would have destroyed the fruits of Socialist in Hungary. It is important to note that the Chinese Government fully supported Russian action in Hungary. Chou-En-lai called the Hungarian Revolt "a crazy subversive movement.")

The western historians disagree with Soviet scholars. They take the Revolt as a genuine popular movement. It should be noted that there was no western political observer in Hungary during these fateful days. As a result there is a considerable dearth of first-hand account of the matter. Mr. K. P. S. Menon had been the Indian ambassador to U.S.S.R. during this time. In his report he considered the matter as a genuine popular upsurge.

The view of K. P. S. Menon can be justified from a study of the tendencies of political force which were working in Hungary at this time. In the Hungarian leadership there was a three-fold division. The most popular man was Imre Nagy who commanded the most popular group

in the country. He was a convinced Communist but bitterly an anti-Russian. He was caught between two fires. He showed hostility to Russia, yet at the same time he had to depend upon the confidence and favour of Russia if he was to keep himself in position. He committed a two-fold mistake. He did not decide how far he should go. But at the same time he went too far in supporting the anti-Russian attitude of the Hungarians. His abrogation of the Warsaw Pact was a desperate act. For this he incurred the animosity of Russia.

Imre Nagy was closely followed by a right-wing group which derived sustenance from the lapses of the leadership and developed into a counter revolutionary force during the course of the movement. Nagy's association with them made him a target of Soviet criticisms. This group was led by Cardinal Mindszenty. He sharply criticized the existing government of Nagy. He had a profound influence on the Catholic population in the country. He was trying to bring about a distinctly anti-Communist movement in Hungary. American propaganda and radio broadcasts helped to fan this movement. All round attempt was made by America and some other countries to stir up the people of Hungary against Communism. But when the people rose up in rebellion and found themselves in crisis having been forced to meet a showdown with Russia, America did not come to their help. Mindszenty could not capture power and American broadcasts had no effect except provoking bloodsheds.

To this movement of counter revolution one wing of the leadership was trying to put up tough resistance. This was the Pro-Russian wing of leadership led by Janos Kadar. Men of this wing believed that military withdrawal of Russia from Hungary would only be dangerous for Hungary, for it would allure West Germany to strengthen itself. This group also opposed abrogation of the Warsaw Pact.

From the foregoing analysis it is evident that the Revolt could not be branded as a right-wing reaction although right-wing elements were very much in operations. (Nagy was not a reactionary. He only wanted to follow a line of national independence. But this went against Russian orthodoxy and the consequence was this brutal episode. America could do nothing. She inspired the revolution to attempt more than it could accomplish. The United Nations was helpless. The Russian declaration of a new Socialist Commonwealth was proved to be utterly false. No tangible effect followed. Only a multitude of innocent Hungarians along with Nagy were made to suffer martyrdom.)

Q. 16. Critically discuss the problem of Vietnam.

Forces at play :

Ever since the Second World War, Vietnam has been the playground of divergent forces. It was one of the most important East Asian theatres where nationalism came to play even during the early part of the present century. This nationalism, as in many parts of Asia, was directed against imperialism and aimed at establishing an independent Vietnamese State with Socialistic orientation. There was also Communism which clashed with neo-imperialism. The appearance of neo-imperialism was somewhat a new phenomenon and its coming transformed Vietnam to one of the major theatres of cold war.

At the outset the most formidable of all these forces had been nationalism. The bitter experience of the people about French imperialism made them fanatically anti-Western in their attitude. Nationalism in subsequent years came to be equated with Communism and consequently it assumed a magnitude of extreme complexity. Thus, in Indo China, at least at the outset, Communism and nationalism merged into one stream of resistance to French colonialism. Ho Chi Minh's early appeals to the people had a nationalistic bias. Again side by side with this Communist

revolts were taking place as early as 1930. They were, however, ruthlessly suppressed by the French. The Russian influence was at work. Ho Chi Minh was Moscow trained. His lieutenant Vo Nguyen Giap was of course a champion of Mao-Tse-Tung's theories of revolutionary war. Thus Communist influence was very strong from the beginning and this explains much of the later complexities of the Vietnam problem.

Besides Communism there was another factor which complicated the situation. This was the colonial policy of the French. They failed to appreciate the potentialities of the germinating nationalism of the Vietnamese people. This nationalism was directed towards complete freedom from outside interference. After the Second World War the French were willing to grant some amount of autonomy to the Vietnamese. But they kept final authority with them selves. This at once antagonized the Vietnamese Nationalists and the Communists.

The attitude of Communist China towards Vietnam was another factor in the development. Historically the influence of China was very prominent in Vietnam. Particularly the developments of North Vietnam were shaped under the direct influence of China. A significant trend of North Vietnamese history was a drive to the south. In the context of Chinese influence in North Vietnam in the period of Cold War such a tendency appears in a new light. The motives of Ho's Government and the help given to it by China present all traditional forces of history in their new dimensions.

A new development in Vietnamese history is the infiltration of American influence. America had an unambiguous attitude towards the problems of Vietnam. At the beginning the Americans were in favour of Nationalists and were somewhat against the French. But once Communist China intended helping North Vietnam, American attitude changed. The Chinese influence in the North was counter-

acted by the American attempt to take the direct responsibility of Vietnam. As early as 1952 American war materials began to pour into Indo-China. President Eisenhower declared that the United States did not consider the Vietnamese war simply to be a colonial war but rather to be a part of a general struggle against Communism. Dulles in his statement highlighted the concept of 'massive retaliation'. The possibility that America could use Atom Bomb in this region to fight Communism added to the gravity of the situation. This attitude of America complicated the internal developments of Vietnam and in the long run created conditions for Cold War. So long as the developments in Vietnam were nationalistic and completely immuned from its blending with communism and so long as there were no Communist China in the North and no America in the South, there was no possibility of Cold War. But subsequently under pressure of circumstances Nationalism came to be merged with the force of Communism and America and China came to the backing of the North and South Vietnam. This prepared the fertile field for the beginning of the cold War.

Events :

Vietnam was the most important component part of the French empire of Indo-China. In 1941 national liberation movement began there. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, the League for the Independence of Vietnam was formed. At the outset it was the common platform for both the Nationalists and the Communists. Side by side with this an army was built by the joint effort of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Tactics of Mao Tse-Tung were followed and they evidently relied on the support of the peasants. Towards the end of the Second World War the Japanese set up a puppet government in Vietnam under Bao Dai. This government was not recognized by the Communists and the Nationalists. After Japan's surrender Ho Chi Minh set up the People's Liberation Committee of

Vietnam. He also persuaded Bao Dai to abdicate. On August 22, 1945 a Provisional Government was set up.

In the crucial days of the Provisional Government the Allied troops began to come in according to the decisions reached at the Potsdam Conference. Under the Potsdam agreements Northern Indo-China down to the 16th parallel was to be under the Chinese control and the remainder under the British troops. In September, 1945, the British troops under General Gracey arrived in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's government did not oppose the incoming forces. The British force began to come in, captured South Vietnam and handed it over to the French who set about reconquering Vietnam from South to the North. In 1946 the British troops withdrew. Admiral d' Argenlieu was appointed French High Commissioner. The Chinese permitted Ho Chi-Minh to control the government in the North where the French were refused admission. Thus Ho got opportunity to consolidate his position in the North. During this period the Americans took little interest in Vietnam.

First Indo-China War

The French from the beginning were trying to get back their control over the Indo-China empire. Even General de Gaulle himself was against de-colonization. The French, however, recognized North Vietnam as a free state, but they did not allow the unification of the North and the South which was demanded by Ho Chi-Minh. To frustrate the design of Ho, the French turned to Bao Dai, for they hoped that Bao Dai would prove a rallying point for nationalists. Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, insisted on two principles, independence and unity, meaning the unification of the three provinces of Vietnam—Tonking, Annam and Cochinchina. No negotiation could cover up this divergence which ultimately developed into a crisis. The actual fighting broke out with the French bombardment on Haiphong in November, 1946. Thus, the first Indo-

China war began and with it the first phase of the Vietnam war.

The Port of Haiphong was held by the Vietminh Party. When the French bombed the port the Communists were forced to take shelter in Hill-sides. The Vietminh were very popular with the people. As the struggle continued the French attempted to set up local government in Vietnam under ex-emperor Bao Dai. But the government so formed was ineffectual and weak and was also corrupt from the start. The purpose for which the French called on the emperor was not realised. Speaking of this government Professor Hall says : "It was, of course, yet another bogus version of independence".

American Involvement :

In 1949 the Chinese revolution ended in a victory of the Communists. In January, 1950, the People's Republic of China gave recognition to Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh Government followed by Russian recognition and recognition by People's Democracies of East Europe quickly followed. As a counter measure and as a measure of retaliation Britain and the United States accorded recognition to Bao Dai's government. Thus the situation in Vietnam took a new turn by 1950. This was the definite beginning of American involvement in Vietnam. The French control in Indo-China was approaching its end. "The policy of control in Vietnam", says Professor Hall, "stepped out of French hands into those of the State Department at Washington." Vietnam became a theatre of Cold War.

Since 1950 the French activities in Vietnam were shaped under American pressure and were executed with the backing of American money. Yet the hope of French victory of the Indo-China War was remote. America was bearing 80 percent of the cost of war and wanted France to adopt bolder plans against the Viet Minh. But the public opinion in France was steadily turning against French offensives in Vietnam. The campaign unleashed by the French

Communists to open negotiation with Ho Chi Minh had gained grounds. The plan of General Navarre, the French Commander-in-chief in Indo-China, which aimed at 'a build-up of military superiority based upon massive deliveries of American aid' came to be wrecked by the brilliant offensive of Giap [the plan was adopted in July 1953]. The battle of Dien Bien Phu registered a French disaster [May, 1954]. Important consequences followed. The French disaster amply demonstrated the strength of a people's army. It also called for a rethinking of American policy on a new plain. Records show that Dulles wanted "to use air and naval powers in Indo-China." His fear was that the French "might use some disguised means of getting out of Indo-China if they did not receive help soon." Dulles also feared that the fall of Indo-China would mean that the Americans "might eventually be forced back to Hawaii."

In the context of these developments Dulles favoured all-out American intervention in Vietnam. The "allied intervention" was the last thing in the list of British preference. So opposition came from Churchill and Eden who took firm stand in favour of a negotiated settlement. Dulles flew off to London. But the outcome was nothing but "a thinly veiled hostility between Dulles and Eden." In the meantime Mendes-France came to power in France. He decided in the face of pressing public opinion to put an end to this costly Colonial War. His public announcement that he would resign if he failed to bring about an honourable settlement of the problem, revealed a welcome prospect of change in the situation. The French disaster at Dien Bien Phu brought the Indo-China war to an end. The French Empire of Indo-China sealed its end.

The Geneva Conference :

The Geneva Conference met on April 23, 1954 and the Geneva agreements were signed on July 21, 1954. The nations that participated in the Conference were : Cambodia, Laos, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Soviet Russia,

People's Republic of China, Vietnam, United States and Britain.

According to the Geneva agreements Vietnam, was partitioned at the 17th parallel. The North went under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [that is the Viet Minh]. The South was placed under the Saigon Government. This partition was not permanent. To unify Vietnam free general elections by secret ballot was to take place in July 1956 under the supervision of an international commission. No foreign military base was to exist in the two regrouping zones. There would no longer be any introduction of foreign troops and arms into Vietnam. The French troops were to be withdrawn from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. These three States undertook not to request foreign aid. The members of the General Conference pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity" of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. An International Control Commission, composed of India, Poland and Canada, was set up "for supervision and control in Vietnam." India was to preside over this Commission.

Post-Geneva developments :

The Geneva agreements brought to an end the first Indo-China War. It also sealed the end of the French empire of Indo-China. The momentous decision to unify Vietnam by free elections met American ratification that came in the form of "unilateral declaration". The Viet Minh also recognized the proposal for free elections and this was done even when the military position was in their favour. They hoped that free elections would result in their victory. The root of the Post Geneva crisis in Vietnam lies here.

The French troops were withdrawn just before the deadline for elections. The South Vietnam Government under Ngo Din Diem suspected that free elections would go against it. Therefore, with the active backing of America it refused to participate in the consultative conferences and thus wrecked the arrangements for free elections. The

International Commission placed the blame squarely on Saigon. Ho Chi Minh invited the Commission and insisted on holding free elections. But elections did not take place in 1956 and the Geneva agreements were buried.

In the meantime attempts were made by the Americans to build up in South Vietnam a nationalist rival to the Communist Ho Chi Minh. Bao Dai came to be replaced by Ngo Dinh Diem who became the President of the Republic of Vietnam in October 1955. As a catholic and rabid anti-Communist Diem enjoyed American patronage to the full. He was built up as the 'nationalist alternative to the Viet Minh. America utilized her for a massive military build-up in South Vietnam. The Diem regime gradually degenerated into a family dictatorship. Popular discontent was widespread. Yet it remained in power with active American backing.

Out of this situation was born the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1960. Its aim was the overthrow of "the camouflaged colonial regime of American imperialism and the dictatorial regime of Ngo Dinh Diem." It also wanted to "institute a Government of National Democratic Union." Later it was alleged by the Americans that the Liberation Front received assistance from Hanoi. The American view was corroborated by the report of the International Control Commission which noted that supplies of arms and armed personnels had been sent into South Vietnam from the North. The Front, however, built up a strong influence in the countryside of Cochinchina. Massive American aids were poured in but nothing could check the dismal unpopularity of the Diem regime. A popular revolt broke out in November 1963. The Diem regime was overthrown.

Escalating the War :

Thus by 1963 a new aspect was added to the civil war. The country remained partitioned at the 17th parallel but a new struggle was going on inside the southern part between

the Front and the Saigon Government. The Front spread a network of units all over the countryside and followed guerilla tactics. Tensions mounted after the fall of the Diem regime when the political situation came to be disturbed by a series of coups. With the fall of puppet governments in Vietnam the military participation of America in Vietnam also increased. The number of American military personnels in Vietnam rose from 800 in 1960 to about 21,000 in 1964. The Kennedy administration stepped up military aid to the South Vietnamese government in 1961. By the time Johnson came to power, the military personnel in Vietnam had grown into 21,000. On February 7, 1965 the Communist guerillas raided the American army bases on the Tonkin Gulf. The American retaliation came in the form of air attacks against North Vietnam. Thus the civil war in Vietnam became a big American war against Vietnam.

The escalation of war by the Americans became a threat of the first magnitude to the peace in South East Asia. The American air raid invited a stern warning from Russia. "The Soviet Union will be compelled together with its allies and friends to take further measures to ensure the security and strengthen the defence capacity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Similar promise to help North Vietnam came from People's Republic of China. A wave of protest burst forth in America in the form of meetings, "Teach-ins" and demonstration. Even U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, appealed to the American government to stop bombing over North Vietnam. "The basic problem in Vietnam" so goes U Thant's report to the General Assembly is not one of ideology but one of national identity and survival of the Vietnamese people" This produced no impression on the American policy. The bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans continued. The war has been escalated to to the maximum. The absurdity and the naked expression of imperialism that are there in the American stand in Vietnam, have caused deep concern all over the world.

The Paris peace-talks of 1968 have failed. A demand has raged all over the world that America must return to the essentials of the Geneva agreements. The recent change in American administration may influence the course of events in Vietnam. But immediate settlement of the problem in Vietnam is not yet in sight.

Q. 17. Write a brief note on the Sino-Soviet Conflict.

Introduction :

The Sino-Soviet conflict is one of the most significant events in the history of the Communist Movement in the world. Its roots are deeply laid in the past although it manifested itself only towards the end of the fifties of the present century. Therefore, the conflict cannot be regarded as the result of a mere rivalry for leadership of the World-Communist Movement between Russia and China, nor can it be considered as simply the outcome of a mere doctrinaire quarrel over the correct interpretation of Marxist-Leninist creed. It is the product of a conflict of interests profoundly rooted in history and also in the national situations of these two countries. Since both of these countries are governed by totalitarian parties that justify their rule by a common ideology, this conflict has assumed the shape of an unbridgeable doctrinaire schism. Ideology and nationalist aspirations have been blended, says Edward Crankshaw, with racialism and power politics. To him ideology is not the prime factor. He writes : "In this great conflict ideology is not the end but the means, that ideology is being used by both sides as a weapon in the struggle." This struggle, he adds, is "for self-assertion, if not for domination." Mutual excommunication and anathema could be the only consequence.

Different stages of the conflict :

The conflict developed in different stages. The first stage began in 1949. In this phase both Mao Tse-tung and

Stalin had reserves with regard to each other's ideological pretensions. The period intervening between 1949 and 1958 was the second stage. In this period the leaders exchanged friendly words. The years following 1958 saw the development of the third stage. During this period bitter words were exchanged and mutual anathema followed.

First phase :

In this period there were tensions born of ideological and nationalist consideration. For the making of revolution Stalin placed *prima facie* importance in the role of the industrial proletariat. In Mao's consideration peasantry had the primary role. This difference in outlook came to a head when Mao refused the Borodin Mission sent by Russia to China. The question of policy to be adopted towards the Kuomintang China gave rise to a new problem of political nature. Towards the end of the twenties Stalin was keen on building up a stable regime in China that could be a Russian ally against Japanese expansionism. So he advised Mao to suspend his revolutionary struggle and co-operate with the Kuomintang. This led to the weakening of the position of the Chinese Communists. Such an action on the part of Stalin was repeated in 1936, that is one year after the beginning of the Long March. Stalin quarrelled with Chiang Kai-shek, but later he wanted to make it up and, therefore, he advised Mao to cooperate with him. This capricious move, although understandable in the context of Japanese menace, severely reacted upon the position of the Communists revolutionaries in China. The result of all these was that after the Second World War the Chinese Communists refused to oblige the Russians and drove the Kuomintang Government out of China. The Chinese action in this regard was contrary to Stalin's advice.

Parallel to this there was a rift over territorial questions. During the First World War, Russia captured outer Mongolia and tried to obtain Port Arthur and Dairen. At the Yalta

Conference she got these ports and gained control over the Manchurian Railways.

Second Phase :

From 1949 to 1958 the two countries put up co-operation among themselves. Russia judiciously refrained from interfering in the international policy of China. A treaty of mutual defence and friendship was also concluded between these two countries. Russia withdrew from Port Arthur and Dairen. China got back the control of the Manchurian Railway. But outer Mongolia was still retained by the Russians. On the whole this co-operation was effective and it reached its peak in 1956. In this year Mao supported the Russian stand on two important events, the Polish Revolt and the Hungarian Revolt. Several factors influenced the Chinese mind in this regard. In the first place Mao never approved of de-Stalinization initiated by Moscow and was exasperated by the limits to which the Russians had carried it. The de-Stalinization movement was the direct cause of the revolts in Poland and Hungary. So Mao supported the Russian move of coercion that followed the revolts. That apart the influence of Khrushchev, amply demonstrated in the 20th Party Congress, irritated Mao. The Chinese Communist party was never willing to accept Khrushchev as the successor of Stalin. They were never reconciled to the fact that one undisputed hand would control the directions of the World Communist Movement. Liu-Shao-Chi clearly described "Mao's Road" as the only suitable policy for the underdeveloped countries. China also made it clear that every event which took place in the Communist World was a concern to all Communist States. This was simply a calculated move to assert the Chinese voice in the Communist World. This clearly explains why China supported the Russians in the two important events of 1956. China was steadily preparing to overthrow the pretensions of Moscow as the Communist Rome. In 1957, Mao Tse-Tung met Khrushchev at a conference in Moscow. Out of this emerged

the Moscow Declaration which laid down principles to be followed by all Communist States.

Beneath this show of co-operation a rift was yawning wide. In 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin undertook their celebrated tour of India and Burma. This tour, says Crankshaw, was a Russian counter to the Chinese pretensions in Asia. Khrushchev brought to bear upon China that the Russian interest in Asia was in no way less than that of China and that Russia was not going to permit any division of Asia or any part of the globe into Communist spheres of influence. Moreover Khrushchev promised to give material help to all countries that had newly gained independence although they were anti-communist. This Russian line of policy subsequently came to be severely criticised by Peking. This criticism proved that differences between Moscow and Peking existed even when there was a treaty of friendship between them and just at the time when China was backing Russia in international politics.

Third Phase :

The third phase began in 1958. It was the most crucial phase of the conflict. It was in this phase that Mao decided that Khrushchev was unfit to be the leader of the World Communist Movement which also included China. Henceforth ideology became the major point of conflict. This ideological clash involved five aspects of Marxist thinking : (i) the nature of today's imperialism, (ii) the question of peace (iii) policy to be adopted to the newly independent countries, (iv) transition to socialism and finally (v) the national liberation movement and the historical role of the workers.

The real conflict began with the 20th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1956. In this Congress Khrushchev advanced the view that world conditions had changed since the time of Lenin and the supporters of Leninism must reconcile themselves to this change. The power of the socialist camp had increased and the fetters of colonialism were

steadily breaking down. This created, according to Khrushchev, an atmosphere in which the Communists could work. Such a thesis had little appeal to the Chinese. The Chinese Communists firmly believe that the fundamental characters of colonialism even today has not changed. Economic imperialism is coming up very fast to fill the places where colonialism has been eliminated. Thus present-day colonialism cannot be interpreted in terms of fundamental change. To do this is to support one basic principle of what is called revisionism.

Khrushchev's view has its logical next step. Accepting that a fundamental change has taken place in the imperialist camp Khrushchev advanced the idea that war with the imperialist camp is not inevitable and that peaceful co-existence is possible. He advocated that if necessary the socialist countries should follow the policy of peaceful economic competition with the imperialist powers. This Khrushchevite Communism has quite a right-wing orientation and involves a substantial revision of the original Marxist creed. China adhering to Marxism-Leninism in their original and unaltered form was naturally shocked at the advent of this new communism. China emphasises on the basic Marxist dictum that there is a fundamental contradiction between the imperialist power and the socialist countries. This basic contradiction cannot be reduced only to an economic competition. War is inevitable so long as there will be imperialism, and peaceful coexistence is, therefore, has no meaning at all.

That apart Khrushchev came out in support of the national bourgeoisie in all the newly independent countries. According to him the bourgeoisie can play a 'progressive role' and he was in favour of supporting them. China attaches no value to the 'progressive role' of the national bourgeoisie and, therefore, briefly criticises Russia's policy of supporting them even when they belong to anti-communist countries. This policy of Khrushchev was a part of his

belief that peaceful transition to socialism through parliamentary means is possible—a view which China rejected outright.

With regard to the national liberation movement Khrushchev's attitude was cautious and moderate. He advocated communist support for these movements but he reasoned that caution should be taken in this regard otherwise new forces would be released and another world war would be the result. China on the other hand adopted an uncompromising stand and advocated support for the national liberation movements even in the face of world war.

These ideological differences were reflected in the two different stands taken by Russia and China with regard to certain international developments which took place in the period following 1958. The first crisis came over the question of the revolution in Iraq in 1958. This revolution brought American soldiers to Lebanon. This act was denounced by both China and Russia. China wanted to fight the Americans straightway. But Khrushchev was ready to meet the Americans in a summit meeting. This attitude of Khrushchev came to be bitterly criticised in the Chinese circles.

In the wake of this bitterness came the off-shore island crisis. With a view to liberating Taiwan China started bombarding the off-shore islands. Russia offered no positive support to China on this issue. The Russian inaction was interpreted in the Chinese circles as an indication that unilateral action of China would not be supported by Russia.

Since 1959 the Sino-Soviet difference gathered momentum. In October '59 Khrushchev submitted his annual report to the Supreme Soviet where he rejected Chinese claim over Ladakh which according to him is an Indian territory. This alienated the Chinese. Awkward things followed in consequence. Russia recalled her technicians and technological experts who were working in China, thus creating there

what the Chinese called a great economic confusion. In the same year Russia definitely rejected the Chinese claim to the manufacture of Atom Bomb. The proposal of a joint Sino-Soviet naval patrolling in the Pacific was abandoned. Russia also slowed down her supply of oil to China. About this time clashes between Russian and Chinese frontier guards were reported. One such incident in Russian Turkistan was made public. China began to publish maps. To the Russians these maps were 'not the end but the means.' In 1962 the rift between Russia and China became clear. In the Sino-Indian war the Soviet Union adopted a neutral stand and did not stop economic aid to India. The Chinese press and radio attacked the Soviet support to non-aligned India. On the Cuban crisis also China denounced Khrushchev's policy of removing the missile bases as "Capitulationism."

The Sino-Soviet relations did not improve even after the fall of Khrushchev. During the India-Pakistan war in 1965, the Soviet Union expressed her support for India. This was again criticised in the Chinese quarters. In 1966 the rift entered a dangerous stage. After the eleven plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee the Cultural Revolution was launched in China. The Chinese propaganda machine issued new calls to the Russian people. They were urged to overthrow "the existing system" and to raise "the banner of Mao Tse-Tung on Red Square". Mammoth anti-Soviet rally in Peking showed the Chinese hatred for the revisionists. One such rally was addressed by Chou-En-lai and Chen Yi. In retaliation serious articles were coming out in Pravda. On February 16, 1967 Pravda published a long article which hinted at "a complete break".

Ever since 1966 the Sino-Soviet difference has only gained in momentum. Today it stands at a height where it seems unbridgeable. A schism in the Communist camp between Russia and China has offered the gravest blow to the world Communist movement. The Leninist world view has suffered a temporary check. New trends have emerged

in the Communist camp and these call for a refashioning of the old strategies. The Soviet deviation from the original creed of Marxism-Leninism has resulted in the possibility of new international alignments. Russia must have broad international backing for this new policy. China must look forward towards developing a new International Organisation consisting of actively revolutionary parties and fashioned on their own model and under their doctrinal authority. Smaller Communist parties like the Rumanian or the Cuban party, may desire to remain temporarily outside any 'camp'. This would call for recasting of the inter-communist relations. Those relations which will be in the immediate power sphere will tend to be sound. Thus there may be hegemonial relations of military and economic co-operation in Eastern Europe or military economic subversive co-operation in South-East Asia. Such relations are coming up very fast. It is also worthy of note that as a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict the Soviet bloc is coming closer to the Western Powers. It is very true indeed that after the conflict the difference between America and the Soviet Union has lost much of its former explosiveness. This makes Russia's difference with Socialist China all the more unbridgeable.

APPENDIX—A

The Suez Crisis

The Suez Canal question dominated Egyptian politics for a long time. There was serious popular demand for the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt. Egypt decided to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The declaration to this effect came in 1951. In 1952 General Naguib seized power in Egypt by a military coup and established a military dictatorship there. In 1954 Naguib was overthrown by Abdel Nasser. He was a leader of the "young officers" and he showed left-wing tendencies. Under him the nationalist movement gained speed and the legacies of colonial rule came to be seriously challenged.

This upset Britain and France. Britain insisted that Egypt should become a member of a Middle East Defence Organization. This organization was to be of the NATO type. By this move Britain was finding a means whereby foreign troops could be posted in Egypt. This proposal was, therefore, rejected by Egypt. In July 1954 an agreement between Britain and Egypt took place. Under this agreement the British troops were to leave Egypt in June 1956. Each party undertook to uphold the Constantinople Convention of 1888 which guaranteed the freedom of navigation of the Canal. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was abrogated. The Americans played an important role in bringing about this agreement. They also promised help for the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt. Apparently this treaty was a step in the direction of the peaceful settlement of the Suez question. But it could not satisfy the extremists in Egypt. Even there was an attempt on Nasser's life. Meanwhile situations took a new turn. Nasser wanted to strengthen Egypt against Israel. He was expecting arms aid from the West. But he was soon disappointed in his expectation. In 1955 he concluded an agreement with Czechoslovakia to

obtain arms. This arms deal with Czechoslovakia, a member of the Soviet bloc, alienated the west.

In June 1956, the last contingent of British soldiers was withdrawn from Egypt. It coincided with Shepilov's [the then foreign minister of the Soviet Union] visit to Egypt. Shepilov's tour was a new shock to the West. In July America withdrew her offer of constructing the Aswan Dam. This was a great setback for the Egyptians. The people had high hopes over the projected Aswan Dam. The withdrawal of American offer created great consternation in the Arab World. Nasser responded to the populous mood. He nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 20th July. His argument was simple. Nationalisation would bring revenue and that would be utilised for the construction of the Dam. This was a bold and dramatic move. Nasser had the backing of the entire Arab World. Soviet Russia also promptly offered her support to him. Arab nationalism appeared in a new dimension.

The Suez Canal had economic and strategic importance. The nationalisation move was, therefore, a disaster to both Britain and France. This was all the more so because sixty percent of the oil from Middle East passed through Suez. Naturally situation was very serious. Twenty-two maritime powers met in a conference in London. It was proposed that an international body would be set up to control the Canal. The Anglo-French bloc was applying pressure tactics. Nasser contemptuously rejected the proposal. Then Dulles came out with his new move. He proposed to set up a "Canal Users Association" which would manage the Canal. Once again Nasser rejected the offer. The point of no-return was reached. Any attempt of forceful imposition of this move would mean war.

In October, 1956, Israel invaded Sinai. The Anglo-French aggression against Egypt quickly followed. Thus in October, 1956, events reached climax. Records that have come to light till now show that the plans of the Anglo-French

attack upon Egypt were laid immediately after Nasser's move of nationalization. As early as July the British and French official circles talked of using force. Dulles who viewed the episode as a "business dispute over the control of an international public utility" was just keeping the secret from being too much public. Conferences were held but nothing tangible emerged. Meanwhile in September British and French forces were gathered at Malta and Cyprus. On 29 and 31 October began respectively the Israeli and Anglo-French attack on Egypt. The Anglo-French collusion in the Israeli invasion upon Egypt presented situations in this new aspects. The Suez crisis began. Signs of a global conflagration lurked in the horizon.

The Soviet Union came out in support of Egypt. She threatened that she would use missiles if Britain and France did not stop aggression upon Egypt. India also criticised the Anglo-French aggression. There was also sharp reaction in Britain. Two junior ministers protested against the British move and resigned. Meanwhile there was difference between America and the Anglo-French authorities. The United Nations intervened. On November 7, a ceasefire was ordered. A group of U.N. observers was sent to the Canal area. Britain and France were forced to withdraw their troops in December. Israel withdrew from Sinai in January 1957. Her hold upon Gaza strip was given up.

The Suez Crisis had consequences of far-reaching importance. It left "an indelible mark on the course of events." So far as the Arab world was concerned the Canal question became an impetus to their solidarity. The power and prestige of Nasser increased. He became idol of Arab Nationalism. Secondly, the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East increased. Nasser was brought into a closer contact with Moscow. In 1958 he went to Russia and with the Russian help the construction of the Aswan dam was undertaken. Thirdly, the Suez Crisis strengthened anti-western feeling in Egypt and in the whole of the Arab

World. It exposed the weakness of Britain and France and showed their inability to play the traditional imperialist role by virtue of force. It also revealed the disunity in the Atlantic bloc. It could not take concerted action against Egypt. The Americans criticised the adventurist policy of the two West European powers. Eden blamed Dulles for the catastrophe.

The result of all these was that there was a shift in the American policy. The grading strength of Arab nationalism, the increasing unpopularity of the West in the Arab World and the growing influence of Soviet Russia these alarmed the Americans. They, henceforth, wanted to take more active interests in the Middle East. Out of this situation emerged the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. America sent troops to Lebanon, Britain rushed her forces to Jordan. These were some "long-term gains" from the Suez Crisis. Sir Anthony Eden writes: "Our intervention at least closed the chapter of complacency about the situation in the Middle East. It led to Eisenhower Doctrine and from that to Anglo-American intervention in the following summer in Jordan and Lebanon. It helped to show that the West was not prepared to leave the area wide open for the infiltration and subversion by others. But these were only partial gains. The uneasy equipoise still continues." The Suez Crisis had one more importance. It "furnishes the classic example of the power of the U.N, when the two Great Powers agree on a course of action."

APPENDIX—B

America and the Middle East

The Middle East is rich in oil and this has always been the centre of American and Western interests there. America had the exclusive possession of the oilfield in Saudi Arabia. They also shared on a fifty-fifty basis with the British the exploitation of the Iraqi and Kuwait fields. The United States admittedly wanted to control almost the whole of the oil resources of the Middle East. But this region was on Russia's doorstep. When the cold war came and the question of containment arose the United States wanted to draw this strategic area into its own defence system scheme. It was with this intention that the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed in 1947. The American policy-makers discussed the question of the control over the straits. Finally America undertook the military guardianship of the straits. Turkey was admitted into NATO in 1951. American arms, aid and missions flooded the country and bolstered up the economy of Turkey.

America was also interested in Iran. There the Anglo-Persian dispute had already led to the Abedan crisis. The American intervention in the crisis came in 1951 when President Truman sent his personal ambassador Harriman to find out a settlement of the problem. But Harriman's talks with Mosaddeq were ineffectual. America resorted to pressure tactics. Loans were not granted to Iran so that her losses from royalties were offset. Mosaddeq fell from power in 1953. President Eisenhower immediately rushed American aids there. 45 million dollars were granted to Iran. The condition for this was that the oil dispute had to be settled. Iran was neatly roped into the American net.

In 1955 the Baghdad Pact came into existence. Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain were its members. The United States did not join the pact although she sponsored

it. It united "the northern tier of states bordering the Soviet Union". There was of course a basic fallacy in the American approach to the problems of the Middle East. The Arabs did not want to get involved in Cold War. The American policy-makers had to face this dilemma. In 1959 Iraq withdrew from the Pact which subsequently came to be known as the CENTO. The CENTO was not effective in defending the Middle East against possible Russian aggression. John C. Campbell, a recognised authority on the Middle East, writes - "CENTO does not in fact offer the means of defending the Middle East against a major Soviet attack, by reason of the weakness of its members, particularly Iran, and because of the absence of co-operation on the part of Iraq, the lost partner, and the other Arab States."

A parallel attempt was, therefore, made by the United States to develop friendly relations with Israel. America had always been committed to the Zionist cause. When the State of Israel was established in 1948, President Truman immediately accorded recognition to it. Hitherto there was a paradox in the American approach. Israel always looked to America for political and financial support in his conflict with the Arabs. This created strong resentment among the Arabs. Faced with this the American administration had to change the pro-Israel policy of President Truman. Dulles who did not want to antagonise the Arabs declared in 1953 a policy of impartiality between the conflicting Arabs and Jews. But this policy had no appeal to the Arabs. They refused to recognise the State of Israel. The American policy of impartiality thus became useless.

1956 saw the coming of the Suez Crisis. Dulles abruptly withdrew his previous offer to give Egypt financial assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam [see Appendix A]. Britain was never consulted before this crucial decision was taken and implemented. The American policy in the Middle East was definitely at fault. Eden writes in his

memoirs: "We were sorry that the matter was carried through so abruptly, because it gave our two countries no chance to concert either timing or methods..... I would have preferred to play this long and not to have forced the issue." The breach of American pledge produced consternation in the Arab World. Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Company. Thus an injudicious move on the part of America produced a crisis of the first rate. But even a greater blunder was to follow when Britain and France attacked Egypt, America came out in sharp criticism for this adventurist policy. The international position of Britain and France was lowered. Humiliated as they were they withdrew their forces. The Atlantic Alliance received a severe setback. There was a general anti-West feeling in the Arab world. Nasser emerged as the hero of the Arab World. Egypt and Russia came close to each other because of the Russian support to the Arabs. The Russian influence permeated in the Arab world. Fleming makes the following comment on the American role in the Suez Crisis, "During the Crisis Eisenhower and Dulles laboured mightily to prevent an outbreak of fighting, and they had not succeeded. They had managed to postpone the crisis, but had not any solution. Dulles had once again proved his cleverness and agility, but he ended with the mistrust of virtually all of his allies, added to that of the neutrals and the Communist World. In the Middle East his policy lay in ruins." The most important sequel to the Suez Crisis from the American point of view is the emergence of the Eisenhower Doctrine [Add to it a brief note on the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is discussed in the following pages].

APPENDIX—C

The Eisenhower Doctrine

The Eisenhower Doctrine was promulgated on January 5, 1957. It was essentially an extension of the Truman Doctrine. In that capacity it aimed at bringing almost the whole of the Middle East under the purview of the American defence system that was to be built up in that region for the containment of communism. The Doctrine came as the direct sequel to the American failures in the Suez imbroglio. The only effect of the Doctrine was the intensification of the Cold War.

Assumptions :

The Eisenhower Doctrine was rooted in the assumption that Britain and France had become weak and could no longer play their traditional role in the Middle East. Their resources were inadequate and their policy had created confusion. Thus with the decline of the British and French influence in the Middle East, a "power vacuum" had arisen there. Unless America stepped in there the whole of the Middle East would be exposed to the communist attack. America wanted to prevent the domination of "alien forces hostile to freedom." She "does not seek either political or economic domination." Her only concern was "the increased danger of international communism." Russia's relation with Egypt and Syria and her supply of arms to these countries had opened up possibilities of serious Russian intervention in the Arab countries. In the context of this America wanted to build up a positive policy with clear aims and methods to protect the interest of many "free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation."

There were also other considerations. Nasser's victory had stimulated the militant Arab nationalism which was threatening the oil interests of the Anglo-American bloc.

But Cuba was in straits. In this critical hour Russia stepped in. Economic assistance and arms were poured into Cuba.

This led to the Cuban Crisis of October, 1962. President Kennedy imposed a naval blockade on Cuba. Its only object was to check the Russian supply of "offensive weapons" to Castro's anti-American administration in Cuba. This was in every sense a "provocative action." Russia condemned it in high terms. She sent ships to Cuba. This was branded as a challenge to America. On October, 22 Kennedy made a TV broadcast. In this broadcast he issued threats and said in explicit terms that his Government would go even risk a nuclear war to preserve the interests of the American nation. The situation was highly explosive. The Security Council met on October 23 to discuss the problem. Britain and other European Powers took no action against America. The Cuba-bound Russian vessels proceeded towards Cuba. Tensions raged all over the world; for every minute the world was leading towards a serious disaster. U. Thant appealed to Khrushchev and Kennedy to take measures that would save the situation. Kennedy was unbending and the crisis mounted high.

In this hour of grave danger Khrushchev showed his restraint. He agreed not to provide weapons to Cuba which America deemed offensive. He also stopped building sites for such weapons. Sites that were already built up were to be dismantled. Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. Thus Russia's restraint saved Cuba. The world was saved from a disaster.

APPENDIX—E

Chronological Table

- 1939—April :** Italy occupies Albania.
August : German Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.
September : Germany invades Poland.
September : Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.
- 1940—June :** Fall of Paris.
- 1941—June :** Germany invades Soviet Russia.
December : Pearl Harbour.
- 1942—January :** United Nations Declaration signed by United States, Britain, Soviet Russia and China.
- 1943—November :** Teheran Conference.
- 1944—June :** Allied landing in Normandy
August : Dumberton Oaks Conference.
- 1945—February :** Yalta Conference.
May : Germany surrenders to the Allied Powers.
June : United Nations comes into being.
July : Potsdam Conference.
August : Hiroshima tragedy.
September : Japan surrenders.
- 1946—March :** Churchill's Fulton speech and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.
June : Marshall Plan.
- 1948—March :** Brussels Pact.
June : Berlin Blockade.
- 1949—April :** Formation of NATO.
October : People's Republic of China comes into existence.
- 1950—June :** Korean war.
- 1951—April :** Abadan Crisis.
September : Japanese Peace Treaty.
- 1952—July :** Naguib captures power in Egypt.
- 1953—March :** Death of Stalin.
July : Korean armistice.

1954—January : Berlin Conference.

May : Dien Bien Phu.

July :—Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

September : SEATO comes into existence.

1955—January : Formosa Crisis.

May : Formation of the Warsaw Alliance.

1956—October : Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolt.

1957—January : Announcement of Eisenhower Doctrine.

1958—February : Merger of Egypt and Syria.

April : Accra Conference.

July : Kassem captures power in Iraq.

November : Second Berlin Crisis

1959—May , Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference.

1960—June : Addis Ababa Conference.

December : National Liberation Front of South Vietnam formed.

1961—July : Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.

November : Kennedy regime steps up military aid to Diem Government, escalation of war in Vietnam.

1962—October : Cuban Crises and Sino-Indian Border-Dispute.

China withdraws unilaterally.

1963—July : Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow.

November : Kennedy assassinated.

1964—August : Tonkin Gulf incident.

1965—September : Indo-Pakistani war.

1966—January : Taskent Declaration signed by India and Pakistan.

Bombing of North Vietnam by America resumed.

1967—June : Arab-Israel war.

APPENDIX—F

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